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Social psychologists have long explored how colorblind and multicultural ideologies may 
improve intergroup relations. Criticisms from an epistemic standpoint of mainstream social 
psychological research discuss the inconsistencies of the effects/implications of these two ideologies 
on outcomes related to intergroup relations and prejudice reduction. Criticisms from a variety of 
critical epistemic perspectives suggest that, despite their antiracist origins, both ideologies have 
become incorporated into dominant cultural formations that reproduce white normativity, reflect 
white sensibilities, and serve white power. In light of these problems, education scholars discussed a 
different ideological approach to diversity, critical multiculturalism, which recognizes the importance 
of the contribution and participation of marginalized people in social and political domains and 
challenges oppressions that are perpetuated through dominate norms. In three studies, I examine how 
critical multiculturalism is a separable construct from multiculturalism, how it differentially predicts 
issues related to social justice, and its effect on social justice policies. White participants (Studies 1 – 
3 ) responded to a diversity ideology scale that measured the extent to which they supported each of 
the diversity ideologies (Studies 1 – 2) including a general social justice policy measure (Study 1) 
and policies measures relevant to each type of ideology (Study 2). Results showed that although 
multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism were strongly positively related, critical 
multiculturalism was consistently a stronger predictor of social justice policies. Finally, participants 
read one of three diversity ideology passages (Study 3) to examine the effects of the ideologies on 
policy endorsement. Results showed little effect of the experimental manipulation on policy 
endorsement. These findings suggest that multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism may be 
variations of a single multicultural construct, but critical multiculturalism differentially and more 









































































































Rethinking Diversity Ideologies:  
Critical Multiculturalism and its Implications for Social Justice Issues 
As multicultural societies such as the United States become more diverse, it is important 
to understand how people’s cultural identities (e.g. racial, ethnic, religion, gender etc.) shape the 
ways they live, learn, and work together in integrated settings (Plaut, 2010; Zirkel, 2008). Within 
social psychology, conflict and cooperation between people with different cultural identities has 
been the subject of a research area called intergroup relations (Allport, 1954; Sherif, 1966; Tajfel 
& Turner, 1986). Resonating with atomistic or ontological individualist constructions of person 
and society more generally, social psychological research on intergroup relations has focused on 
the mental habits of individuals—stereotypical beliefs and prejudiced affect of both consciously 
endorsed and less consciously embodied varieties—as the proximal drivers of intergroup 
conflict. Accordingly, efforts to improve intergroup relations have focused on reduction of 
individual propensities for prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination (Dovidio & Gaertner, 
1998; Fiske, Xu, Cuddy, & Glick, 1999).  
Mainstream social discourse and research in social psychology have focused on two 
general types of diversity ideologies: colorblindness and multiculturalism (Apfelbaum, Pauker, 
Sommers, & Ambady, 2010; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Wolsko, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 
2000; Wolsko, Park, & Judd, 2006). I use the term ideology when referring to different types of 
diversity because in contrast to the emphasis in hegemonic psychological science on inherent 
propensities of individuals as the source of action and experience, a cultural psychology 
perspective directs attention to the ecologically inscribed structures of “mind in context” 
(Adams, Salter, Pickett, Kurtis, & Phillips, 2010) that both reflect and constitute individual 
propensities. This perspective extends consideration beyond individual beliefs to the cultural 
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ideologies—which I define generally as beliefs inscribed in the practices and institutions that 
structure social interaction—for managing diversity in multicultural societies. Colorblind 
ideology suggests that societies can best promote intergroup harmony and social justice by 
deemphasizing group membership (Wolsko et al., 2000). Multicultural ideology suggests that 
societies can best promote intergroup harmony and social justice by recognizing and appreciating 
group categories (Wolsko, et al., 2000).  
Critics have discussed weaknesses of both ideologies. Criticisms from an epistemic 
standpoint of mainstream social psychology focus mainly on inconsistency of research that 
investigates the effects/implications of these ideologies on/for outcomes related to intergroup 
relations. More important for present purposes are criticisms from a variety of critical epistemic 
perspectives that interrogate the White racial standpoint of mainstream or hegemonic knowledge 
foundations. These perspectives suggest that, despite their apparent differences and antiracist 
origins, both ideologies have become incorporated into dominant cultural formations that 
reproduce white normativity – the ideas and practices that make whiteness appear to be the 
standard set of social norms – reflect white sensibilities, and serve white power. 
In light of the problems of mainstream diversity ideologies, education scholars identified 
a different ideological approach to diversity that I will call critical multiculturalism (May, 1999; 
May & Sleeter, 2010; McLaren, 1995). Critical multiculturalism recognizes the importance of 
the contribution and participation of marginalized people in social and political domains and 
challenges oppressions that are perpetuated through dominant social norms. I refer to the 
perspective as critical multiculturalism because, like hegemonic multiculturalism, it celebrates 
and recognizes the differences between cultural groups. I refer to the perspective as critical 
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multiculturalism because, unlike hegemonic incorporations or appropriations of multiculturalism, 
its goal is to radically disrupt the hegemonic social order of white normativity.  
 The current research examines whether critical multiculturalism is a separable ideology from 
multiculturalism or a different manifestation of a multicultural construct. It also considers how 
critical multiculturalism relates to and affects different policy endorsement. In what follows, I 
provide a critical overview of research on diversity ideologies in mainstream social psychology 
(see Table 1 for a summary of each ideology). First, I will discuss colorblind and multicultural 
ideologies for improving intergroup relations by reviewing relevant theoretical and empirical 
work. The overview will focus on associations of these diversity ideologies with racial and 
ethnic intergroup relations as the majority of the empirical work has focused on race and 
ethnicity group memberships as opposed to other group memberships. Next, I will review origins 
and implications of critical multiculturalism as a tool for intergroup relations. I regard critical 
multiculturalism not just as another diversity ideology but instead as an “Other” diversity 
ideology. Resonating with decolonial perspectives of cultural psychology (see Adams, Dobles, 
Gomez, Kurtis, & Molina, 2015) and critical race theory (see Crenshaw, Gotanda, Peller, & 
Thomas, 1995) this diversity ideology has its foundations in the critical consciousness of and 
experiences of subordinated group members. It applies this consciousness as a resource to 
challenge knowledge forms that perpetuate normative standards that support systems of 
oppression. I then report three studies that examined whether multiculturalism and critical 
multiculturalism are separable constructs, whether the three diversity ideologies show different 
patterns of relationships with theoretically important variables (e.g. identification and policy), 
and how the ideologies effect policy endorsement. I end with implications and future directions 




Colorblindness is a model of diversity that deemphasizes and minimizes the significance 
of racial group distinctiveness and membership (Apfelbaum, et al., 2010, Plaut, 2010, Rattan & 
Ambady, 2013, Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004). This ideology was prominent during the civil 
rights movement, anti-racist movements, and dismantling of Jim Crow laws and emerged in the 
U.S. (Ansell, 2013) as an antidote to the practices of segregation and discrimination. Advocates 
of colorblindness supported Martin Luther King Jr’s (1963) sentiments that people should be 
judged “by the content of their character” (p. 5) and not by their racial identity. Thus, notions of 
separate but equal were no longer viable, and proponents proposed colorblind society as a means 
to protect equal opportunity for all individuals regardless of race (Ansell, 2013).  
Besides the United States, another context where colorblind ideology is influential is 
France. French governments have coped with increasing cultural diversity by establishing public 
policies and laws that deemphasize treatment on the basis of racial or ethnic category and even 
outlaw the classification of citizens by ethnic characteristics and identities in official statistical 
data (Lieberman, 2001).  From this perspective, actions that emphasize or engage people in terms 
of racial, religious, or ethnic identities are fundamentally problematic to the extent that they 
degrade the ideal of egalite, fraternite, and universal rights that all people possess as individual 
citizens (Lieberman, 2001). In this context, colorblindness affords support for individual rights 
and discourages public recognition of difference in favor of a common cultural and assimilative 
identity.  
Organizations that adopt colorblind ideologies have emphasized equal treatment of 
people on the basis of individual characteristics and merit regardless of racial identities (Banks, 
2004). One reason that proponents have advocated this ideology is their belief that attention to 
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social identities is divisive (Jansen, Vos, Otten, Podsiadlowski, & van der Zee, 2016; Richeson 
& Nussbaum, 2004). Another reason that proponents have advocated colorblind ideology is the 
belief that fair distribution of benefits (e.g. university admission, employment, promotion) 
should be based on relevant personal qualifications (e.g., ability) rather than considerations of 
collective identity. Related to this, yet another reason proponents have advocated colorblind 
ideology is the concern that any special treatment based on racial identity was inherently 
discriminatory (Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 1978). 
The idea that social categorization is productive of intergroup conflict is not limited to 
social discourse outside of the academy, but also has informed mainstream approaches to 
intergroup relations in hegemonic psychological science. One thread of research on intergroup 
relations within the U.S. has been a social cognition perspective that emphasizes how 
categorization promotes intergroup conflict by facilitating the operation of stereotypes and 
prejudice (see, Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Park & Judd, 2005, for reviews; Wilder, 1981). Given 
this construction of the problem, researchers have investigated decategorization strategies 
designed to improve intergroup relations. According to the decategorization model, encouraging 
members of different groups to view one another as individuals and not as members of a 
collective group eliminates the functional utility of the category itself (Bettencourt, Brewer, 
Croak, & Miller, 1992; Brewer & Miller, 1984; Wilder, 1981) and leads to a reduction in 
negative intergroup attitudes.  In general, researchers of this strategy argued that decategorization 
through a process of personalization will create more inclusive and expansive group boundaries 
resulting in cooperative interactions with outgroup members (Brewer & Miller, 1984). Research 
suggests that when contact situations were person focused (rather than task focused) and 
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permitted personalized interactions, participants reported more positive attitudes toward the 
outgroup members in the contact situations (Bettencourt et al., 1992).  
Researchers of decategorization strategies argue that, on a psychological level, 
categorization is a basic tool for which we organize the world and it is unlikely that people will 
not go through this process (Park & Judd, 2003). Brewer (1988) found that people automatically 
utilize three elements (e.g. age, gender, and race) to rapidly categorize and this type of reaction is 
difficult to suppress, therefore, suggesting that it may not be feasible for people to ignore distinct 
group identities.  
In contrast to decategorization strategies that focus on psychological elimination of 
categories all together, recategorization strategies attempt to undermine problematic intergroup 
categorization through unification or establishing a common ingroup identity (see Gaertner & 
Dovidio, 2000). Specifically, recategorization strategies stresses redrawing social group 
boundaries so that, psychologically, people see themselves as members of a larger groups rather 
than of distinct categories (Park & Judd, 2005). Here the emphasis is on shared communities 
which will unite individuals and decrease bias towards outgroup members by establishing them 
as ingroup members. Thus, the common ingroup identity model argues that members of separate 
groups can come together and see themselves as members of the same group through cooperative 
interdependence (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), eliminating former distinctions that divided them.  
Critics of recategorization strategies argued that successfully establishing a superordinate 
identity is difficult to sustain. Hewstone (1996) proposed that interventions to create a 
superordinate identity are unlikely strong enough to overcome the process of ethnic and racial 
categorization.  Theoretically, Brewer (1991, 1997) proposed the optimal distinctiveness theory 
which suggests that people have competing motives for assimilation – a desire for belonging to 
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social groups – and differentiation – an opposition to the need for immersion in social groups. 
People will identify with social groups that help them achieve a balance between the needs for 
both inclusion and differentiation simultaneously. When situations of imbalance are experienced 
by a person (e.g. situations that produce feelings of deindividuation) it threatens their need for 
distinctiveness, resulting in them reestablishing distinctive subgroup identities.  
A critique of both strategies is that abstraction (e.g. decategorization) or unification (e.g. 
recategorization) is not so positionless or culture-neutral; instead, it involves the imposition of 
default norms of whiteness. This imposition is reminiscent of work on assimilation which argues 
that member of marginalized groups should give up their own identities and cultures and adopt 
the dominant groups’ identity and culture (also referred to as minority group assimilation, see 
Hornsey & Hogg, 2000b; Whitley & Webster, 2018). However, empirical evidence suggests that 
colorblindness and assimilation are distinct ideologies and unrelated (Purdie-Vaughns, Steele, 
Davies, Ditlmann, & Crosby, 2008; Whitley & Webster, 2018). For example, a recent meta-
analysis found that scores on measures of support for assimilation and colorblind ideology were 
not correlated, g = −0.18, p = .21, r.= –.09 (Whitley & Webster, 2018). Theorists who distinguish 
between these ideologies propose that assimilation entails eliminating group differences by 
requiring marginalized group members to abandon their distinct group memberships and adopt 
the dominant group’s culture (Levin et al., 2012; Verkuyten, 2005; Whitely & Webster, 2018). In 
contrast, colorblind ideology does not require that people from marginalized groups abandon 
their own culture for the dominant culture but merely suggests that people should ignore cultural 
identity when making decisions about evaluations or outcomes. This ideology has an egalitarian 
focus because it emphasizes ways to avoid discrimination and promote equality (Knowles, 
Lowery, Hogan, & Chow, 2009); however, colorblind ideology is not without critics.  
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Problems with Colorblindness 
White normativity. One of the main criticisms of colorblindness is that it preserves 
white normativity—again, the elevation of White cultural patterns as the norms and practices for 
defining the socially expected or “neutral” range of human attributes and behavior (Bell & 
Hartmann, 2007; Bonilla-Silva, 2018; Morris, 2006; Ward, 2008). The basic principle of white 
normativity is that tendencies of White people are the “natural” baseline against which to 
evaluate other cultural practices. An alternative conception of white normativity is that White 
people are people and individuals of other social groups are people to the extent that they are 
similar to White people (Morris, 2006). Research indicates that people associate being American 
with being White (Devos & Banaji, 2005). When people imagine the unmarked category 
American, the default features of the category prototype are tendencies of White people. 
Critiques suggest that calls to ignore racial identity do not lead to race-neutral evaluation or 
perception, but instead instantiate or elevate particular (White) tendencies as something akin to a 
“just-natural” standard—a standard against which cultural difference becomes deviance or 
abnormality. One of the consequences of white normativity is to preserve a racial structure in 
which Whites occupy unquestioned positions of power and privilege. 
In this attempt to preserve white normativity, Blake, Ioanide & Reed (2019) discuss how 
current rhetoric about race claims to embrace racial equality and diversity, while upholding racial 
violence and discrimination. The researchers described that within the political spectrum, 
individuals tend to misuse critical language about the relationship between race and power to 
counter liberation movements. For example, public school officials in Arizona invoked Martin 
Luther King Jr to argue against ethnic studies courses and praise support for colorblind 
ideologies. Public school officials appropriated Dr. King’s vision of a colorblind society to deny 
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group-based discrimination, thus, neutralizing Dr. King’s radical vision of racial justice, 
suggesting that a focus on ethnic studies in education would instead lead to resegregation. They 
argued that they instead were the ones who strived to protect the civil rights of marginalized 
students by opposing racial specific curriculum. This example shows how colorblind rhetoric is 
co-opted to legitimize white domination of epistemologies, methods, and histories, while 
sanitizing radical platforms challenging racism and racial power to argue that colorblind 
ideology is the better solution for systemic racism.   
The previous discussion suggests that white normativity results from the exercise of 
racial power. Because White people occupy positions of cultural dominance, their ways of being 
and knowing acquire the status of unmarked standard. Some research suggests that White people 
are motivated to maintain their dominant group status and, therefore, have a general preference 
for inequality (e.g., Knowles et al., 2009; Plaut, Thomas, & Goren, 2009). Research has 
highlighted that one way to maintain their position as members of the advantaged group was to 
focus on commonalities between themselves and those in disadvantaged groups as to blur and 
deny the power differential that exists between them (Saguy, Dividio, Pratto, 2008).  
Colorblind racism. Given these consequences of colorblind ideology for preservation of 
the status quo, it is perhaps not surprising that endorsement of colorblind ideology tends to be 
stronger among White people than among people from marginalized racial groups (Apfelbaum, 
Grunber, Halevy, Kang, 2017; Knowles, et al., 2009; Neville, Lilly, Duran, Lee, & Browne, 
2000; Ryan, Hunt, Weible, Peterson, & Casas, 2007). One reason why there are group 
differences in the endorsement of colorblindness is white ignorance. Mills (2007) discussed the 
concept of white ignorance and argued that White people do not have to learn about their own 
positionality or about the inequitable disparities that various cultural groups experience because 
10 
 
their privilege insulates them from all responsibility for the consequences. He explained that this 
process of ignorance is not passive, or a simple lack of knowledge on the part of White people, 
but rather a deliberate tactic which extends white supremacy into a culture of (non)knowledge, 
which infiltrates not only at an individual level but also at a systemic level. One main criticism of 
endorsing colorblind ideology is that it becomes a way for White people to deny that racism 
exists because white ignorance affords them to ignore differential outcomes between dominant 
and marginalized groups, or at the very least minimize the negative implications of the outcomes. 
The second main criticism of colorblind ideology is that it may produce a lack of 
awareness of the roles that race and racism play in society. Indeed, Bonilla-Silva (2017) suggests 
that present advocates of colorblind ideology deploy it more as a means to maintain rather than 
undermine social inequalities (e.g. racism). The failure to acknowledge racial and other identity 
differences allows people to ignore manifestations of persistent racism.  
Bonilla-Silva identifies four central frames of colorblind racism: abstract liberalism, 
naturalization, cultural racism, and minimization of racism. Abstract liberalism includes notions 
of both political liberalism (e.g. equal opportunity) and economic liberalism (e.g. individualism 
and choice). The thinking goes that because equal opportunity is available to all, any inequalities 
experienced by a group is because of their own choice. Naturalization is a frame that allows 
White people to explain away racism by saying inequalities are natural occurrences. For 
example, Whites can explain structural segregation as the product of natural preferences for 
people to seek affiliation with (racially) similar others. Cultural racism is the use of culturally-
based explanations for the apparent failure of marginalized groups to overcome obstacles or 
current standings in life. An example would be the belief or assertion that people from 
marginalized groups are overrepresented in social welfare programs and public assistance 
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programs because they lack cultural values of hard work or self-control (e.g., “they are too 
lazy”). Lastly, minimization of racism is a frame that suggests racism is no longer the main 
problem for marginalized group members because it is better than it was in the past. This frame 
also involves regarding any discrimination as affecting all races (e.g. sentiments of “All Lives 
Matter” in response to the “Black Lives Matter” movement).   
Although all four of Bonilla-Silva’s (2017) frames of colorblind racism are important, I 
will emphasize abstract liberalism. This frame operates under notions of liberalism – a political 
doctrine based on equal opportunity, individualism, egalitarianism, and free-choice. By framing 
social issues under these components of liberalism, White people can appear reasonable and even 
moral while opposing policies designed to reduce social inequalities. Another way to frame this 
is the notion that colorblind ideology has ego-protective features (Plaut, Thomas, Hurd, & 
Romano, 2018). Adopting colorblindness allows the dominant group, who is likely to perpetuate 
racism, to maintain egalitarian self-images because it allows them to self-present as 
nonprejudiced. For example, by evoking the principle of equal opportunity, people from 
dominant social groups oppose policies such as affirmative action because they claim such 
policies represent preferential treatment of some groups over others. This can affirm their 
perception that policies such as affirmative action are contradictory to the principle of equal 
opportunity for all. However, this argument and justification abstract the notion of opportunity 
from history, focus it on the present, and ignore the longstanding racism that denies people from 
marginalized groups equal opportunity in a larger sense. Alternatively stated, this convenient 
philosophy ignores the facts that subordinate groups are underrepresented in good jobs, schools, 
and universities and is an “abstract utilization of the ideal ‘equal opportunity” (Bonilla-Silva, 
2017, p. 56). Thus, a colorblind ideology may provide justification to dismiss poor race relations 
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and social inequalities (Bonilla-Silva, 2017; Richeson and Nussbaum, 2004; Schofield, 2010; 
Wolsko et al., 2000) simply by arguing that ideals of liberalism would be violated.   
Evidence for the idea that colorblind ideology serves as a mechanism for denial of racism 
comes from research on the Color-Blind Racial Attitudes Scale (see Neville et al., 2000). 
Researchers developed this scale to measure the extent to which people deny the existence of 
white privilege, institutional discrimination, and the possibility that racism remains a problem. 
Some examples of items include, “White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of 
the color of their skin,” “Social policies, such as affirmative action, discriminate unfairly against 
white people,” and “Racism may have been a problem in the past, it is not an important problem 
today,” (p. 62). People who score high on this measure demonstrated less awareness of white 
privilege, implying that they held more distorted views of institutional forms of racism and race 
relations more generally. A likely motivation for this avoidance of race is defense against 
charges of racial bias. However, the consequence is that White people fail to recognize an 
important force that structures everyday life in the United States. 
Instead of reducing discrimination, colorblind ideology may further perpetuate the 
inability to recognize discrimination. In another study, Rattan & Ambady (2013) found that 
children who were taught about colorblindness were less likely to recognize clear cases of bias 
and discrimination. Further, teachers working in a school setting that endorses colorblind policies 
were less likely to acknowledge race-related problems between students, minimized the disparate 
suspension rates for Black students, and failed to include academic material that reflects the 
diversity of students in the in classroom (Schofield, 2010). This research suggests that de-
emphasizing group memberships within the schools may cause teachers to overlook inequalities 
between groups and neglect to implement programs to advance students’ academic success. In 
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sum, colorblind ideology may afford denial of racism and undermine support for policies to 
eliminate racial discriminate—it is difficult to motivate people to support policies designed to 
alleviate a problem that doesn’t exist—rather than improving intergroup race relations or social 
justice. 
Multiculturalism 
As a remedy to the shortcomings of colorblind ideology, civil rights activists in law and 
education articulated ideologies of multiculturalism (Berry, 1984; Plaut, Cheryan, & Stevens, 
2015). Within education, a major goal of multiculturalism was to reform institutions so that they 
better reflected the cultural diversity of U.S. society (Banks, 2004; Banks & Banks, 2004). Banks 
(1993, 2004) explained that another goal was to bring about structural and systemic changes in 
the school system to increase educational equality for marginalized students. To achieve this 
goal, multicultural educationists were influenced by earlier ethnic studies movements which 
demanded the incorporation of marginalized people’s history, cultures, and voices into the 
curricula and structures of schools, colleges, and universities (see, Banks 1993 for a history of 
ethnic studies and its influence on multicultural education). Thus, education scholars used 
multiculturalism to disrupt the hegemonic structures and overemphasis of the dominant culture. 
Some scholars describe multiculturalism as “a moral movement” (Fowers & Richardson, 1996, 
p.609) intended to gain rights and equality for marginalized groups as well as to reduce 
intergroup conflict and prejudice. 
In contrast to colorblindness, multiculturalism suggests that people should not only 
acknowledge and recognize distinct cultural group origins (Benet-Martinez, 2012; Plaut 2010; 
Rattan & Ambady, 2013), but also value and respect them (Berry, 1984; Fowers & Richardson, 
1996; Huo & Molina, 2006; Park & Judd, 2005; Rattan & Ambady, 2013). Generally, scholars 
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suggest that multicultural ideology yields positive outcomes for members of both dominant and 
marginalized groups.  
With respect to people from dominant groups, scholars argued that attention to racial and 
ethnic differences associated with multiculturalism will promote more inclusive attitudes (Berry 
& Kalin, 1995). Thus, thinking about cultural difference may increase commitment to tolerance 
and equality among people from dominant groups (Morrison, Plaut, & Ybarra, 2010). Similarly, 
engagement with multicultural institutions enables people to gain more knowledge about cultural 
patterns different from their own (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000a; Rosenthal & Levy, 2010). In turn, 
such knowledge can reduce prejudice as people learn that cultural others are similar to 
themselves.   
Among people from marginalized groups, emphasizing and celebrating cultural 
differences associated with multicultural ideology can promote cultural identification and its 
positive effects, including psychological well-being (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999) and 
positive self-worth (Benet-Martinez, 2012). One important benefit of multiculturalism for 
marginalized groups is that it is identity supporting (Verkuyten, 2007). That is, multiculturalism 
offers marginalized groups the possibility to maintain their own ethnic identity and culture. 
Researchers have documented evidence for this argument in domains of education (Banks, 2004; 
Sleeter & Grant, 2009), corporate organizations (Plaut, et al., 2009) and counseling (Sue & Sue, 
2012).  
Multiculturalism emerged as a result of activism by people from marginalized racial and 
ethnic groups who were opposed to the assimilationist pressures and white normativity of 
colorblind ideology. Similar processes were evident in academic social psychology, particularly 
in its hegemonic North American articulations. Conventional work in social psychology 
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portrayed the self in individualist fashion as distinctly separate from the collective. It often 
regarded social influence as a problematic force that compromised individual behavior (e.g. 
conformity, obedience, diffusion of responsibility, etc.; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Myers, 1993) 
and prescribed individuation as a remedy to such group mentality. As multicultural ideology 
gained force in broader society, it informed several responses to this “collective fear of the 
collective” (Markus & Kitayama, 1991) in hegemonic articulations of (North American) social 
psychology.   
Association of Black Psychologists 
A primary source of multicultural resistance to the colorblind white normativity of 
mainstream (social) psychology has been the work of psychologists from marginalized cultural 
groups associated with the Society for the Psychological Study of Culture, Ethnicity, and Race 
(Division 45 of the American Psychological Association). Some of the earliest and most forceful 
articulations of this perspective came from the members of the Association of Black 
Psychologists who advocated for the discontinuation of psychological testing (e.g. intelligence 
testing; Cleary, Humphreys, Kendrick, & Wesman, 1975; Jackson, 1975). They argued that these 
psychological tests were not objective or neutral measures of individual differences but instead 
were oppressive practices meant to prevent Blacks from gaining equal and fair access to 
educational and employment opportunities. This resistance by Black psychologists illuminated 
the white normativity within mainstream psychology and demonstrated the need to focus on 
studying the psychological effects of the collective rather than individual.  
The idea that people are group members not individuals separate from society is further 
supported by the formal emergence of ethnic minority (and other marginalized groups’) 
psychologies within the psychological literature. Marginalized groups in the U.S. do not 
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conceptualize their identity and psychological experience in the same way as the dominant group 
(Russo & Vaz, 2001; Tomes, 2018). As such, each marginalized group experiences a unique 
psychological consequence as a result of being, for example, Black, Latinx, Asian, LGBTQ, 
women, among others (e.g., see Baldwin, 1986 for Black psychology; see Padilla & Olmedo, 
2009 for an overview of Latinx psychology; see Chrisler, Golden, & Rozee, 2008). Thus, the 
importance of the study of specific social groups emerged within academic scholarship to be 
more contextually responsive to the lived experiences of these various marginalized cultures. 
Social Identity Theory 
Another source of multicultural sensibilities in social psychology was social identity 
theory. In contrast to the idea of collective influence as a problematic force, researchers of social 
identity theory argued that collective identification was necessary and beneficial, especially for 
people from marginalized groups. In their discussion of social groups, Tajfel and Turner (1979) 
suggested that individuals identify with social groups as a way to systematize the social world, 
and create and orient the individual’s place in society. Social groups, therefore, provide members 
with a way to identify themselves in the social context. In addition, this social identification with 
a group helps to maintain and enhance people’s self-esteem and provides a sense of 
distinctiveness from relative outgroups. Thus, not only is identifying with social groups inherent 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979), but identifying with marginalized identities can buffer wellbeing when 
it is threatened (e.g., perceived discrimination; Branscombe et al., 1999; Schmitt, Branscombe, 
Postmes, & Garcia, 2014) and motivate collective action. This theory assumed a dynamic 
interaction between psychological processes and the social context (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). 
Thus, it considered the importance of collective realities and understood that people are situated 
culturally and collectively as group members not individuals separate from society.   
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Cultural Psychology  
A third intellectual site in which the influence of multicultural ideology is evident is 
cultural psychology (see Adams, 2012; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Shweder, 1990). Scholars 
working in this perspective emphasized the mutual constitution of psyche and culture, arguing 
that one cannot understand person abstracted from context. These researchers further emphasized 
the positive effects of collective identities and recognized that the self is interdependent with the 
collective and is therefore inherently an integral part of the collective (Markus & Kitayama, 
1991). A key feature of this interdependence is an awareness of the other, and of the relationship 
and mutuality with the other. Thus, this perspective helped scientists not only investigate how a 
person is distinct from groups but also how he or she related to the collective.  Importantly, 
cultural psychology revealed that people’s experiences are not independent of culture but that 
basic psychological processes are cultural and, therefore, psychology must attend to the cultural 
positioning of both researcher and researched.  
These perspectives emphasis the fundamental role of collective identity in psychological 
experiences and processes. Psychological research has long included frameworks that have 
helped scientists to not only investigate how a person is distinct from groups but also how he or 
she relates with collectives. This emphasis on providing knowledge and understanding of 
marginalized groups validates their voice and unique challenges, which supports the principle 







Effectiveness of Diversity Ideologies for Improving Intergroup Attitudes  
Although supporters of multiculturalism argue that this ideology improves intergroup 
relations and reduces prejudice better than colorblind ideology, empirical evidence to support 
this argument is mixed. Whitley and Webster (2018) explained in their meta-analysis that 
experimental studies that investigated the effects of multiculturalism on prejudice included either 
abstract or concrete primes to manipulate multicultural ideology (see Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 
2014). Abstract primes discuss multiculturalism in terms of positive outcomes (e.g. promoting 
harmony among different cultural groups; Whitley & Webster, 2018). Concrete primes discuss 
multiculturalism in terms of societal outcomes (e.g. supporting ethnic groups to maintain their 
distinct identities at work, school, etc.). Because concrete primes discuss multiculturalism in 
ways that challenge the social order, Whitley and Webster (2018) hypothesized that priming 
multiculturalism in concrete terms would lead to higher prejudice, whereas abstract primes 
would lead to lower prejudice relative to a control condition. The results of their meta-analysis 
supported their hypotheses. Specifically, concrete primes used in experimental studies produced 
higher self-reports of prejudice than a control condition, g. = 0.20, p < .05, r. = .10, whereas 
abstract primes produced marginally lower self-reports of prejudice than a control condition, g. = 
−0.07, p = .08, r. = –.05, χ2(1) = 9.37, p = .002. These mixed results indicate that although 
multiculturalism manipulations may lower explicit prejudice, the effects are dependent on the 
type of multicultural message (abstract versus concrete) that is made salient to participants. 
Specifically, it appears that positive messages of multiculturalism are more likely to reduce 
prejudice than messages that promote changing societal outcomes.  
In another series of studies (Wolsko et al., 2000), researchers primed participants to think 
about colorblindness or multiculturalism (versus a control condition), and then asked them to 
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report stereotypes about and attitudes toward Black targets. Overall, colorblind and multicultural 
ideology primes led participants to express less race bias compared to the control group, but 
colorblindness led to more ethnocentrism – evaluating other groups based on the standards of the 
ingroup – than did multiculturalism. Additionally, multiculturalism encouraged more 
stereotyping but less prejudice towards Black targets than both the colorblind ideology and the 
control conditions. Extending this research, Richeson and Naussbaum (2004) found that both 
explicit and implicit forms of pro-White bias were lower after researchers primed participants 
with multicultural ideology than after priming with colorblind ideology.  
Evidence suggests that perception of intergroup conflict moderates the effect of diversity 
ideologies on prejudice. Correll, Park, and Allegra Smith (2008) extended earlier work 
(Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Wolsko et al., 2000) by manipulating perceptions of intergroup 
conflict. When researchers portrayed conflict as low, the colorblind and multiculturalism 
conditions did not differ from one another. When researchers portrayed conflict as high, 
participants exposed to a multicultural ideology treatment exhibited greater explicit prejudice 
than did participants in a colorblind ideology condition. However, this pattern was evident only 
immediately after the conflict reminder. After an additional 20-minute time lapse, participants in 
the colorblind condition showed greater implicit prejudice than did participants in the 
multicultural condition. The findings suggest that colorblind ideology can afford suppression of 
prejudiced attitudes immediately after reminders about high intergroup conflict, but does not 
prevent later expression of prejudiced attitudes. One interpretation of this study is that 
multiculturalism may produce conflict for people in the present but it may reshape their affect in 
the long term, whereas colorblindness provides people a way to suppress expressions of 
prejudice in the short term that will resurface later.  
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The studies I discussed in the preceding paragraphs conform to standard tendencies in the 
field of social psychology to emphasize prejudice (reduction) as an outcome of interest. Rather 
than measuring prejudice as an outcome, Vorauer and Sasaki (2010) investigated prejudice as a 
moderator of the effects of diversity ideologies on perceptions of Aboriginal Canadians. Using 
similar primes and methods as the previous studies, they found that diversity ideologies had 
differing effects based on the participant’s level of prejudice. Specifically, colorblind ideology 
had negative effects on feelings of warmth toward Aboriginal Canadian outgroup members 
across all participants (no moderation of prejudice level). Multiculturalism (compared to 
colorblindness) led participants to believe that there were greater differences between themselves 
and Aboriginal Canadians. Additionally, multiculturalism had positive effects for participants 
low in prejudice who reported greater feels of warmth toward and perceived similarity with the 
outgroup members, however, it had negative effects for participants high in prejudice who 
reported less feelings of warmth toward and greater perceived cultural differences between 
themselves and the outgroup members. Overall, these patterns suggest that exposure to 
multicultural ideology may have some positive effects but only among people with low prejudice 
towards outgroup members and may lead to more bias for those with high prejudice.  
There is also some evidence to suggest that diversity ideologies have differential effects 
on people from dominant and marginalized groups. For example, one study (Wolsko, et al., 
2006) found that endorsement of multiculturalism was associated with less ingroup bias among 
White participants, but was associated with more ingroup bias among participants from 
marginalized racial minority groups (African American, Asian American, and Latinx American 
participants). The opposite patterns emerged for endorsement of colorblind ideology: positively 
associated with ingroup bias among White participants, but negatively associated with ingroup 
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bias among participants from marginalized groups. These results suggest that, for White 
participants, embracing colorblind ideology amounts to endorsing white normativity and more 
positive sentiments towards White members. For participants from marginalized groups, 
endorsement of colorblind ideology requires giving up allegiance with and deriving less positive 
regard for their cultural background. In order for Whites to endorse multiculturalism it may 
require some commitment to relinquish their positions of power within a white normative center.  
Other research showed that people in dominant groups feel threatened by 
multiculturalism (Ginges & Cairns, 2000; Morrison et al, 2010; Verkuyten, 2005) and perceive it 
as exclusionary (Plaut, Garnett, Buffardi, & Sanchez-Burks., 2011; Rattan & Ambady, 2013). 
For example, Morrison and colleagues (2010) found that highly identified White participants 
reported higher levels of social dominance orientation (SDO) after being primed with 
multiculturalism than with colorblind ideology. Less identified White participants reported lower 
levels of SDO following the multiculturalism prime. Another study (Plaut et al., 2011) used an 
implicit association task (IAT) to test the association between multiculturalism and colorblind 
ideologies with inclusion and exclusion among White participants. They found that participants 
implicitly associated multiculturalism with exclusion rather than inclusion. However, this 
association was not present when the multicultural information explicitly included Whites. Thus, 
when presented with a type of all-inclusive multiculturalism in which they perceived their group 
to be included, Whites were more likely to endorse multiculturalism (Plaut et al., 2011).  
It appears that the original goals of multiculturalism (e.g. improvement of intergroup 
attitudes and structural changes to gain equality for marginalized groups) took on many forms to 
make it more palatable to dominant sensibilities. For example, Whites often report feeling 
threatened and excluded when asked to evaluate or when exposed to multiculturalism. However, 
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these feelings of threat and exclusion may be a result of Whites not willing to give up the power 
associated with their membership in the dominant group. A reshaping of what constitutes valued 
knowledge and consciousness disrupts dominant cultural norms and is often perceived as a zero-
sum game--a gain for the subordinate group directly means a loss for the dominant group (Jones 
& Dovidio, 2018; Norton & Sommers, 2011). A consequence of adjusting multiculturalism to fit 
dominant sensibilities is that Whites tend to define multiculturalism “safely” in a domesticated 
fashion as superficial embrace of other cultures: attending occasional food festivals, sampling 
different cultural traditions, and even recognizing cultural achievements. However, they resist 
embedding various cultural traditions into mainstream cultural institutions (e.g., the use of 
Spanish in public schools), especially if they pose a challenge to dominant culture (Plaut, 2010). 
This adjusted version of a safe multiculturalism may lead to the recognition and tolerance of 
cultural diversity but it fails to establish marginalized knowledge and experiences to address 
social inequalities as well as dismantle white hegemonic power inequities. 
This overview of empirical evidence suggests the effects of diversity ideologies on 
improving intergroup attitudes are variable. One reason for this variability may be because the 
measures of the ideologies used in research are multifaceted constructs that are conceptually 
capturing different components of the ideology (Whitley & Webster, 2018). For example, 
Rosenthal and Levy (2010) suggest that multicultural ideologies are composed of various forms 
(e.g. acknowledgement of group differences and belief that groups should maintain their own 
cultures and traditions), each of which may be discussed in either concrete or abstract terms 
(Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014). To better understand the relationship between 
multiculturalism and outcomes such as prejudice reduction, it is important to identify the 
separate facets and examine how they relate to outcomes of interest. These facets of 
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multiculturalism may influence outcomes differently in isolation than when incorporated 
together.  
Another important manifestation of this inconsistency is that multicultural ideology 
appears to have different implications for people from marginalized and dominant groups. 
Among people from marginalized groups, it appears that multiculturalism may result in higher 
levels of ingroup bias. From the perspective of marginalized groups, this result may not be seen 
as a negative consequence because identifying with one’s ethnic ingroup also leads to positive 
in-group evaluation (Verkuyten, 2005). Among people from dominant groups, it appears that 
multiculturalism may elicit feelings of threat and exclusion which may lead White people not to 
endorse multiculturalism (Plaut et al., 2011). These differential effects suggest that conventional 
articulations of multiculturalism may not productively address improvements to intergroup 
relations.  
Criticisms of Multiculturalism  
Criticisms from mainstream epistemic perspectives of multiculturalism. A central 
criticism of multicultural ideology from mainstream epistemic perspectives is that it promotes 
separatism and balkanization. For example, critics of multiculturalism argue that increasing 
recognition of various ethnic, cultural, gender, or religious identities is inherently destabilizing to 
the common bond of nationhood (May, 1999; Lieberman & Goucher, 1999). Brewer (1997) 
suggested that multiculturalism can lead to reified group distinctions that result in conflict. 
Similarly, Fowers and Richardson (1996), and Schlesinger (1992), contend that multiculturalism 
may result in balkanization of previously harmonious groups because the boundaries between 
them have become vaster and overly distinct, resulting in unnecessary division and separatism.  
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Critics of multicultural ideology also have expressed concern that it can promote cultural 
relativism (Fowers & Richardson, 1996). From this perspective, the mandate to respect, 
celebrate, and value different cultural groups is problematic to the extent that it requires that one 
extend such respect and honor to morally reprehensible practices and groups (e.g. Nazis). They 
also explained that at times there may be differences in moral perspectives across cultural groups 
that are too reprehensible to tolerate or respect.   
A final criticism from mainstream epistemic perspectives is the concern that multicultural 
ideology promotes devaluation and resentment of dominant cultural groups and their associated 
cultural patterns. For example, Fowers and Richardson (1996) argue that multiculturalism fails to 
give the same respect and value to White people that it demands for people from marginalized 
groups. Similarly, if multicultural education reminds people about histories of racialized colonial 
violence at the center of modern societies, then it may lead to anger toward people in dominant 
cultural groups who maintain the status quo. Accordingly, multicultural ideology—especially 
more critical versions that that draw attention to histories of colonial violence and present 
hegemonic power relations—is likely to prompt mutual resentment. In other words, this suggests 
that multicultural ideology fails to reduce intergroup tensions.  
Criticism from marginalized perspectives of multiculturalism. Conventional thinking 
about multiculturalism was that multiethnic societies could achieve intergroup harmony through 
recognition and respect for cultural differences. However, scholars in critical education studies 
have argued that conventional approaches to multiculturalism constitute a deracialized discourse 
that reifies culture and cultural difference while failing to address issues of racism and social 
inequality (Hatcher, 1987; McLaren, 1995; May, 1999; May 2003). Others scholars suggest that 
multiculturalism denies, obscures, and minimizes the pervasiveness of systemic racism and 
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discrimination (Blake & Ioanide, 2019). One way this occurs is to use multiculturalism as a way 
to reinterpret the meanings of racial justice by disregarding group-based discrimination and 
limiting racism to individual proclivities. Current events in sports and popular culture reflect 
these theories. For example, Colin Kaepernick protested patterns of systemic police violence 
against Black people by highlighting that stereotyping an entire group of people is racist. Those 
who opposed Kaepernick, reinterpreted his protests as unpatriotic group-based stereotypes 
against police officers, thus, denying, obscuring, and minimizing matters of systemic racism 
against Black people, and the opposers suggested instead that Kaepernick was being racist 
against police officers (Blake & Ioanide, 2019). Thus, the Kaepernick’s opposers shifted the 
conversation obscured and denied the systemic discrimination against Black people and limited 
the conversation on how they thought Kaepernick’s proclivities were instead examples of racism.  
Drawing on these critiques, education scholar Peter McLaren (1995) identified three 
articulations of multiculturalism that enabled mainstream education institutions to incorporate 
this ideology without disturbing white domination. The first articulation of multiculturalism that 
McLaren (1995) identified was conservative (or corporate) multiculturalism. He used this label 
to refer to versions of multicultural ideology in which people from the dominant culture distance 
themselves from racist ideologies without giving up any of their positions of power or privilege 
(McLaren, 1995). This construction of multiculturalism positions whiteness as an “invisible 
norm by which other ethnicities are judged” (McLaren, 1995, p. 93). Under conservative 
multiculturalism the hope is to integrate different cultures into society without changing the 
policies and practices of that society. The goal is for people of different backgrounds to settle 
into society without resistance and to assimilate their different life experiences into the 
Eurocentric ideals currently in place. Conservative multiculturalism welcomes “others” to the 
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extent that they separate themselves from all but the external markers of “otherness” and settle 
within the normative structure. Thus, conservative multiculturalism welcomes a visual form of 
racial and cultural diversity as affirmation of tolerance and progressive aspirations, but expects 
people from marginalized groups to remain silent about their perspective as they assimilate to 
dominant social norms. In this way, conservative multiculturalism avoids disruption of the social 
order and maintains silence about racial power and institutional forms of racism.  
The second articulation of multiculturalism that McLaren (1995) identified was liberal 
multiculturalism. Liberal multiculturalism asserts that there is an “intellectual sameness among 
the races…that permits them to compete equally in a capitalist society,” (McLaren, 1995, p.96). 
This perspective appears to be anti-racist to the extent that it celebrates the essential equality of 
people from different racial communities. However, it retains and promotes a racialized 
ignorance about the persistence of structural inequality that reproduces relations of dominance 
and subordination, regardless of essential individual equality.  Liberal multiculturalism is 
different from conservative multiculturalism because it rejects the idea that people from 
marginalized cultural groups need to assimilate into the dominant culture; instead, it encourages 
the maintenance of their collective identities and practices. Thus, liberal multiculturalism appears 
to be compatible with and not opposed to the fair integration of marginalized others into society. 
However, this articulation of multiculturalism still does not address the structural inequalities 
inherent in the modern social order. The modern social order is organized around norms that are 
specific to the historical realities constituted by dominant groups. Thus, essential or inherent 
equality only exists for one group at the expense of another because the social order was created 
for dominant sensibilities and advancement. Without directly addressing structural inequalities, 
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the logic that all people can “compete equally” is flawed and reinforces a racist system that will 
continue to hinder marginalized groups’ routes to equality and progress. 
The third articulation of multiculturalism that McLaren (1995) identified was left-liberal 
multiculturalism. He used this label to refer to a version of multicultural ideology that 
emphasizes cultural differences to the point of essentialism. In extreme forms, left-liberal 
multiculturalism exoticizes differences and reifies them into tightly bound identities. One 
consequence of this essentialism is to treat expressions of cultural difference as defining features 
of collective identity. This version of multiculturalism proposes that there is an “authentic” way 
to embody a social identity (e.g. female, African American, Latinx), leading to conservative 
responses to innovations or creative adaptations to changing circumstances as inauthentic. The 
more important consequence of essentialism is the tendency to valorize intergroup differences as 
expressions of cultural values without interrogating the social and historical processes that are 
the source of many intergroup differences. In other words, left-liberal multiculturalism abstracts 
cultural difference away from contexts of history, political economy, and power. As a result, left-
liberal positions of multiculturalism do not effectively advance social transformation.  
To summarize, McLaren (1995) suggests that “Multiculturalism without a transformative 
political agenda can just be another form of accommodation to the larger social order” (p.98). 
Alternatively stated, hegemonic forms of multiculturalism emphasized an idealistic 
preoccupation with culture at the expense of structural concerns and thereby domesticated or 
counteracted its liberatory potential. People may value these versions of multiculturalism 




Evidence for the preference of domesticated varieties of multiculturalism to preserve 
white normativity comes from work by Bell and Hartmann (2007), who conducted interviews in 
four racially diverse U.S. cities to better understand people’s conceptualizations of diversity. 
Participant responses revealed two separate themes about the meaning of diversity. One theme 
focused on general descriptions of diversity such as being exposed to different people and 
different cultures resulting in participants listing various racial/ethnic groups, various cultural 
traditions, food, music, etc. The second theme highlighted diversity as a current and future goal 
in which people should recognize and accept group differences. These two themes revealed 
tensions between idealized notions of diversity (e.g. embracing differences, multiculturalism) 
and the day-to-day complications that people experienced as a result of these differences (e.g. 
misunderstandings with those of other races).  
Bell and Hartmann also reported that most participants, even the most politically 
engaged, found it difficult to discuss inequality, power, and privilege in the context of diversity. 
When they asked participants directly about inequalities in the context of diversity, participants 
were noticeably anxious and they gave vague responses. However, a few respondents were able 
to discuss inequality within the context of diversity. For example, one respondent mentioned:  
“Diversity is something that you write down in columns, so many of this kind, so many 
of that kind, so many of this kind. But it doesn’t carry with it then, the why are these in 
different columns...And it’s to keep from having to say racism...Or feminism, sexism, 
whichever one it may be” (p. 911).  
The respondent’s critique suggests that there are fundamental issues of inequality that are absent 
from diversity discourse; to fully engage with ideas of diversity is to directly engage with issues 
of inequality. Despite the few respondents who were able to articulate a response, the researchers 
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suggested that these tensions resulted in more superficial articulations about diversity based on 
white normative perspectives.  
Similar to colorblind ideology, multiculturalism sustains white normativity. The analysis 
of white normativity specific to multiculturalism demonstrates that inclusion of marginalized 
members is not necessarily accompanied by social change. For example, even in ethnically 
diverse environments in which people from marginalized groups occupy some positions of 
power, white normativity may still dominate in the prevailing norms for ways of thinking, 
knowing, and behaving (Ward, 2008). These forms of multiculturalism treat marginalized groups 
as mere additions to the dominant culture, contributing to an external appearance of diversity that 
fails to produce systems of white accountability or new structural outcomes (McLaren, 1997; 
Ward, 2008). Such versions of multiculturalism maintain assimilationist assumptions in that 
marginalized cultural groups function to add spice, flavor, or color to the dominant culture 
themes. Although proponents of this multiculturalism celebrate cultural differences, these 
differences exist against the background of white normativity.  
Evidence that multicultural discourse can reproduce white normativity comes from Bell 
and Hartmann’s (2007) research. Specifically, some participants who perceived diversity as a 
positive element qualified their response with appeals to cultural assimilation (Bell & Hartmann, 
2007).  For example, participants expressed the necessity of a defining thread, whether political 
or linguistic, that unifies the diversity within the U.S., calling into question people’s right to 
deviate from these norms practiced by the dominant group. Thus, there is a disparity between the 
focus on celebrating cultural differences while also preserving the dominant cultural norms. This 
is different than the assimilative properties of colorblind ideology in that multiculturalism 
emphasizes appreciation of cultural differences but only to the extent that it preserves the 
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dominant white normative order. Rather than being truly transformative, multiculturalism 
strengthens the power and privilege of the white normative centrality by masking its assimilative 
properties as acceptance of diversity.  
To summarize, dominant forms of multiculturalism may fail to achieve the goal of 
creating long-lasting, substantive social change. One strategy to effectively address and promote 
social change is to incorporate the epistemological perspectives of members of marginalized 
groups into multiculturalism. This strategy will challenge mainstream perspectives of diversity 
and cultural differences, which may have better implications for social justice and progress. In its 
current form, dominant interests have domesticated multiculturalism, adapted it to celebrate and 
benefit formal cultural diversity without challenging white normativity and the associated 
naturalization of white patterns. Thus, a restructuring of the social order that relies on the critical 
consciousness of marginalized knowledge is required to push past superficial celebrations of 
different cultures, white normativity, and return to an ideology of liberation and social justice, 
known as critical multiculturalism. 
Critical Multiculturalism 
What is Critical Multiculturalism?   
In light of the problems with multiculturalism, researchers in education have discussed a 
different approach that I will call critical multiculturalism (see McLaren, 1995; May, 2009; May 
& Sleeter, 2010). Rooted in critical race theory (see Crenshaw, Gotanda, Peller, & Thomas, 
1995), critical multiculturalism is an ideology that recognizes the importance of participation of 
people from marginalized groups in social and political domains and challenges various forms of 
oppression (e.g. racism, classism, sexism, etc.) that are perpetuated through dominant social 
norms (McLaren & Farahmandpur, 1999). The main goal of critical multiculturalism is to 
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emphasize the collective issues of oppression and the social inequalities experienced by 
marginalized groups in the context of their political activism and social mobilization.  
Principles of Critical Multiculturalism  
As I noted in the previous section, multiculturalism encompasses practices that affirm 
pluralism across various identities (e.g. gender, race, class, ability, sexuality, etc. Leistyna, 
2002). Proponents of this ideology stress the importance of cultural diversity, using appropriate 
cultural codes (e.g. traditions, customs etc.) in various settings, and recognizing the contributions 
of all people, especially those in marginalized groups (Leistyna, 2002). However, conventional 
manifestations of this ideology are usually limited to the celebration of cultural otherness, which 
perpetuates the centrality of Eurocentric knowledge and reinforces white normativity (Bell & 
Hartmann, 2007).  
Critical multiculturalism is similar to multiculturalism to the extent that its proponents 
recognize, value, and respect diverse cultures. However, critical multiculturalism extends 
dominant appropriations or expressions of multiculturalism in that it brings diverse experiences 
to the center of discourse (rather than perceiving them as mere add-ons to dominant sensibilities) 
and empowers people to critique and challenge social norms that benefit some at the expense of 
others (May & Sleeter, 2010; McLaren, 1997). That is, critical multiculturalism is an ideology 
that recognizes the historical contributions of people from marginalized cultural backgrounds to 
American society, and it values the active participation of people from marginalized groups. A 
genuinely critical multiculturalism is not merely multiculturalism—essentializing, recognizing, 
and celebrating the differences of marginalized cultures—understood as equitable representation 
as the focus of official attention (e.g., in educational activities or public holidays) (May & 
Sleeter, 2010; McLaren & Farahmandpur, 1999; Sleeter & Bernal, 2004). Instead, what makes 
32 
 
critical multiculturalism critical is its approach to knowledge: that is, an understanding of society 
in general from the perspective of marginalized cultural groups as a tool for used for critiquing 
and changing the social order. To elaborate on this ideology, I will discuss three essential 
principles that separate critical multiculturalism from a superficial focus on cultural differences 
and tolerance.  
Deconstruction of the neutrality of civism. First, critical multiculturalism deconstructs 
what May (1999) refers to as the neutrality of civism—the notion that the values and practices 
that underpin the current social order are neutral and universal. From this perspective, the current 
social order in American society is not culture-neutral, but instead represents a specific cultural 
system that reflects and reproduces dominant group interests. Society represents a particular 
cultural construction of practices and values (e.g. linguistic, individualism) based primarily on 
the dominant group. These practices gain social capital and become embedded within society 
while practices specific to marginalized groups do not. One main consequence for many people 
from minority groups, both at the individual and collective level, is the loss of ethnic and cultural 
practices as a necessary price of entry to the civic realm (May, 1999). Another consequence is 
that many of the practices and values (e.g. individualism, freedom of choice, opportunity, etc.) 
that constitute dominant cultural patterns are not common or accessible to many people from 
marginalized groups. One reason is that marginalized group members may not have social capital 
required to gain access to the practices and values of the dominant group. Therefore, 
acknowledging and deconstructing the historical and cultural situatedness within the civic realm 
places cultural differences within the histories of the dominant cultural system. This may help to 
better understand differing experiences of dominant and marginalized groups with the practices 
and values as they relate to the current social order.  
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Acknowledging (unequal) power relations. This suggests the second key principle of 
critical multiculturalism: to situate cultural differences within relations of domination by 
analyzing differences in power between marginalized and dominant groups and the implications 
of such differences for the production of institutionalized inequality (May & Sleeter, 2010). 
Whereas the first principle emphasizes that the everyday habits of mainstream society reflects 
dominant group sensibilities, the second principle highlights the unequal power relations that 
afford differential opportunities to gain influence in the civic realm. An analysis of unequal 
power relations makes visible the processes of cultural reproduction that institutionalize or 
realize dominant group preferences and cultural practices over others. By attending to these 
processes, one can avoid the mistake of believing that different cultural groups have equal 
opportunities across the civic realms (May, 1999). In this process of understanding culture within 
the nexus of power relations, previously “subjugated knowledge” become valuable counter-
hegemonic critiques of dominant ways of knowing (May, 1999).  
Conceptions of relationality within historical contexts of cultural difference. The 
recognition and incorporation of cultural knowledge as a tool to disrupt unequal power relations 
can still be problematic to the extent that it treats culture as essential properties of rigidly 
bounded collective entities (Adams & Markus, 2004).  This understanding of culture reproduces 
inequality by mandating that people from marginalized cultural groups perform as authentic 
cultural actors (according to a restrictive definition) and by constraining their agency to enact 
creative innovations to re-imagine society in ways that better serve humanity in general (rather 
than White supremacy). In response to this problematic essentialism, the third principle of 
critical multiculturalism is a relational conception of culture and cultural difference (May, 1999; 
McLaren & Farahmandpur, 1999). My understanding of this concept has roots in a cultural 
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psychological perspective that emphasizes the mutual constitution of mind and context: the idea 
that culture and person, or the human psyche and context, exist in a dynamic relationship that 
make each other up (Adams, Estrada-Villalta, & Kurtis, 2017; Shweder, 1990). From this 
perspective, the recognition of cultural or historical situatedness does not require an essentialist 
conception of social identities as static, fixed, or monolithic. Instead, cultural patterns emerge 
through a dynamic process located in a particular place, at a specific time in history, from 
particular experiences, but without being bound to that particular position (May, 1999).   
 The principle of relationality affords a reflexive critique with respect to cultural 
practices, not only between cultural groups but also within them (McCarthy, 1993). A goal of 
critical multiculturalism is to foster a reflexive engagement with cultural diversity in which 
people better appreciate the racial and cultural positioning of experience, not just for exotic 
Others, but especially for the familiar, everyday settings of their own lives (May, 1999). This 
philosophy helps people from both marginalized and dominant groups to recognize and explore 
the interconnections, gaps, and differences that emerge between their own and the collective 
identities of others. One consequence for people from marginalized groups is that they can 
participant in and reconstruct the social order, without expectation of assimilation to the social 
norm. A consequence for people from dominant groups is that they can better participate in 
critical dialogues regarding the dominant nature of white normativity. This reflexive and 
reciprocal process allows people from both marginalized and dominant groups to recognize both 
the limits and interconnections, gaps, and differences that occur between their own and other 
cultural groups. Thus, critical multiculturalism moves beyond essentialist understandings of 
cultural differences as commodities and celebration of identity that legitimizes the social order 
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through racial harmony (May, 1999), and embraces a direct challenge to the oppressive nature of 
the current social order.  
To summarize, critical multiculturalism supports pushing societal and hegemonic 
boundaries to work constructively to understand the nature of oppression in modern society.  
Supporters have specific plans to recognize diversity and promote social action centered on 
restructuring a discriminatory social system. Advocates argue for a critical multiculturalism that 
prepares both dominant and marginalized groups to reorder society to better serve the interests of 
all, especially those who have been historically oppressed and have been expected to adopt the 
norms of the dominant group. 
Theoretical and Empirical Examples of Critical Multiculturalism in Social Psychology  
Discussions of critical multiculturalism emerged within the field of education, as 
educators considered how to create forms of multicultural education that served liberatory 
purposes rather than reinforcing the status quo of white normativity. There have been few 
discussions of critical multiculturalism or related concepts in the field of (social) psychology.  
Theoretical/empirical evidence from (social) psychology. A possible exception to this 
generalization is work on polycultural ideologies (Rosenthal & Levy, 2010). Proponents of 
polycultural ideologies, like proponents of multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism, not 
only call for recognition of racial and ethnic identities, but also focus on the past and present 
interactions that have mutually influenced the connections between groups. This component 
relates to the relationality principle of critical multiculturalism I discussed earlier because it 
“implies a dynamic, fluid process whereby habits of the mind are simultaneously conditioned 
by … the particular affordances of everyday cultural worlds” (Adams, et al., 2017, p. 236). Thus, 
supporters of this ideology are more concerned with how various racial and ethnic groups have 
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been shaped by history and their connections with one another. (Rosenthal & Levy, 2010). This 
ideology is similar to critical multiculturalism in that it does not essentialize differences or define 
cultural groups as discretely bounded entities (Adams & Markus, 2004). Rather, polyculturalism 
highlights how current connections with other cultural groups are rooted in historical and 
contemporary constructions. Although supporters of this theoretical approach attempt to avoid 
cultural essentialism by reflecting on the relationships between various groups, there is no 
discussion of how cultural differences are situated within power relations. Additionally, 
polyculturalism does not require the active participation of marginalized group members in the 
reordering of hegemonic culture and the reinterpretation of history.  
One social psychologist who does explicitly refer to critical multiculturalism is James 
Jones (2010), who discusses the concept in a special issues article about a sociocultural 
perspective of diversity. According to Jones, critical multiculturalism extends beyond standard 
recognition of cultural difference associated with mainstream multiculturalism to address the 
differential social and cultural capital that hegemonic power relations confer to some identity 
groups at the expense of others. He briefly reports an unpublished study that he presented as a 
poster at a professional psychological conference (Engleman & Jones, 2007). In this study, 
researchers examined the effect of diversity ideologies (colorblindness, multiculturalism, and 
critical multiculturalism) on a variety of outcomes including perceptions of ingroup and outgroup 
membership, the degree to which participants blamed a group for their status of poverty, the 
types of reasons participants gave to explain poverty, and allocation of funding to organizations 
that support structural and economic change (Engleman & Jones, 2007; as cited in Jones, 2010). 
Although the article does not offer full details about the method or results of the study, Jones 
reports that participants exposed to a critical multiculturalism treatment were more likely to 
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endorse structural sources of poverty, less likely to blame people for their poverty, and more 
likely to allocate funds to organizations that support structural and economic change than were 
participants in other (colorblind and multicultural) conditions. Jones (2010) suggests that such 
outcomes cannot occur by merely acknowledging or valuing differences. Rather they are related 
to understanding the necessity and motivations to change the effects of structural biases. 
Limitations of Critical Multiculturalism  
Many of the criticisms and limitations of critical multiculturalism are similar to those that 
I discussed earlier concerning multiculturalism. These criticisms include consequences of 
separatism, balkanization, cultural relativism, devaluation of dominant members, and 
expressions of resentment between dominant and marginalized groups. In addition, I anticipate 
these other critiques of critical multiculturalism.  
First, I anticipate that critical multiculturalism will be especially threatening to white 
normativity and, therefore, generate especially strong resistance among people from dominant 
groups. Critical multiculturalism turns the lens on societal values of white normativity to identify 
and contest the construction of white supremacy and institutions of white hegemony. 
Accordingly, it is likely to promote feelings of threat among people from dominant groups who 
find it difficult to give up their status of power and privilege (see Plaut et al., 2011).  
Second, I anticipate that people will regard critical multiculturalism as undesirably 
political in comparison to more popular articulations of (domesticated) multiculturalism. Rather 
than deny the political stance that informs critical multiculturalism, my response to this criticism 
(itself informed by critical multiculturalism) is to illuminate the political positioning of 
conventional scientific approaches that masquerade as politically neutral. Science and academic 
inquiry are neither neutral nor completely objective (Adams et al., 2015; Bonilla-Silva & Zuberi, 
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2008). Indeed, they implicitly (and at times explicitly) reflect and reinforce inequitable social 
practices, institutions, and values. From a critical multiculturalism perspective, the desire to 
preserve “neutral” scientific inquiry is not realistic because these spaces are inherently political. 
Pretending otherwise is itself the reflection and realization of a political agenda that preserves the 
status quo (Adams, et al., 2015).  
A final critique of critical multiculturalism is that it is likely to increase prejudice--
defined as hostile affect or antipathy toward a person or a group (Jones, 1997).  As I previously 
noted, Whitley & Webster (2018) found that primes about concrete representations of 
multiculturalism – representations that focused on specific ways to implement multiculturalism 
and how society must change to achieve multiculturalism – led to increased expressions of 
prejudice by ethnic majority group members (e.g. Whites) toward ethnic minority group 
members (e.g. non-Whites). Critical multiculturalism will likely result in the same outcome.  
Despite this potential consequence for increased prejudice, my rationale for preferring 
critical multiculturalism to other diversity ideologies reflects the conception of racism, antiracist 
action, and social justice that informs this work.  But this may be one price to pay for social 
justice (Dixon, Tropp, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2010). Racism and social inequalities will not be 
effectively eradicated by teaching tolerance or providing information that prejudice towards 
marginalized groups is bad. Instead the principle of critical multiculturalism that emphasizes the 
relationality of people within contexts provides the understanding that connections with other 
cultural groups are rooted in historical and contemporary constructions situated within power 
relations. From a dominant hegemonic perspective, racism and its consequences is portrayed as a 
phenomenon of individuals abstracted from historical context (Adams, Biernat, Branscombe, 
Crandall, & Wrightsman, 2008). This way of knowing preserves the social order by advocating 
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the adjustment of individuals rather than the transformation of the status quo. As a response, 
critical multiculturalism encourages a reordering of the current social order by a process of 
unknowning dominant sensibilities. This reflects a version of a cultural psychology approach that 
reflects engagement with and understanding of marginalized knowledge in order to rethink 
concepts and practices that inform mainstream ways of knowing (Adams et al., 2015).  
 
Overview of the Current Research  
 The conceptual overview of the diversity ideologies argued that colorblindness and 
multiculturalism are ideologies that perpetuate normative standards and support systems of 
oppressions. As a result of rethinking the diversity ideologies, I purposed the inclusion of 
an(other) diversity ideology, critical multiculturalism, which extends expressions of 
multiculturalism by bringing diverse experiences to the center of discourse and empowers people 
to critique and challenge social norms that benefit some at the expense of others. Is a more 
critical consciousness of a diversity ideology required in order to gain support for social justice 
issues that value the active participation of people from marginalized groups? To investigate this 
question, the broad purpose of the research is to consider where support for different ideologies 
come from by examining potential antecedents and consequences related to these diversity 
ideologies. Regarding potential antecedents, it is possible that people support issues based on 
how they receive cultural messages and the ways they interact with their cultural artifacts. It is 
also likely possible that people already have certain proclivities and social positions that resonate 
with the tenets of one diversity ideology over another, and are therefore motivated to stay true to 
these proclivities and preserve their positions in the world. In considering these possible 




Two identity constructs that are worthy of examination as antecedents of diversity 
ideologies are national identification and political conservatism. Although there are many 
antecedents that may be relevant for examination, I will specially focus on and describe the 
relevance of investigating both national identification and political conservatism in relation to 
diversity ideologies and provide brief predictions on how they may be related to the diversity 
ideologies based previous research.  
National Identification 
American historian Arthur Schlesinger (1992) voiced concerns and challenges of the 
growing cultural diversity in U.S. society to nationalism. His discussion centered around “people 
of different ethnic origins, speaking different languages and professing different 
religions….[who] live under the same political sovereignty”(pp.13). He warned that unless a 
common purpose binds diverse people together, “tribal antagonism will drive them apart,”(pp. 
13). He suggested that without a superordinate commonality, multiculturalism negatively effects 
national politics, national language, public education, and national identity. Previous research on 
national identity has found that White Americans tend to view American national identity as 
prototypical of their own racial group, thus, perceiving that ethnic minorities are not prototypical 
of being “American” (Devos & Banaji, 2005). This tendency of positioning White as normative 
of national identity may also lead White Americans to view cultural traditions, values, and 
practices of marginalized cultural groups as threatening and in opposition to the American 
national prototype, which is defined in terms of European American values and traditions 
(Yogesswaran & Dasgupta, 2014). Broadly speaking, this conceptualization of national 
identification can be understood as a defense for maintaining the status quo. Thus, the goals of 
41 
 
multiculturalism, or diversity more broadly, may be perceived as a type of symbolic threat to 
one’s national culture, values, and worldview.  
Within the U.S. context, few research studies examined the relationship between national 
identification and diversity ideologies.  Instead, some research investigated how diversity 
ideologies may threaten national identity. For example, one study examined the effects of 
abstract versus concrete construal of multiculturalism on symbolic threat to national identity. 
Results showed that when multiculturalism is construed in concrete terms (specific steps to 
achieving multiculturalism) versus abstract terms (broad goals of multiculturalism), White 
participants reported higher feelings of threat to national identity (Yogesswaran & Dasgupta, 
2014). This suggests that a form of multiculturalism that evokes concrete change in support of 
marginalized groups, is considered a threat to national identification. Research conducted outside 
of the U.S. studied how national identification is related to out-group threat and support for 
multiculturalism. Verkuyten (2009) proposed three different models of the relationship among 
national identification, perceived out-group threat, and support for multiculturalism.  
The first model, group identity lens, hypothesizes that national identification can be an 
antecedent of perceived out-group threat. In line with self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, 
Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; Turner & Reynolds, 2001), this model suggests that people’s 
social identity is a lens through which they perceive and make meaning of the world. Group 
identity, such as national identification, is one lens that may make people aware when their 
group is being harmed. Thus, higher national identification may lead to greater perceptions of 
threat leading to perceptions that result in some other response (e.g. negative attitudes towards 
out-group members; Van Oudenhoven, Prins, & Buunk, 1998).   
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The second model, group identity reaction, proposes that a group’s perceived threat leads 
to stronger identification with their in-group with leads to more negative attitudes toward out-
groups. Previous research has indeed shown evidence that perceived threats increased group 
identification (Jetten, Branscombe, Schmitt, & Spears, 2001).  
Finally, the third model Verkuyten (2009) described is the group identity moderator 
model. This model predicts that the interaction between national identification and out-group 
threat predicts support for multiculturalism. In line with social psychological research on social 
identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), this model suggests that because there are different 
motivational meanings of perceived threat, it has different effects depending on national 
identification.  
Verkuyten (2009) found consistent support for the group identity lens model, but not the 
other two models in his studies with Dutch participants. He found that national identification was 
indirectly related to support for multiculturalism. Specifically, he found that national 
identification was positively related to out-group threat (Muslim immigrants were posed as the 
outgroup members in the study), and threat was negatively related to support for 
multiculturalism. Thus, national identification may present as an antecedent for support (or not) 
for different diversity ideologies.  
Given that national identification is an important consideration for endorsement of 
diversity ideologies as exhibited by some empirical and theoretical evidence, I included it as a 
correlate to investigate in this research. For the purposes of the present research, I conceptualized 
national identification in two ways. Most social psychological research operationalizes national 
identity in terms of identity attachment – the degree to which a person has a connected personal 
experience with an identity category (Phinney, 1992). This form of national identification, which 
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I call national identification attachment, is conducive to understandings of identification that is 
fixed and not permeable to change. Aligned with the previous research that I described earlier in 
this section, this form of national identification acts as a defensiveness of things that don’t align 
with one’s cultural traditions and values. This tendency towards attachment would most likely be 
in support of a colorblind ideology. Another conceptualization of national identification is more 
typical of developmental approaches to identification as a process of active engagement that is 
conducive to openness and curiosity to learn more about one’s national identification, which I 
will call national identification exploration. National identification exploration is flexible to 
change as one’s process with and understanding of their national identification can change and is 
not fixed. This tendency towards exploration would most likely be at odds with colorblind 
ideologies and in support of both multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism. While research 
on diversity ideologies and national identification have mostly centered around perceptions of 
threat, it is important to examine how they are directly related and how their relationship may 
influence other related outcomes (e.g. support for related diversity policies).  
Political Conservatism  
Psychology researchers (e.g., Jost 2017) have  proposed that individuals are not passive 
vessels of beliefs and opinions they are exposed to, but rather are drawn to beliefs and ideologies 
that are aligned with their needs and interests. People have an epistemic motivation to maintain 
certainty, order, structure, and to avoid threat. One can hypothesize that this epistemic 
motivation is associated with conservative attitudes that preserve the status quo, because political 
conservatism promises certainty, order, and security by maintaining traditional, and normative 
hierarchical social organizations (Eidelman & Crandall, 2012; Jost, 2017). To embrace political 
liberalism instead of political conservatism would mean to accept the possibility of uncertainty, 
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complexity, and ambiguity for the sake of equity, progress, diversity, and acceptance of 
differences (Jost, 2017).  
Results from a comprehensive review of the psychological bases of political orientation 
showed that epistemic motivations associated with intolerance, dogmatism, need for certainty, 
and social order were positively related to political conservatism (Jost, Blount, Pfeffer, & 
Hunyady, 2003). Accordingly, it is likely that political conservatism is associated with support 
for colorblind ideology as this ideology is most related to maintaining hegemonic norms and 
practices associated with whiteness that represent order, structure, and certainty. Although I have 
argued that multiculturalism in its current form is most palatable to dominant sensibilities, it may 
be less associated with political conservatism. As Jost (2017) explained, political liberalism is 
associated with diversity and acceptance of difference, which are both included in 
multiculturalism, thus, it is likely that multiculturalism will be associated with political 
liberalism rather than political conservatism. Accordingly, critical multiculturalism would also 
more likely be related to political liberalism as it aligns more with some of the components of 
multiculturalism.  
Differences in political orientation are often times studied to understand how it shapes 
prejudice or behaviors intentions (Yogesswaran & Dasgupta, 2014). Thus, one’s reaction 
towards diversity ideologies may be influenced by their political orientation. In their research 
examining how participants’ political orientation affects reaction to abstract versus concrete 
multiculturalism, Yogesswaran & Dasgupta (2014) found that political conservatives exposed to 
concrete (versus abstract) multiculturalism showed higher prejudice towards Latinx Americans. 
However, there were no differential effects on attitudes towards Latinx Americans for liberals 
when exposed to either type of multiculturalism. Thus, for conservatives, a concrete 
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multiculturalism framing is inconsistent with their ideological position – it highlights cultural 
group differences, support for marginalized groups, therefore, promoting equity and diversity, 
exposing too much uncertainty and opposition to the normative social order. It is important to 
further understand how one’s political ideological position may influence support for diversity 
ideologies and policies.  
Consequences 
 Previous research in social psychology in the area of intergroup relations has focused on 
reduction of individual propensities for prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination. Thus, 
consequences of diversity ideologies have also been focused around prejudice and bias 
reduction. Although supporters of multiculturalism argue that this ideology improves intergroup 
relations and reduces prejudice better than colorblind ideology, empirical evidence to support 
this argument is mixed (Whitely & Webster, 2018). Similarly, because critical multiculturalism 
goes against conventional understandings of diversity ideologies and reconstructs knowledge 
through marginalized critical consciousness, it likely to be ineffective in reducing prejudice. 
However, as I noted previously, the purpose of critical multiculturalism is not to highlight ways 
toward harmony, but rather to reflect conceptions of racism, antiracist action, and social justice 
for people from marginalized groups. Thus, for the purposes of the current research I focus on 
policy support as the consequence to better understand if the diversity ideologies differentially 
predict support for critical social justice issues.  
Policy Endorsement  
America has been characterized as a vision of a “melting pot” –  a community of ethnic 
groups with unique identities and equal status that alludes to the idea of equal rights in the 
distribution of public benefits and resources. The failure of the civil rights movement to 
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dismantle racial inequality despite illegalization of racial discrimination fueled a push for racial-
conscious policies in the Black community (Hall, 2005). Massive immigration from other 
countries attracted ideals of multiculturalism for the purposes of fair public benefits (Citrin, 
Sears, Muste, & Wong, 2001). As a result, policies that supported multiculturalism emerged with 
the purpose of promoting equal standing of marginalized groups (Citrin et al., 2001). These 
policy agendas included affirmative action, bilingual education, recognition of cultural customs 
of different groups by law, support for autonomous cultural institutions, and the allocation of 
public space (e.g. radio, television, etc.) to include the diverse preferences of marginalized 
groups (Loobuyck, 2005). Thus, an important question to consider is how one’s support for a 
diversity ideology is related to diversity policy endorsement.  
Previous research has investigated the impact of threat on foreign and domestic policies 
related to diversity. For example, one study conducted six months after the attacks that took 
place on 9/11, presented a document to participants as either a domestic or foreign policy on 
intergroup relations which either endorsed an assimilation or multicultural ideology (Davies, 
Steele, & Markus, 2008). Participants completed a questionnaire that measured the extent to 
which they endorsed the policy on intergroup relationships they read about. White and non-white 
participants both endorsed multicultural domestic policies as a model of intergroup relations 
within America, but outside of America, the participants expressed a preference for assimilation 
as a foreign policy. The researcher believed that salient foreign threat to America (e.g. 9/11 
attacks) led to increased tolerance of multiculturalism domestically but not internationally. In a 
subsequent study, Davies and colleagues (2008) showed that when they manipulated foreign 
threat, participants preferred assimilation as a foreign policy, but when the threat was absent, the 
participants were more responsive to multiculturalism within foreign policy. Thus, these results 
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suggest that under conditions of threat, policies that incorporate multiculturalism may be too 
inconsistent with people’s cultural values resulting in opposition of multicultural polices.  
 Other research suggests that support for multiculturalism could lead to support for pro-
immigration based policy. In a study conducted in New Zealand, researchers conducted a 
correlational study investigating New Zealanders’ attitudes towards immigrants and immigration 
policy (Ward & Masgoret, 2008). Support for multiculturalism, high contact with immigrants, 
and low levels of perceived threat of immigrants, were directly related to endorsement of 
immigration policies (Ward & Masgoret, 2008). Similar to the research conducted by Davies and 
colleagues (2008) these results suggest that in the absence of threat, people may be willing to 
support multiculturalism policies that support the advancement of marginalized people   
 
Overview of the Research Studies  
 The research presented here explores whether multiculturalism and critical 
multiculturalism are separable constructs, whether the three diversity ideologies show different 
patterns of relationships with theoretically important variables (e.g. identification and policy), 
and how the ideologies affect policy endorsement. I focus on critical multiculturalism because 
past research has demonstrated the effects of multiculturalism and colorblind ideologies on 
intergroup relations and prejudice. It’s important to begin to investigate how an(other) diversity 
ideology may differently influence how people support social justice issues.  
 In the current research, I examine the distinctions among the three diversity ideologies – 
colorblind ideology, multiculturalism, and critical multiculturalism. Beyond exploring the 
separateness of the diversity ideologies, I was also interested in whether the diversity ideologies 
predicted social policies related to diversity in unique ways. Specifically, while previous research 
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suggests that multiculturalism is a predictor of multicultural policies, I am interested to see if 
critical multiculturalism is a stronger predictor of these policies. Additionally, I examined the 
effects of each of the diversity ideologies on diversity policies to better understand whether a 
critical multicultural framing would cause greater endorsement of policies related to social 
justice issues. Finally, I included national identification (e.g. attachment and exploration) and 
political conservatism to understand their relationships with the diversity ideologies and whether 
they may be antecedents of endorsement of the diversity ideologies.  
 To the extent that multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism overlap, one can 
hypothesize that both multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism would be related to one 
another. I predict competing hypotheses for their relationships with colorblind ideology. Since 
both colorblind ideology and multiculturalism resonate with dominant sensibilities of normative 
hegemonic values of maintaining white normativity (Bell & Hartmann, 2007; Bonilla-Silva, 
2017), it is possible that they may be positively related with one another. However, 
multiculturalism was initially introduced as the opposite of colorblind ideology. Multiculturalism 
is an ideology that advocates for the explicit awareness of and appreciation for cultural 
differences, and as such it is conceivable that colorblind ideology and multiculturalism may be 
negatively related. Further, because critical multiculturalism goes further than multiculturalism 
by placing marginalized voices in the center of discourse to challenge social norms (May & 
Sleeter, 2010; McLaren, 1997), I hypothesize that critical multiculturalism and colorblind 
ideology will be negatively related.   
 Because critical multiculturalism offers a way to reconstruct the social order through the 
critical consciousness of marginalized knowledge to move beyond the denial of racism and 
illuminate how white normativity embedded in conventional ways of knowing, I hypothesize that 
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critical multiculturalism will be a stronger predictor of endorsement for social justice policies. 
Given some of the overlap between multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism, it is possible 
that both ideologies may predict policies aligned with multiculturalism (e.g. diversity 
appreciation and respect for differences), but I predict that critical multiculturalism will be the 
strongest predictor of policies that more explicitly support marginalized groups (e.g. social 
justice polices, affirmative action, etc.). Additionally, following previous research on intergroup 
relations and diversity ideologies, being presented with the different diversity ideologies will 
affect the types of policies one might endorse. Specifically, I predict that being primed with the 
ideologies will lead participants to endorse its complementary policy. That is, a framing of 
critical multiculturalism will lead to endorsement of more social justice policies as well as 
multiculturalism polices, whereas multiculturalism and colorblind ideologies will only 
correspond to their similar diversity policies.  
 With regard to the identification variables, I predict that colorblind ideology will be 
positively related to national identification attachment and political conservatism because they 
represent a fixed and normative orientation that maintains white normative cultural traditions, 
values, and practices. In contrast, colorblind ideology will be negatively related to national 
identification exploration because national identification exploration promotes openness and 
flexibility with one’s nationality, which does not align with colorblind ideology. I believe the 
opposite patterns to be true for both multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism. That is, both 
ideologies will be positively related to national identification exploration, but negatively related 
to national identification attachment and political conservatism. Critical multiculturalism and to a 
smaller extent multiculturalism both represent openness in exploring one’s American identity 
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while accepting uncertainty, and complexity for the sake of progress and equity for marginalized 
groups.  
 In Study 1, I examined whether critical multiculturalism constituted a separable construct 
from standard multiculturalism, and whether endorsement of critical multiculturalism showed 
divergent relationships with identification and policy measures than did multiculturalism. 
Additionally, I explored how participants defined multiculturalism to better understand if they 
defined multiculturalism in a celebratory or critical fashion. I predicted that the majority of 
participants would overwhelmingly define multiculturalism in a celebratory fashion.  
I tested similar predictions in Study 2 except I included separate policy measures that 
corresponded with each of the diversity ideologies. I included an affirmative action policy 
measure as an extension to better understand the benefits of critical multiculturalism. I also 
included a measure of awareness of race and privilege to examine if a critical consciousness will 
support more politicized policies of social justice. Finally, in Study 3, I used an experimental 
approach to explore the effects of the three diversity ideologies on policy endorsement relevant 
to each type of ideology and tested whether results from Studies 1 and 2 replicated in another 
study.  
Study 1  
 To put hypotheses about critical multiculturalism to empirical test, I first created a 
measure of critical multiculturalism by modifying items on an existing scale of standard 
multiculturalism. In Study 1, I administered this critical multiculturalism scale along with 
standard measures of colorblind ideology and multiculturalism, identification measures, and 
policy support. The primary purpose of Study 1 was then to examine whether critical 
multiculturalism constitutes a separate (or separable) construct from original/standard 
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multiculturalism. More specifically, I considered not only whether critical multiculturalism items 
constituted a psychometrically separate factor from multiculturalism items,  but also whether 
endorsement of critical multiculturalism items showed different patterns of relationship with 
theoretically important variables than did multiculturalism items.  
A secondary goal of this study was to understand how people conceptualize 
multiculturalism. In particular, I was interested in whether people defined multiculturalism 
primarily in celebratory fashion or as something more consistent with critical consciousness.   
Method 
Participants. I used Amazon’s TurkPrime to recruit participants. TurkPrime is an online 
survey tool that produces reliable data comparable to traditional methods (e.g., Buhrmester, 
Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Litman, Robinson, & Abberbock, 2017). Recruitment efforts indicated 
that the study was about people’s attitudes and beliefs about culture. There were no other special 
recruitment requirements for this study (e.g. specific racial/ethnic groups, specific gender, etc.) 
except that all consequent studies will include a unique group of participants who did not 
participate in any of the previous studies.  
A total of 250 participants responded to the survey and received $1.00 for their time. One 
participant indicated a desire to withdraw data from the study, and so I excluded this 
participant’s responses from all analyses. I report analyses including only the 183 participants 
who self-identified as White.1 The age of the participants who I included in the analyses ranged 
from 20–75 years (M = 39.68, SD = 13.21, Mdn = 36). About half the participants identified as 
                                               
1For all studies, the analyses that I report include only those participants who self-identified as White. The rationale 
for this exclusion was because previous research (Correll, Park, & Smith, 2008; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; 
Wolsko et al., 2000) studied multiculturalism and colorblind ideology as approaches to ameliorating intergroup 
relations and, thus, their results were based on analyses of responses from White participants. I recognize this as a 
limitation of the studies and will discuss further in the general discussion. Results for Study 1 do not change when I 
include all participants in the analyses.  
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male (50.8%), earned a Bachelor’s degree or higher (54.6%), and earned $40,000 or less in 
annual income (52.5%). For the final analyses, all participants were U.S. citizens.  
Procedure and measures. I used thematic analysis to identify patterns and themes to the 
question “What does multiculturalism mean to you?” Specifically, I coded and developed themes 
in a deductive, top-down way driven by specific theoretical conceptualizations. That is, coders 
coded data that were relevant or captured something specific to the research question. A team of 
five trained coders rated these responses (with at least two coders per rating item) according to 
the system that appears in Table 2.  For the first two items, coders rated the extent to which 
participants mentioned key themes of differences (emphasis on differences of people’s identities) 
and celebration (emphasis on recognition of and celebrating the differences of people’s 
identities) on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 3 (very much). These two themes do not capture a 
critical consciousness of multiculturalism. Interrater reliability/agreement for these items ranged 
from .546 to .608.  
For the final 3 items, coders indicated whether participants did (coded as 1) or did not 
(coded as 0) discuss the themes: structural disadvantage (the idea that different cultural 
perspectives are due to structural disadvantage), whiteness (discussed set of norms related to 
white sensibilities), and racism/oppression (discussed racism, oppression or overcoming 
barriers). These themes reflected a more critical consciousness of multiculturalism by including 
discussions about different cultural perspectives as a result of structural disadvantage, white 
racialization and privilege, and racism when discussing multiculturalism. Interrater 
reliability/agreement for these items ranged from .313 to .702.  
Participants next completed key constructs about demographic background. A full set of 
materials for Study 1, appear in Appendix A.  
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Diversity Ideology Endorsement. The first set of items assessed endorsement of different 
diversity ideologies. To assess endorsement of colorblind ideology, I used the 5 item measure 
from Morrison et al., 2010, (adapted from Knowles et al., 2009).  A sample item was, “We must 
stop obsessing so much about race and ethnicity.” Participants used a 7 point scale ranging from 
1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) to indicate their endorsement of each item. To assess 
endorsement of multicultural ideology, I used the 5 item multiculturalism subscale from the 
Interethnic Ideology Items measure (e.g., “We must appreciate the unique characteristics of 
different racial and ethnic groups;” Wolsko et al., 2006). Participants used a 7 point scale ranging 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) to indicate their endorsement of each item.. 
I could not find an appropriate measure of critical multiculturalism, so I created one 
based on the conception of critical multiculturalism that informs the work. Specifically, I 
understand critical multiculturalism as multiculturalism (i.e., the celebration of the important 
contribution and participation of marginalized people) plus a recognition of the systemic cultural 
and racial oppression embedded in dominant social norms of European settler societies. 
Accordingly, to create a measure of critical multiculturalism, I modified each of the five 
multicultural items to deemphasize the celebratory focus of conventional multiculturalism in 
favor of an emphasis on issues of social inequality and mainstream cultural domination of 
marginalized groups. For instance, I modified the multicultural item named above to read, “We 
must appreciate the unique experiences of oppression that different racial and ethnic groups have 
suffered” (see Appendix A for a list of all items). Participants used a 7 point scale ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) to indicate their endorsement of each item.  
I conducted a Principle Component Analysis (PCA) of all 15 diversity ideology items 
with Varimax rotation. Results suggested two factors that accounted for 66.39 % of variation: 
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One factor included all multiculturalism items, all critical multiculturalism items, and one 
colorblind ideology item, “We must learn about the similarities between racial and ethnic 
groups” (item number 13; see Appendix A and B). The second factor included the four 
remaining colorblind ideology items. Clearly, these PCA results did not reveal the neat, three-
factor structure that I imagined when I selected and created items. Of particular relevance to the 
current project, they did not reveal a critical multiculturalism component separate from a 
multiculturalism component. This tentatively suggests that one can understand multiculturalism 
as an overarching set of ideas with celebratory and critical manifestations.  
As the goal of this project is not necessarily scale development, but instead to assess 
identity and social justice implications of theoretically separable diversity ideologies, I 
proceeded to conduct analyses as originally planned. I calculated the mean of the four items that 
loaded together on the second factor of the PCA to create a composite measure of colorblind 
ideology endorsement CB (α = .77).  I calculated the mean of the five items for the other 
ideologies to create a composite measure for endorsement of multiculturalism (α = .87), and 
critical multiculturalism (α = .90). 
 Social Justice Policy. I created a measure of reactions to social justice policies that are 
the subject of public debate within multicultural societies (see Joseph, 2017). Participants used a 
scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) to indicate their endorsement of 
seven items (e.g., “I support the allocation of public funds for autonomous cultural institutions 
such as communal charities, libraries, and museums.” I computed a mean score of all the items; 
higher scores indicated higher policy endorsement (α = .92).  
National Identity. To assess national identification, I adapted items from the Multi-
Ethnic Identity Measure (Phinney, 1992) and a measure of social identity (Cameron, 2004). Five 
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items constituted a measure of national identification exploration (e.g. “I have spent time trying 
to figure out more about American history and traditions”; α = .86).  Participants responded to 12 
items that measured national centrality (e.g., “I often think about the fact that I am American”), 
national affect (e.g., “I am glad to be an American.”), and national ingroup ties (e.g. “I feel 
strong ties to other Americans”). Participants responded to each item on a scale from 0 (not at 
all) to 6 (completely), where higher values indicated greater identification. I computed the mean 
of these 12 items to create a composite index of national identification attachment (α = .90).  
Demographics. Finally, participants responded to a series of demographic questions 
including items about age, gender, annual income, educational attainment, and residency status. 
They used a scale from 1 (very liberal) to 7 (very conservative) to indicate their political 
orientation separately for economic and social issues. I computed the mean of these to items to 
create an indicator of overall political conservatism (α = .87).  
Results 
 Prior to running any analyses, I conducted relevant test of assumptions. My analyses of 
residuals and scatter plots indicated that I could reasonably assume linearity and 
homoscedasticity (Meyers, Gamst, & Guarino, 2013) but not normality (Meyers et al., 2013). I 
examined boxplots to determine if any cases met the cutoff range of 1.5 to 3.0 times the 
interquartile range (IQR). These tests indicated that five cases were outliers. I removed these 
cases, resulting in a final sample of n = 178 cases whose data satisfied all tests of assumptions.2  
Qualitative analyses: Conceptualizations of multiculturalism. For the purposes of this 
study, I was interested in whether or not participants understood multiculturalism with a critical 
consciousness. Thus, I focused on five themes for the goals of this study. Descriptive statistics 
                                               
2 Inclusion of the five outliers did not change conclusions for either the main or supplemental statistical analyses. 
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for the themes differences and celebration appear in Table 3 and the descriptive statistics for the 
themes structural disadvantage, whiteness, and racism/oppression appear in Table 4.  
First, I analyzed the interrater reliability between the two coders who coded a particular theme 
for all participants. Interrater reliability statistics for each themes appear in Tables 3 and 4.  
I assessed interrater reliability for differences and celebration by assessing the intraclass 
correlation coefficient (ICC). The results showed there was a moderate degree of reliability 
between coders on both differences, average measures ICC = .546 (95% CI, .046 to .754), F(174, 
174) = 3.10, p <.001, and celebration, average measures ICC = .608 (95% CI, .128 to .793), 
F(175, 175) = 3.60, p <.001. I assessed Cohen’s κ to determine the level of agreement between 
the coders’ for the binary response options (structural disadvantage, whiteness, and 
racism/oppression) on whether the themes was present or not in participants’ responses. Based 
on Landis and Koch’s (1977) interpretations, there was fair agreement between the two coders' 
on structure disadvantage, κ = .313 (95% CI, -.036 to .662), p < .001, whiteness, κ = .394 (95% 
CI, -.147 to .935), p < .001, and moderate agreement on racism/oppression, κ = .702 (95% 
CI, .426 to .978), p < .001. I resolved all instances of disagreement between coders by first 
reviewing the codes assigned by each coder and choosing the code I agreed with the most 
The most frequent understanding of multiculturalism was a focus on celebration (79.1%) or 
cultural differences (74.6%), and 60.5% offered responses that include both celebration and 
cultural differences. This understanding was evident in responses like the following: 
Multiculturalism means many different cultures living within the same area.   
Multiculturalism is a facet of a country, state, town, or otherwise general population where 
multiple people from different backgrounds live together in that community of a town.  
[Multiculturalism] means to me a true society where we have a bunch of cultures races and all 
types of people that come together and unify. 
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[Multiculturalism] means celebrating that we all have a different culture and come from different 
places but we can live together peacefully. 
The first two examples imply that multicultural means differences of backgrounds, people who 
are from different places, or different cultures living together. The last two examples highlight 
the celebratory aspect of multiculturalism by suggesting that it promotes unity or enables people 
from different backgrounds to live together peacefully. Taken together, the majority of 
participants emphasize the celebration of cultural differences associated with multiculturalism.   
In contrast, very few participants discussed a critically conscious understanding of 
multiculturalism in terms of Structural Disadvantage (3.9%), Whiteness (0.6%), or 
Racism/Oppression (3.4%). One of the few participants who mentioned these themes noted that,  
It means valuing diversity. Non-dominant paradigms, cultures, and traditions, and value to 
society as a whole and we should work for inclusivity in all social institutions, especially where 
historical inequalities have created exclusion and disadvantage.  
More generally, though, most participants failed to mention institutional disparities, inequalities, 
or disadvantages of marginalized cultural groups as part of their conceptualization of 
multiculturalism. These results suggest that themes of critical consciousness do not figure 
prominently in White American understandings of multiculturalism in general.  
Quantitative analyses: Relationships between variables. Correlations, means, and 
standard deviations for all measures appear in Table 5.3 A first point of interest was the 
relationship between endorsements of different diversity ideologies. Consistent with the PCA of 
diversity ideology items (as I discussed in the Method section), results indicated a strong positive 
association between critical multiculturalism and multiculturalism (r = 0.89, p < .001). However, 
                                               
3 Across all studies, participants endorsed critical multiculturalism the least compared to the other two ideologies as 
indicated by the low mean.  
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some indication of the differences between these ideologies appears in their separate 
relationships with colorblind ideology. Although endorsement of colorblind ideology was 
positively associated with endorsement of multiculturalism (r = 0.16, p = .029), it was unrelated 
to endorsement of critical multiculturalism (r = 0.08, p = .320), although these patterns are not 
significantly different from each other.  
A second point of interest was the relationship between measures of identification and 
endorsement of diversity ideologies (Plaut, et al., 2011; Navarro, Worthington, Hart, & 
Khairallah, 2009).  Endorsement of colorblind ideology was positively associated with national 
identification attachment (r = 0.28, p < .001) and political conservatism (r = 0.28, p < .001), but 
endorsement of multiculturalism was unrelated to national identification attachment (r = -0.12, p 
= .126), and negatively related to political conservatism (r = -0.40, p < .001). Consistent with 
hypotheses, endorsement of critical multiculturalism was negatively associated with both 
national identification attachment (r = -0.25, p = .001) and political conservatism (r = -0.48, p 
< .001). In other words, these relationships were similarly negative in direction for both 
manifestations of multiculturalism, but slightly (although not significantly) stronger in 
magnitude for critical multiculturalism than for multiculturalism. National identification 
exploration was positively associated with multiculturalism (multiculturalism: r = 0.32, p < .001) 
and critical multiculturalism, r = 0.21, p = .005). However, contrary to hypotheses, national 
identification exploration was also positively related to colorblind ideology (r = 0.27, p < .001).   
A third point of interest was the relationship between diversity ideologies and 
endorsement of social justice policies. Endorsement of social justice policies was unrelated to 
colorblind ideology (r = 0.03, p = 0.716), but was strongly positively correlated with both 
multiculturalism (r = 0.82, p < .01) and critical multiculturalism (r = 0.87, p < .01).  
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At first glance then, results appear to contradict the hypothesis that critical 
multiculturalism is more conducive than multiculturalism for promotion of social justice policies. 
However, the equally strong relationship of different manifestations of multiculturalism may be 
an artifact of their strong relationship with each other. In order to test the independent 
contribution of different diversity ideologies as predictors of social justice policy endorsement, I 
conducted a multiple regression analysis.  
Predictors of social justice policy endorsement.  I conducted a standard multiple 
regression analysis with social justice policy endorsement as the dependent variable (Table 6). I 
entered all three diversity ideologies, identification variables, and political conservatism into the 
model simultaneously. The overall model was significant, F(6,171) = 105.83, p < .001, and 
accounted for 78.8% of the variance in policy endorsement (adjusted R2 = .780). More important 
for present purposes, results revealed that critical multiculturalism was a strong predictor (b = 
0.65, SE =.08, t(171) = 7.79, p < .001) and uniquely explained 7.6% of the variation in policy 
endorsement. Multiculturalism (b = 0.25, SE = .10, t(171) = 2.67, p = .008), and conservatism (b 
= -0.13, SE = .04, t(171) = -3.20,  p = .002) also contributed significantly to the regression 
model, but were weaker predictors and explained less variance (0.9% and 1.3%, respectively) 
than did critical multiculturalism.  
Discussion 
These results indicate that critical multiculturalism and multiculturalism have some level 
of compatibility with one another and with policy endorsement, whereas colorblind ideology is 
not at all compatible with critical multiculturalism or social justice policy endorsement. This 
suggests that multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism are related rather than completely 
distinct, which aligns with my theoretical assumptions.  
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One aim of Study 1 was to examine how participants conceptualize multiculturalism. 
Analyses of open-ended responses suggest that the majority of participants have a mainstream 
and normative understanding of multiculturalism. When describing what multiculturalism means 
to them, their responses included mostly discussions of cultural differences and celebrating 
cultural differences, both of which are current common understandings and principles of 
multiculturalism (Bell and Hartman, 2007; McLaren 1997; Ward, 2008). Very few participants 
discussed multiculturalism in terms of structural disadvantage, whiteness, or racism/oppression. 
These results provide some evidence that dominant conceptualizations of multiculturalism lack 
critical elements regarding what multiculturalism means. This was also apparent in the low mean 
endorsement of critical multiculturalism in the study. Therefore, it is reasonable to examine how 
critical multiculturalism may differently signal awareness of the systemic disparities and 
inequalities experienced by marginalized cultural groups, while also celebrating and encouraging 
peoples’ cultural or racial differences. 
 Another aim of Study 1 was to investigate the relationships between the three diversity 
ideologies, their relationships with national or political identification, and their relationships with 
and support for social justice policies. On one hand, results suggest considerable overlap 
between multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism. Specifically, results of the PCA showed 
that the two measures loaded on the same factor; bivariate correlations indicated strong positive 
relationships between them; and both emerged in multiple regression analyses as unique, positive 
predictors of social justice policy endorsement. These results are consistent with the idea that 
multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism share a common core related to an emphasis on 
celebration of cultural difference.  
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 On the other hand, results also provide evidence for hypothesized divergence of critical 
multiculturalism from multiculturalism. A first point of divergence was bivariate relationships 
with colorblindness. The results also showed that colorblind ideology and critical 
multiculturalism were unrelated supporting the idea that the two ideologies include dissimilar 
principles. Second, results showed that although both multiculturalism and critical 
multiculturalism were negatively related with national identification attachment and political 
conservatism, this relationship was nominally (but not significantly) stronger in magnitude for 
critical multiculturalism than multiculturalism. Finally, multiple regression analysis reveals 
independent contributions of both forms of multiculturalism to support social justice policies, but 
a stronger relationship between social justice policy and critical multiculturalism than 
multiculturalism. This suggests that even though there is some level of similarity between to the 
two, there is some support for the idea that the two ideologies diverge in their predictive value.  
Patterns from the standard multiple regressions are particularly relevant for the guiding 
idea of this research: namely, that critical multiculturalism is more conducive to promotion of 
social justice than multiculturalism. However, it remains unclear whether this is a general 
relationship or particular to the measure of social justice policy that I used in Study 1. I 
deliberately chose social justice policy domain to show that it was a compatible concept with 
critical multiculturalism. It remains unclear whether the critical multiculturalism advantage 
would extend to a broader range of social justice policies. Study 1 implies that each of the 
diversity ideologies may be stronger predictors for different types of policy measures. Therefore, 
in Study 2, I examine how the three diversity ideologies may differentially predict policy 





Study 1 showed that whereas both multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism 
predicted social justice policy endorsement, critical multiculturalism explained the largest 
amount of variance in policy endorsement. However, a skeptical critic might argue that the social 
justice policy items in Study 1 were closely tailored to the critical multiculturalism items. It 
would be informative to know how critical multiculturalism and other ideology items were 
related to endorsement of a broader range of policies. As a result, I made three changes in Study 
2.  
First, in contrast to Study 1, I developed a set of policy measures in which items were 
relevant to each type of diversity ideologies (see Appendix B). A straightforward hypothesis is 
that is that each of the diversity ideologies will most strongly predict its corresponding policy 
measure. Beyond that straightforward expectation, the specific motivation for the current study is 
to test a second and somewhat competing hypothesis that a politicized critical multiculturalism is 
a better predictor of a range of social justice policies than a domesticated multiculturalism.  
Second, I added an affirmative action measure as another relevant policy that might show 
differential correlations with multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism. I was interested in 
how the diversity ideologies differently predicted a policy that has triggered both colorblind 
narratives against it and multicultural narratives somewhat in favor of affirmative action (Citrin 
et al, 2001). The hypothesis is that critical multiculturalism ideology will be a stronger predictor 
of affirmative action policies than multiculturalism because it includes acknowledgement and 
understandings of structural issues where multiculturalism does not.  
Third, I added a measure of awareness of race and privilege measure and tested its 
mediating effects. I wanted to examine whether awareness of race and privilege mediated the 
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relationship between diversity ideology and policy endorsement. Since critical consciousness 
acknowledges the historical inequities and policies that created them, it will be associated with 
more support for politicized policies that rectify these structural issues. 
Method 
Participants. Based on the similarities in design between Study 1 and Study 2 (similar 
number of predictors with two additional outcomes), I chose to recruit 280 participants. I 
conducted a post-hoc analysis using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) to 
ensure the sample size was adequate to yield a power of .80. Analysis was set at a small to 
moderate effect size, alpha of .05, and a power of .90. Results indicated that the final sample 
used for the study had adequate power. As in Study 1, I again used TurkPrime to recruit 
participants, and I retained only those participants who self-identified as White. Two participants 
wished to withdrawal their results from the study, so I excluded their data from all analyses. The 
final sample size was 190 White participants.  
Participants’ ages ranged from 21 - 71 years (M = 38.72, SD = 13.01, Mdn = 35). About 
half the participants identified as female (50.5%), did not earn a Bachelor’s degree or higher 
(52.1%), and earned $40,000 or less in annual income (51.1%). All participants were U.S. 
citizens. Recruitment efforts were similar to Study 1 indicating that the study was about people’s 
attitudes and beliefs about current social issues.  
Procedure and measures. The procedure for this study was similar to that of Study 1, 
except that I omitted the open-ended question about understandings of multiculturalism. The full 
set of materials appears in Appendix B. 
Diversity Ideology Endorsement. First, participants responded to the same 15-item 
diversity ideology scale from Study 1. I analyzed responses in terms of the same three 
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subscales—specifically, colorblind ideology (α = .83)4, multiculturalism (α = .89), and critical 
multiculturalism (α = .87)—from Study 1.  
Policy measure. Participants responded to a set of policy measures which included items 
that were distinct to each diversity ideology.5 Common-identity policy items were an 
expression of colorblind ideology (e.g. “give priority to core or mainstream American themes 
(rather than diversity for its own sake) in public education and arts institutions;” α = .84). 
Diversity appreciation policy items were an expression of multiculturalism (e.g. “support 
the creative traditions (e.g. art, music, literature, etc.;”) associated with a broad set of 
cultural communities;” α = .86). Social justice policy items were an expression of critical 
multiculturalism (e.g. “expand government investment in communities of color as a 
form of reparation for past and present injustice;” α = .86). Participants responded to the 
extent to which they endorsed each policy on a Likert-type scale from 0 (not at all) to 5 
(completely). 
 Affirmative action support. Next, participants responded to 4 items about their support 
for affirmative action policies on a scale of 0 (not at all) to 5 (very much). The items ranged 
from no support of affirmative action policies (e.g. “nothing, I believe we should end 
the use of affirmative action policies as a means to ensure proportionate representation 
in important institutions across social identity categories”), to high support (e.g. “to 
ensure recruitment and retention of people from racial and cultural communities who 
                                               
4Similar to Study 1, the colorblind ideology scale only included the four items which emerged as one factor based 
on results from the PCA analysis.  
5I conducted a PCA of all the policy items with Varimax rotation. Three factors emerged with eigenvalues greater 
than 1. Together, they explained 67.57% of the variance. Factor 1 included policy items associated with both 
multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism ideologies, Factor 2 included four of the policy items associated with 
colorblind ideology, and Factor 3 included the one remaining item associated with colorblind ideology, item 5. 
Based on these results, I computed the colorblind policy measure using the four items that loaded together from the 
PCA. Cronbach alpha of all five colorblind policy items was 0.81 compared to 0.84 after I excluded policy item 5.  
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have suffered from a history of exclusion and disempowerment”). I reverse coded the no 
support item and I computed an affirmative action policy support index by averaging across the 
four items (α = .85); higher scores indicated stronger support of affirmative action.  
  Colorblind racial attitudes scale (CoBRAS). Participants next responded to the 7-item 
Awareness of Race and Privilege subscale from the CoBRAS (Neville et al., 2000). The 
CoBRAS measures the extent to which participants believe that racism is a factor related to 
racial divisions and inequities. The subscale measured the extent to which participants believe 
that racial divisions and inequities are due to white privilege. Responses were measured on a 
scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Some example items were “White people 
in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin,” and “Racial and ethnic 
minorities do not have the same opportunities as white people in the U.S.” I reverse coded items 
such that higher scores indicate higher levels of awareness of racial privilege (α = .93). 
 Identification measures and demographic questionnaire. Participants responded to the 
same two identification measures (U.S. identity exploration, α = .86 and national identity 
attachment, α = .92), as in Study 1. They also completed the same demographic questionnaire as 
Study 1, including 2-item composite measure of political conservatism (α = .88). 
Results and Discussion 
  Prior to running analyses, I conducted relevant tests of assumptions. Analyses of scatter 
plots and Q-Q plots of residuals of all quantitative variables included in the analyses (e.g. 
predictor variables, outcomes variables, etc.) indicated that data met assumptions of linearity and 
homoscedasticity (Meyers et al., 2013) but violated assumptions of normality (Meyers et al, 
2013). I examined boxplots to determine if any cases met the cutoff range of 1.5 to 3.0 times the 
interquartile range (IQR). These tests indicated that 20 cases were outliers. Further investigation 
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led me to remove the seven most extreme of these 20 were cases (2.2. - 3.0 times the IQR; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).6 I analyzed data from a final sample of 183 participants.7  
Relationships among variables. Correlations among all measures and descriptive 
statistics appear in Table 7. Similar to Study 1, there was a strong positive association between 
critical multiculturalism and multiculturalism (r = 0.85, p < .001) that reflects a degree of 
conceptual overlap. Other results deviated from Study 1 patterns. Whereas colorblind ideology 
was positively associated with multiculturalism and unrelated to critical multiculturalism in 
Study 1,  it was unrelated to multiculturalism (r = -0.00, p = .955) and negatively associated with 
critical multiculturalism (r = -0.15, p = .044) in Study 2. Nonetheless, consistent with 
hypotheses, relationships with colorblind ideology were more incompatible—that is, less positive 
(or more negative)—for critical multiculturalism than for multiculturalism in both Study 1 and 
Study 2.   
Consistent with Study 1, colorblind ideology was positively associated with national 
identification attachment (r = 0.31, p < .001) and political conservatism (r = 0.31, p < .001). 
Furthermore, the other two diversity ideologies showed negative relationships with both national 
identification attachment and political conservatism that were slightly more pronounced, 
although not significantly different, in the case of critical multiculturalism (r = -0.29, p < .001; 
and r = -0.50, p < .001, respectively) than multiculturalism (r = -0.13, p = .090; and  r = -0.39, p 
< .001, respectively). Contrary to hypotheses, national identification exploration was unrelated to 
                                               
6 Although removal of these 7 cases resulted in slight improvements, the data still violated assumption of normality 
(Shapiro-Wilks test of normality changed from p = .000 to p = .011). However, I chose not to remove more cases 
because data in the remaining cases did not appear to be the result of systematic bias (e.g. extreme or neutral 
responding). 
7 Removal of the seven outliers did not change any of the statistical patterns for either the main or supplemental 
statistical analyses.  
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both multiculturalism (multiculturalism: r = 0.08, p = .267) and critical multiculturalism (r = -
0.07, p < .326), but positively related to colorblind ideology (r = 0.16, p < .029).   
Predictors of policy endorsement. I conducted a series of standard multiple regression 
analyses with each of the policy endorsement subscales—common-identity, diversity 
appreciation, and social justice—as separate dependent variables. Similar to Study 1, I entered 
the three diversity ideologies, political conservatism, and the identification variables 
simultaneously into the model. 
Predictors of common identity policy endorsement. The multiple regression analysis for 
common identity policy endorsement appear in Table 8. The regression model explained 51.5% 
of the variance in common-identity policy endorsement and the predictive model was significant, 
F(6,176) = 31.14, p < .001, Adjusted R2 = .498. Colorblind ideology (b = .25, SE = .06, t(176) = 
4.38, p < .001), political conservatism (b = 0.30, SE = .06, t(176) = 5.49,  p < .001), critical 
multiculturalism (b = -0.27, SE = .12, t(176) = -2.36, p = .020), and national identity exploration 
(b = 0.11, SE = .08, t(176) = 2.18,  p = .030), were significant predictors. Colorblind ideology 
and political conservatism uniquely explained the highest proportion of variance in colorblind 
policies (5.3% and 8.3%, respectively) then critical multiculturalism (1.5%), and national 
identity exploration (1.3%).  
Consistent with expectations, higher endorsement of colorblind ideology predicts 
stronger endorsement of common-identity policies. I propose this connection is an expression of 
colorblind ideology. More interesting for current purposes, critical multiculturalism—but not 
multiculturalism—emerged as a significant predictor of the opposite, weaker endorsement of 
common-identity policies.  This suggests that critical multiculturalism may be more effective 
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than multiculturalism for mobilizing resistance to common-identity policies associated in the 
current political climate with colorblind ideology and White supremacy.   
Predictors of diversity appreciation policy endorsement. The standard multiple 
regression analysis for diversity appreciation policy endorsement appear in Table 9. The 
regression model was significant F(3,176) = 70.02, p < .001, and accounted for 70.5% (Adjusted 
R2 = .695) of the variance in diversity appreciation policy endorsement. Multiculturalism (b = 
0.32, SE = .08, t(176) = 4.21, p < .001), critical multiculturalism (b = 0.33, SE = .07, t(176) = 
4.51, p < .001), national identity attachment (b = -0.28, SE = .06, t(176) = -4.68, p < .001), and 
national identity exploration (b = 0.15, SE = .05, t(176) = 3.02, p = .003) emerged as significant 
predictors.  
Similar to the relationship between multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism, it 
appears that because both share many of the same principles, they almost equally predict 
diversity appreciation policy. With regard to this type of policy, these two ideologies are 
compatible and are not differentially predictive of diversity appreciation policies. Also consistent 
with hypotheses—higher engagement of one’s national identity (exploration) predicted 
endorsement of diversity appreciation policy, while attachment with national identity predicted 
opposition to diversity appreciation policy. 
Predictors of social justice policy endorsement. The standard multiple regression 
analysis for social justice policy endorsement appears in Table 10. The regression model was 
statistically significant, F(6,176) = 61.21, p < .001, and accounted for 67.6% (Adjusted R2 
= .665) of the variance in social justice policy endorsement. Critical multiculturalism (b = 0.45, 
SE = .08, t(176) = 5.73, p < .001), national identity attachement (b = -0.28, SE = .06, t(176) =  
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-4.47, p < .001), and political conservatism (b = -0.11, SE = .04, t(176) = -2.82, p = .005) were 
significant predictors, but critical multiculturalism was the strongest predictor and uniquely 
explained 6.1% of the variance in social justice policy. Thus, although it may be related to the 
other diversity ideologies, critical multiculturalism uniquely predicted support for this set of 
social justice-related policies. Both multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism similarly 
predicted diversity appreciation policy, but they diverge in their prediction of support for social 
justice policy. In fact, multiculturalism ideology is not well positioned as an ideology to predict a 
more critical type of social justice policy measure. This suggests, again, the ineffectiveness of 
multiculturalism with regard to policies that require more than the acknowledgement of different 
identities and celebration of those identities. There are indeed policies that require a critical lens 
that acknowledges the voice of marginalized cultural groups, the inequities specifically 
experienced by those groups, and more radical changes to support more critical types of social 
justice.  
Predictors of affirmative action. I used a similar standard multiple regression model 
approach to examine the predictors of affirmative action endorsement (see Table 11). The model 
was significant, F(6,172) = 38.09, p < .001, R2 = .565, Adjusted R2 = .550, and revealed three 
significant predictors, critical multiculturalism (b = 0.45, SE = .10, t(172) = 4.39, p < .001), 
colorblind ideology (b = -0.11, SE = .05, t(172) = -2.09,  p = .038), and conservatism (b = -0.10, 
SE = .05, t(172) = -2.06, p = .041). Critical multiculturalism was the strongest predictor, 
uniquely accounting for 4.8% of the variance in endorsement of affirmative action policy. 
Aligned with hypotheses, critical multiculturalism may be a better predictor than 
multiculturalism at mobilizing support for affirmative action policies.  
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Predictors of awareness of racism and privilege. I used the same standard multiple 
regression approach to assess predictors of awareness of racism and privilege. Results, which 
appear in Table 12, show a significant final model, F(6,176) = 36.03, p < .001, R2 = .551, 
Adjusted R2 = .536, and revealed four significant predictors, colorblind ideology, (b = -0.24, SE 
= .07, t(176) = 3.67, p < .001), critical multiculturalism (b = 0.58, SE = .13, t(176) = -4.42, p 
< .001), national identity (b = -0.27, SE = .11, t(176) = 2.50, p < .013), and political 
conservatism (b = -0.29, SE = .06, t(176) = 4.62, p < .001). Critical multiculturalism and 
conservatism uniquely explained the most variance (5.0% and 5.4% respectively) in opposite 
directions.  
Consistent with hypotheses, critical multiculturalism predicted the awareness of racism 
and privilege while colorblind ideology, political conservatism, and national identification 
attachment predicted the denial of racism and privilege. Colorblind ideology and critical 
multiculturalism ideologies diverge in how they predict denial and awareness of racism and 
privilege, again supporting the distinction between the predictive value of the diversity 
ideologies.  
These results also suggest further exploration of the possible mediating effects of 
awareness of racism and privilege between diversity ideologies and policy endorsement. It is 
possible that awareness or denial of racism and privilege is a mechanism by which diversity 
ideologies are related to policy endorsement. More current purposes, it may also reveal how 
critical multiculturalism and multiculturalism may diverge as diversity ideologies.  
Awareness of racism and privilege as a mechanism between diversity ideologies and 
policy endorsement. To better understand the relationship between diversity ideologies, 
awareness (or denial) of racism and privilege, and policy endorsement, I conducted several 
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exploratory mediation analyses. Few empirical studies have investigated diversity ideologies as 
predictors of different outcomes mediated by different types of identification (Deaux et al, 2006). 
Rather than exploring the mediating effects of identification, my interest was whether critical 
awareness or denial of racism and privilege would mediate effects of diversity ideologies on 
endorsement of social justice policies. To my knowledge no empirical work has examined a 
model with these sets of constructs.  
All mediation analyses controlled for national identification exploration, national 
identification attachment, and political conservatism since at least one of these constructs 
emerged as a significant predictor in multiple regression models. I conducted three analyses to 
test the mediating effects of awareness of racism and privilege on the relationship between the 
three diversity ideologies (which I entered into each model simultaneously) and each policy 
measure outcome, tested separately. A theoretical model appears in Figure 1. To test these 
models, I used Hayes’ (2016) PROCESS macro for SPSS. This macro produced estimates of co-
efficient and standard error as well as direct and indirect effects with 95% bias-corrected 
confidence intervals ([CIs]) using a 10,000 bootstrap resampling method. Bootstrapping 
resamples a subset of the sample from the original data set to produce estimated indirect effects. 
This is a preferred method for testing mediation models because it does not assume a normally 
disturbed mediated path (Hayes, 2012; 2018). An indirect effect is significant if the CI does not 
include zero within the range.  
Model testing. The results of path statistics for each of the three models appear in Figures 
2 – 4, and indirect paths and CIs appear in Table 13. Mediation was significant for both the 
common identity policy and social justice policy outcomes. First, the denial (or low awareness) 
of race and privilege partially mediated the relationship between colorblind ideology and 
72 
 
endorsement of common-identity policy (see Figure 2). The indirect effect through denial of 
racism and privilege was significant (a1b = .04, 95% CI[.0066, .0912]). The mediation was only 
partial because colorblind ideology was still significantly related to common-identity policy 
when accounting for the effects of denial of racism and privilege (c’ = 0.21, p = .0004). 
Similarly, the indirect effect of colorblind ideology on social justice policy endorsement via 
awareness of racism and privilege was significant (a1b = -.05, 95% CI [-.0860 to -.0172]), and 
revealed a full mediation because colorblind ideology was not related to social justice policy 
endorsement after accounting for the effects of denial of race and privilege (c1 = 0.03, p = .42; 
see Figure 4). These results are consistent with the idea that colorblind ideology lead to 
endorsement of common-identity policies and opposition to social justice policies because it 
promotes denial of racism and privilege.  
Awareness of race and privilege fully mediated the relationship critical multiculturalism 
and common-identity policy endorsement (a3b = -.10, 95% CI[-.2136, -.0148]; see Figure 2). 
That is, critical multiculturalism predicted lower support for common-identity policies via its 
positive effect on race/privilege awareness. The opposite pattern was true for social justice policy 
endorsement. The mediational path was significant (a3b = .11, 95% CI[.0459 to .2604]; see 
Figure 4), and mediation was partial. These results support the idea that the awareness of 
structural issues related to race and privilege helps explain why people support critical 
multiculturalism and are likely to endorse social justice policies but not common-identity 
policies.  
There were no significant indirect effects of multiculturalism through awareness of race 
and privilege for any of the outcomes (common-identity, diversity appreciation, and social 
justice policy; see Figure 3). Across all the models, it appears that multiculturalism is unrelated 
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to awareness of structural issues of racism and privilege and, therefore, is not a significant 
predictor of either support for social justice or diversity appreciation policies, or for opposition 
of common-identity policies. Critical multiculturalism, more so than multiculturalism, is related 
to attunement to structural issues such as racism and privilege and also problematizes the 
endorsement of common-identity policy.  
 Studies 1 and 2 were correlational and provided information about the relationship 
between the ideologies themselves and the ideologies and policy endorsement. However, the 
correlational design of Studies 1 and 2 does not allow for conclusions, regarding the causal 
effects of diversity ideologies on support for social policies. In order to examine the effects of the 
diversity ideologies on policy endorsement, I conducted an experiment.  
Study 3 
I had two primary goals for Study 3. The first goal was to examine the effects of the three 
diversity ideologies on policy endorsement relevant to each type of ideology through an 
experimental design. The second goal was to explore whether results observed in Studies 1 and 2 
would replicate in another study.  
Method 
 Participants. I conducted an a priori power analysis to determine adequate sample size. 
Setting the analysis with an effect size of f = .20, alpha at .05, and power at .80 yielded a sample 
size of 244. I changed the power estimate to .90, and plotted a range of sample size value at 
different estimates of power to help me determine a sample size that would buffer for exclusions 
based on manipulation failures, yielding a sample size of 320.  
 I used TurkPrime and recruited 352 participants. Since I included only White participants 
for the prior studies, I maintained consistency by including only White participants in the final 
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analyses for Study 3, leaving a sample of 282 White participants. This sample size meets a 
conventional range of power as it falls between the lowest point of power of estimation (244 
participants) and the highest point of estimation (320 participants). Participants’ ages ranged 
from 20 to 73 years (M = 36.12, SD = 10.86, Mdn = 33.00). About half the participants identified 
as female (51.2%) and did not earn a Bachelor’s degree or higher (50.9%). Most participants 
earned $60,000 or less in annual income (72.2%) and were U.S. citizens (96.8%). 
 Procedure and measures. Participants first read instructions explaining that the purpose 
of the study was to understand people’s impression of various issues pertaining to diversity in the 
United States. I randomly assigned participants to one of three diversity conditions: colorblind 
ideology, multiculturalism, or critical multiculturalism, which were manipulated via a written 
passage espousing diversity goals. Each of the passages differed in what social scientists advised 
for long-term peace and prosperity in the U.S. In the colorblind condition, the social scientists 
advocated an emphasis on common identity (e.g, “The bottom line is this: social scientists advise 
that an emphasis on our common identity is essential for long-term peace and prosperity of the 
United States”). In the multiculturalism condition, the social scientists advocated appreciation of 
cultural differences (e.g. “The bottom line is this: social scientists advise that appreciation for 
cultural differences is essential for long-term peace and prosperity of the United States”). In the 
critical multiculturalism condition, the social scientists advocated a push beyond mere 
celebration of cultural differences to recognize the ongoing legacy of racism (e.g. “The bottom 
line is this: social scientists advise that we must push beyond mere celebration of cultural 
difference and recognize the ongoing legacy of racism to ensure long-term peace and prosperity 
of the United States”). After participants read the passage, they listed five reasons why they 
thought the approach to diversity they read about would benefit U.S. society. Thus, the design 
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for this study was a one-way between-subjects design with three levels of the diversity condition. 
All materials appear in Appendix C.  
 Policy endorsement. Participants then completed a modified version of the policy 
endorsement items from Study 2. Previously, participants responded to 5 items relevant to each 
diversity ideology. For Study 3, I chose a smaller subset from each category to reduce the 
number of items from 15 to 10 items. I chose items that best reflected each of the diversity 
ideologies and labeled each sub-measure the same as in Study 2: two “common-identity policy” 
items as an expression of colorblind ideology (α = .75)8, three “diversity appreciation policy” 
items as an expression of multiculturalism (α = .76), and four “social justice policy” items as an 
expression of critical multiculturalism (α = .84). I created a composite score for each policy 
measure; higher scores indicated higher endorsement.  
Diversity ideology endorsement. Next, participants responded to the 15 item diversity 
ideology scale which measured colorblind (α = .87), multiculturalism (α = .87), and critical 
multiculturalism (α = .90) ideologies from the previous studies. I made one minor change to item 
number 13 from the previous two studies. In the previous studies, factor analysis of the measures 
showed that item 13, which I intended as a colorblind ideology, loaded with multiculturalism and 
critical multiculturalism. I edited this item to, “We must learn to appreciate individual 
accomplishments without so much attention to people's ethnic or racial identities.” A PCA with 
Varimax rotation replicated the two-factor structure that I observed in previous studies, but the 
new item loaded with other colorblind items as I intended. Thus, in Study 3, I computed the 
colorblind ideology subscale using five items rather than the four items from Studies 1 and 2.  
                                               
8 Originally three items were included as part of the common-identity policy measure. However, I excluded one 
item because it correlated weakly with the other two items and reduced the scale reliability (α = .61).  
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 Manipulation checks. Participants answered a recall manipulation check. They indicated 
which of four statements—(1) Social scientists advise that we emphasize a common identity; (2) 
Social scientists advise that we appreciate cultural difference; (3) Social scientists advise that we 
recognize the ongoing legacy of racism; (4) I do not recall—best described the approach to 
diversity they read. A large number of participants (n = 62; 22%) failed the recall manipulation 
check (colorblind condition failures = 6.4%; multicultural condition failures = 2.1%; critical 
multiculturalism failures = 13.5%). Participants assigned to the critical multiculturalism and 
colorblind conditions both incorrectly recalled that they read about multiculturalism (43.5% and 
24.2%, respectively). A possibility for these failures may be due to the timing of the recall check. 
This manipulation check followed the response task, and the policy endorsement and diversity 
ideology measures. Thus, too much time may have elapsed for participants to respond to this 
question accurately.  
I reviewed participants’ five responses about why they thought the approach to diversity 
they read about would benefit U.S. society. Only about half (55.9%) of the participants assigned 
to the colorblind condition wrote responses that aligned with the passage. Most failures (26.9%) 
were a result of responses that were irrelevant to the task (e.g. “seems fun,” “social scientists,” 
“all good”), while 17.2% of participants wrote responses that resonated with multiculturalism 
(e.g. “our differences are what makes us great,” “different viewpoints”). The majority of 
participants (64.8%) assigned to the multicultural condition wrote responses that aligned with the 
ideology (e.g. “so people are respectful of differences,” “must respect cultural differences and 
learn to appreciate”). Similar to the colorblind condition responses, most failures (30.8%) were a 
result of irrelevant responses to the task (e.g. “this will unite us,” “less hate”). Finally, the 
majority of participants (69.9%) assigned to the critical multicultural condition were unable to 
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write responses that articulated the tenets of the diversity ideology. There was a relatively even 
distribution of responses that were either not relevant to the passage (32.3%; e.g. “more love,” 
“possibility of nuclear wars that could end the world”) or that resonated with multiculturalism 
(37.6%; e.g. “Better understanding and acceptance of other cultures can help us reach new 
solutions to problems”). Some examples of response that did resonate with the critical 
multicultural passage were “we confront our racist legacy and design institutions that reflect the 
strength of our vibrant cultural diversity,” and “only when we are able to recognize our historical 
racism will be able to move forward.” Interestingly, five participants outwardly opposed the 
passage and wrote responses such as, “It won't benefit society. Most claims of racism are 
fabricated,” and “White privilege is a figment of one's imagination. Be honest and look around. 
Most Whites are NOT privileged.”  
Compliance with the post-response exercise may have been low because the instructions, 
“In the space below, please list five reasons why you think the approach to diversity you read 
about will yield benefits for U.S. society”, may have been vague. Additionally, perhaps the 
inclusion of the word “diversity” in the instructions implicitly signaled multicultural ideology to 
participants as previous research has shown that many people conflate ideas of diversity with 
multicultural ideology (Bell & Hartmann, 2007; Plaut, 2010). This may explain why the second 
most common response that participants wrote across all conditions resonated with 
multiculturalism. Despite these various manipulation failures, final analyses included all 
participants as removal of participants who failed the manipulation check did not change 
patterns. 
Identification measures and Demographic questionnaire. Participants next responded to 
the same two identification measures as used in the prior studies: U.S. identification exploration 
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(α = .90) and national identification attachment (α = .88),  as well as the same demographic items 
and the same two item measure of political conservatism (α = .88).  
Results  
 I first conducted tests of statistical assumptions. Analyses of residuals of all quantitative 
variables included in the analyses indicated data met assumptions of homogeneity of variances 
(Meyers et al, 2013) but not normality (Meyers et al., 2013). I ran tests of normality of the 
residuals on the outcome variables. These included the Shapiro-Wilks test of normality and 
examination of histograms, Q-Q plots, and boxplots. The Shapiro-Wilks tests of normality was 
significant for all six outcomes (ps < .001), indicating a violation of assumptions of normality. 
Examination of the histograms showed slight right skewness for most of the outcomes except for 
the common-identity policy outcome, which was normally distributed. Next, I examined 
boxplots to determine if any cases were outliers or extreme outliers (2.2. – 3.0 or more times the 
IQR; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001) and warranted removal. From this investigation, there were 
approximately a dozen possible outliers.  
When I investigated these cases closely, some participants responded in ways that 
followed hypothesized patterns—participants randomly assigned to the colorblind condition 
responded with higher values for common-identity policy items and colorblind ideology items 
and lower values for multicultural and critical multicultural policies and diversity ideologies. 
Other participants did not respond in hypothesized patterns—participants assigned to 
multicultural or critical multicultural conditions either responded with high endorsement of 
common-identity policy and diversity ideology items and low endorsement of all others, or 
responded similarly on both multicultural and critical multicultural policy and ideology items. 
Under these circumstances, I did not deem removal of these cases appropriate. One case met the 
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threshold for removal. Responses across all outcome items were exactly the same value except 
for two, indicating that this participant was not discriminating between the items and showed 
floor effect responding patterns. Based on this result, I removed the one case, resulting in a final 
sample of 281.9 Assumptions of normality did not greatly improve after I removed this case and 
no other interventions were deemed appropriate to remedy this violation.10  
Effects of the diversity ideology manipulations on policy endorsement and diversity 
ideology. I conducted a series of separate one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) to compare 
the effects of the diversity ideology conditions (colorblind, multiculturalism, and critical 
multicultural) on endorsement of policy (common-identity, diversity appreciation, and social 
justice) and diversity ideology (colorblind ideology, multiculturalism, and critical 
multiculturalism) outcomes. Results of all analyses appear in Table 14. 
Effects of the ideology manipulation on ideology endorsement. Results of the separate 
one-way ANOVA indicated that the diversity ideology manipulations had a significant effect on 
endorsement for colorblind ideology, F(2, 278) = 4.72, p = .010, η2 = .033. Simple contrasts 
showed a significant difference between the colorblind (M = 5.49, SD = 1.31) and critical 
multiculturalism conditions (M = 4.86, SD = 1.57; p = .003), but not between colorblind and 
multiculturalism condition (M = 5.27, SD = 1.42; p = .285). The difference between the 
multiculturalism (M = 5.27, SD = 1.42) and critical multiculturalism (M = 4.86, SD = 1.57) 
conditions were marginally significant, p = .052. Similar to correlational results of previous 
studies, this pattern suggest that critical multiculturalism may be incompatible with colorblind 
ideology in way that multiculturalism is not. There were no effects of the diversity ideology 
                                               
9 Removal of the outlier did not change any of the statistical patterns for all analyses. 
10 Previous research suggests that in terms of Type I error, F-tests for Analyses of Variance (ANOVA) are 
robust regardless of the degree of deviation from a normal distribution in the groups (Blanca, Alarcon, Arnau, 
Bono, & Bendayan, 2017).  
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manipulations on either multiculturalism, F(2, 278) = .12, p = .884, η2 = .001, or critical 
multiculturalism F(2, 278) = .75, p = .475, η2 = .005, outcomes.  
Effects of the ideology manipulation on policy endorsement.  Inspection of means for 
each diversity ideology condition suggests hypothesized patterns for policy endorsement 
outcomes (e.g. participants assigned to critical multiculturalism condition endorsed social justice 
policy more than the other policies). However, analyses did not reveal significant effects of the 
diversity ideology conditions on identity-blind policy, F(2, 278) = 1.12, p = .326, η2 = .008, 
diversity appreciation F(2, 278) = 1.00, p = .369 η2 = .007, or social justice policy F(2, 278) 
= .91, p = .405, η2 = .006.  
Summary. The primary analyses revealed little effect of the diversity manipulations on 
either the policy and diversity ideology outcomes. When participants were primed with a 
particular type of diversity ideology it did not cause them to endorse a certain type of policy over 
the another, or a certain type of diversity ideology over another. The single exception to this 
generalization was endorsement of colorblind ideology. Exposure to critical multiculturalism 
appeared to inhibit endorsement of colorblind ideology relative to exposure to colorblind 
ideology or even multiculturalism.   
Supplemental Analysis. Given that the experimental manipulation failed to impact 
responses, I computed correlations and conducted regression analyses to determine whether 
results found in Studies 1 and 2 replicated in Study 3.  
Relationships among variables. Bivariate correlations (see Table 15) showed that similar 
to Studies 1 and 2, multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism were strongly and positively 
related (r = .87, p < .001). Despite this conceptual overlap, this different expression of 
multiculturalism showed different relationships with colorblind ideology. Colorblind ideology 
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was negatively associated with critical multiculturalism (r = -.14, p = .017) but not significantly 
associated with multiculturalism (r = .000, p = .993). This pattern replicates results of Study 2, 
and is generally consistent with the proposition that colorblind ideology is more incompatible 
with critical multiculturalism than multiculturalism.  
Identification and political conservatism measures also showed similar patterns with the 
diversity ideologies as in the two previous studies. National identification attachment and 
political conservatism were positively related to colorblind ideology (r = .29, p < .001;and r 
= .33, p < .001, respectively), but negatively related to both multiculturalism (r = -.21, p = .001; 
and r = -.31, p < .001, respectively), and critical multiculturalism (r = -.26, p < .001; and r = -.41, 
p < .001, respectively). The magnitude of the relationship with national identification attachment 
continued to be more slightly more pronounced, but not significantly different, with critical 
multiculturalism than with multiculturalism. National identification exploration was positively 
related to endorsement of colorblind ideology (r = .22, p < .001), but unrelated to both 
multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism (r = .10, p = .11, r = .03, p = .58, respectively).  
Multiple regression analyses of the policy outcomes. I conducted a series of standard 
multiple regression analyses with each of the policy endorsement outcomes – common-identity 
policy, diversity appreciation policy, and social justice policy – as separate dependent variables.   
Predictors of common-identity policy endorsement. The standard multiple regression 
analysis for common-identity policy endorsement appears in Table 16. The predictive model was 
significant F(6, 274) =33.81, p < .001, R2 = .425, Adjusted R2 = .412. Predictive relationships of 
individual variables were similar to patterns from Study 2. Colorblind ideology was a significant 
predictor (b = 0.28; p < .001) and uniquely explained 6.1% of the variance in common-identity 
policy. Political conservatism (b = 0.33; p < .001) was also a significant predictor and uniquely 
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explained 9.6% of the variance in common-identity policy. National identifications exploration 
was marginally significant (b = 0.13; p = .05). A major difference from Study 2 was that critical 
multiculturalism did not meet conventional levels of significance as a predictor.  
Predictors of diversity appreciation policy endorsement. Results of the standard multiple 
regression analysis for diversity appreciation policy endorsement appear in Table 17. The 
regression model explained 55.0% of the variance in diversity appreciation policy, F(6, 212) = 
39.04, p < .001, Adjusted R2 = .511. In this case, predictive relationships of individual variables 
deviated considerably from the patterns of Study 2. With all predictors in the model, only 
multiculturalism emerged as a significant predictor (b = 0.51; p < .001) and uniquely explained 
7.6% of the variance in diversity appreciation policy.  
Predictors of social justice policy endorsement. Finally, the regression model for social 
justice policy endorsement (Table 18) was statistically significant, F(6, 274) = 116.25, p < .001, 
R2 = .718, Adjusted R2 = .712. Critical multiculturalism (b = 0.44; p < .001) was a significant 
predictor and uniquely explained 6.5% of the variance. Political conservatism (b = -0.18; p 
< .001) and multiculturalism (b = 0.17; p = .009) also emerged as significant predictors, and 
uniquely explained 4.3% and 0.7% of the variance, respectively.  
Discussion  
  These results provided no evidence that experimental priming of diversity ideology 
affected endorsement of the separate policy measures of diversity measures (other than 
colorblind ideology). Participants in both the colorblind and multicultural conditions were more 
likely to support colorblind ideology than in the critical multiculturalism condition. This is 
important, as it suggests that multiculturalism fails to push participants to reject colorblind 
ideology in the same way that critical multiculturalism does. Thus, multiculturalism, a more 
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normative ideology, is not making significant strides in terms of garnering support for a more 
critical lens of social justice. 
A major limitation of the experimental investigation is that the manipulations may have 
been weak or produced overlaps between the diversity ideologies principles and values making it 
difficult for participants to differentiate between the ideologies. For example, when participants 
completed the open response task in which they wrote five reasons why the diversity approach 
they read about would benefit U.S. society, a significant percentage of participants from each 
conditions wrote reasons that were not relevant to the diversity ideology. Participants in the 
colorblind and critical multiculturalism condition wrote reasons that resonated more with 
multiculturalism. This suggests that the manipulations may have failed to articulate the 
differences between the two ideologies, and as a result responses on the outcome measures 
showed little variability.  
Another reason for the failure of the manipulation may be reactance. Indeed, previous 
research has found that multiculturalism led to reactance (Brewer, 1997), especially when a 
threat was present (Davies et al., 2008; Yogesswaran & Dasgupta, 2014). Given the emphasis on 
critical consciousness about intergroup wrongdoing, it is likely that critical multiculturalism may 
be even more threatening and may generate even more reactance, leading participants to respond 
in ways that are opposite to affordances of the manipulation.  
The supplemental results of the study provided mostly consistent support for the second 
aim of Study 3 regarding how the diversity ideologies are related to each other, identification, 
and policy measures. Consistent with hypothesized patterns across all studies, multiculturalism 
and critical multiculturalism was strongly related to each other. Additionally, colorblind ideology 
was negatively related to critical multiculturalism while unrelated to multiculturalism. There was 
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also relatively consistent predicted patterns between national identification attachment and 
political conservatism and the diversity ideologies. National identification attachment and 
political conservatism was consistently positively related to colorblind ideology, while 
negatively related to both multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism. The magnitude of these 
relationships were consistently stronger for critical multiculturalism than multiculturalism.  
Although colorblind ideology was consistently related with national identification 
exploration, some major deviations in Study 3 were that both multiculturalism and critical 
multiculturalism were unrelated with national identification exploration. These patterns were 
inconsistent with the hypotheses that national identification exploration would have a negative 
relationship with colorblind ideology and a positive relationship with the other two diversity 
ideologies. It is possible that national identification is not as important a predictor of diversity 
ideologies as is political conservatism. I return to this possibility in the general discussion.  
Results of Study 3 are consistent with the hypothesis that each diversity ideology predicts 
policy measures that are similar to its principles and values. Contrary to beliefs that 
multiculturalism is a good predictor of social justice policy, it appears that critical 
multiculturalism is a much stronger predictor and possibly better suited to gain support for social 
justice issues. Critical multiculturalism may be a better ideology to move people closer toward 
adopting a critical lens in understanding social issues and endorsing more critical social justice 
policies in favor of helping marginalized cultural groups.  
Analyses Across Studies 
 One main limitation of Studies 1 through 3 is that I did not include participants with 
marginalized identities in the analyses. Although inferences from statistical tests did not change 
as a function of inclusion or exclusion, the number of such participants in any particular study 
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was too small to afford a test of hypothesized differences. Rather than combine participants from 
marginalized groups together with White participants and imply no differences in responses 
without adequate power to observe such differences, I opted to characterize results more 
precisely as responses of White participants. 
Although the number of participants from marginalized groups was small in any 
particular study, aggregation of samples across studies does afford sufficient power to test 
hypothesized differences in support of diversity ideologies as a function of identity group. In 
particular, the theoretical framework that I elaborated in the introduction suggests that 
experiences of people with marginalized identities may provide them with critical consciousness 
that leads them to greater endorsement of critical multiculturalism than I observed among White 
participants.  
To examine this hypothesis, I combined data from Studies 1 through 3 to compare the 
differences in diversity ideology endorsement between White and non-White participants. I 
chose to retain four race categories—Asian, n = 53; Black, n = 73; Latinx, n = 46; and White, n = 
642—for the purposes of this analysis because these four categories included the highest number 
of participants and would be somewhat stable for conducting statistical tests. However, it is 
important to note that these sample sizes are small and I will make interpretations of the results 
with caution. I excluded race categories (Native American/Native Alaskan n = 10; multi-ethnic n 
= 25; something not listed n= 8) that comprised of less than 5% of the total sample. I also 
excluded four participants who indicated they wished to be excluded from all final analyses, 
leaving a final sample size of 814 participants. Participant ages ranged from 19 to 75 years (M = 
36.74, SD = 11.67, Mdn = 33.00). Half the participants identified as female (50.1%). 
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The main goal of this analysis was to compare diversity ideology endorsement across 
participant race categories; therefore, the only measure I included for analysis was the 15 item 
diversity ideology measure. I created the same three subscales which included the 5 items—
specifically, colorblind ideology (α = .82), multiculturalism (α = .87), and critical 
multiculturalism (α = .89)—from Study 1.11 Demographic information and means for 
endorsement of diversity ideologies as a function of identity category appear in Table 19.  
To test hypotheses, I conducted a 3 (Study: 1, 2, 3) x 4 (Race: Asian, Black, Latinx, and 
White) x 3 (Diversity Ideology Type: colorblind, multiculturalism, critical multiculturalism) 
mixed-model Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) of diversity ideology endorsement with Study and 
Race as between-subjects factors, and Diversity Ideology Type as a within-subjects factor. 
Results indicated no significant main effect or interactions involving the Study factor (ps > .05), 
so I removed it from the model. The resulting 4 (Race) x 3 (Diversity Ideology Type) mixed-
model ANOVA indicated main effects of Race, F(3, 809) = 7.36, p < .001, η2 = .027, and 
Diversity Ideology Type, F(1, 809) = 5.10, p = .024, η2 = .006, qualified by a significant, F(6, 
1618) = 3.82, p = .001, η2 = .014.  
To probe the interaction, I conducted a series of one-way ANOVAs to test for group 
differences in endorsement separately for each diversity ideology. Results of the omnibus test 
indicated no significant difference for endorsement of colorblind ideology, F(3, 809) = 0.70, p 
= .550. In contrast, results of the omnibus test did reveal the hypothesized difference in 
endorsement of critical multiculturalism, F(3, 809) = 8.02, p < .001. Post-hoc comparisons 
                                               
11I conducted a PCA of all 15 diversity ideology items with Varimax rotation. Results followed similar patterns that 
emerged in the previous studies, That is, two factors emerged that accounted for 64.31% of variation: One factor 
included all multiculturalism items and all critical multiculturalism items, and the second factor included the five 
colorblind ideology items. I conducted the same analyses separate for White participants and non-White participants 
and the same two factor structure emerged.  
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indicated that endorsement of critical multiculturalism among White participants was 
significantly less than among Black and Latinx participants, but only marginally less than among 
Asian participants. In addition, results of the omnibus test revealed differences in endorsement of 
multiculturalism, F(3, 809) = 8.63, p < .001. Post-hoc comparisons indicated that endorsement of 
multiculturalism was significantly weaker for White participants than Asian, Black, and Latinx 
participants.  
This pattern for multiculturalism is consistent with previous work which suggests that 
White people find multiculturalism threatening (Ginges & Cairns, 2000; Morrison et al, 2010; 
Verkuyten, 2005). I have proposed the hypothesis that this resistance to multiculturalism is 
particularly strong for the more critical manifestations of multiculturalism that I examine in the 
present work. To test this hypothesis, I combined Black and Latinx participants into a single 
“marginalized identities” category12 and conducted a 2 (Race: marginalized identity and Whites) 
x 2 (Diversity Ideology Type: multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism) mixed-model 
ANOVA. Results indicated a marginally significant interaction of racial group and diversity 
ideology, F(1, 761) = 3.83, p = .051, η2 = .005. Although endorsement of both ideologies was 
lower among White participants than  Black and Latinx participants, the interaction pattern 
suggests that the difference in endorsement was greater for critical multiculturalism (Ms = 5.62 
versus 4.99, SDs = 1.16 and 1.48) than for multiculturalism (M = 5.74 versus 5.25, SDs = 1.05 
and 1.28). Although this pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that White folks are especially 
                                               
12 I excluded Asian participants for these analyses because their positions within U.S. social structures are 
ambiguous: advantaged and overrepresented in some ways and also disadvantaged and underrepresented in other 
ways. Given this ambiguity, there is a greater chance that Asian Americans are able to assimilate into U.S. social 
structures in ways that are not available to Black and Latinx people (Citrin & Sears, 2014). Thus, it is possible that 




resistant to critical multiculturalism, the marginal significance level for the interaction effect 
requires that one retain due skepticism about this interpretation.  
General Discussion 
 The general purpose of this research was to explore whether critical multiculturalism 
constitutes a separable construct from standard multiculturalism. Critical multiculturalism is an 
ideology that recognizes the importance of participation of people from marginalized groups in 
social and political domains and challenges various forms of oppression (e.g. racism, classism, 
sexism, etc.) that are perpetuated through dominant social norms (McLaren & Farahmandpur, 
1999). One aim  was to examine how participants conceptualize multiculturalism. Another aim 
was to examine if critical multiculturalism was a separate diversity ideology in its own right, or a 
different manifestation of a normative multiculturalism diversity ideology. A third aim was to 
determine whether endorsement of or exposure to different diversity ideologies was associated 
with different patterns of policy endorsement.  
Overview of Results 
 Conceptualizations of multiculturalism. Consistent with hypotheses, qualitative results 
showed that participants reported celebratory understandings of multiculturalism and only few 
included critical understandings of multiculturalism. Participants wrote about celebrations of 
differences and goals of unification and peace of different cultural groups living together. This 
follows previous research that suggests that multiculturalism maintains normative 
understandings of diversity that deracialize discourse and reifies culture and cultural difference 
while failing to address issues of oppressive systemic inequalities (Hatcher, 1987; McLaren, 
1995; May, 1999; May 2003). One limitation of this investigation is that responses only included 
that of White participants. It is possible that the overwhelming responses of celebratory 
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manifestations of multiculturalism is more specifically a White understanding of 
multiculturalism (Flowers & Howard-Hamilton, 2002), which may be different for people from 
marginalized groups (Flowers & Howard-Hamilton, 2002). Although this initial exploration 
suggested that critical multiculturalism is not a common conceptualization, I wanted to continue 
to consider how it may be related to multiculturalism and when it might emerge as separable 
from multiculturalism.  
Critical multiculturalism as a separate construct. Next, I examined the relationships 
among the diversity ideologies and their relationships with the identification variables. The 
results showed considerable strong positive associations between multiculturalism and critical 
multiculturalism across all the studies. This may suggest that these two ideologies are variations 
of a single multicultural construct rather than separable constructs. Supporters of 
multiculturalism intended it as a remedy to the shortcomings of colorblind ideology (Berry, 
1984; Plaut, Cheryan, & Stevens, 2015).  The goals of multiculturalism were to bring reform to 
various institutions to better reflect the cultural diversity of U.S. society, and more specifically, 
to improve educational equality for marginalized students with the influence of ethnic studies 
movements (Banks, 1993; Banks, 2004; Banks & Banks, 2004). In its early conceptualization, 
multiculturalism emerged in U.S. society as a vehicle to bring social justice issues to the 
forefront. Although over time multiculturalism has changed to meet the sensibilities of the 
dominate cultural group (Bell & Hartmann, 2007; McLaren, 1995), it is likely that any other 
manifestation of multiculturalism, such as critical multiculturalism, will appear to have much 
overlap in similarities due to the origins of multiculturalism.  
However, the results also supported hypothesized patterns of difference between 
multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism. First, there were differences in their bivariate 
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relationships with colorblindness. Although not consistent across all three studies, Study 1 
showed a compatibility between colorblind ideology and multiculturalism as evident with their 
positive association with one another. Studies 2 and 3 showed more incompatibility between 
colorblind ideology and critical multiculturalism than multiculturalism as shown with the 
stronger negative relationship between them. Second, and consistent with hypotheses, there were 
modest differences in relationships with national identification attachment and political 
conservatism with the diversity ideologies across all the studies. Studies showed that the 
magnitude of the relationships were slightly higher with critical multiculturalism than with 
multiculturalism suggesting possible incompatibility between the two identification measures 
and critical multiculturalism. A third area of divergence was results of the exploratory mediation 
analyses. Consistent with hypotheses, these results showed that a critical consciousness exists 
with critical multiculturalism through a greater awareness of racism and privilege but not with 
multiculturalism. A critical consciousness led to stronger endorsement of social justice policies 
and greater opposition of common-identity policies, indicating that multiculturalism is weak in 
endorsing critical social justice issues and possibly even less incompatible with common-identity 
policies.  
Predictors of social justice policy endorsement. A final area of divergence and support 
for hypotheses were the multiple regression models. Despite the overlaps between 
multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism, patterns across all three studies showed that 
critical multiculturalism was the strongest predictor of social justice policy endorsement. This is 
particularly important when thinking about real-life policy endorsement. Although true that a 
normative multiculturalism may promote support for policies in favor of increasing diversity for 
the sake of appreciating differences or valuing the importance of including different cultural 
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groups within dominant structural institutions, it fails to strongly promote support for more 
critical policies that tend to drive social change for marginalized groups. These results suggest 
perhaps a more critical manifestation of multiculturalism is required in order to gain support for 
more critical social justice policies.  
Effects of diversity ideologies on policy support. Although less supportive of 
hypotheses, the effects of diversity ideology manipulations on support for the diversity 
ideologies showed some divergence between multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism. 
Specifically, only exposure to critical multiculturalism, and not exposure to multiculturalism, 
resulted in less support for colorblind ideology than did exposure to colorblind ideology.   
Critical multiculturalism influences clear opposition to colorblind ideologies in ways that 
multiculturalism fails to do, suggesting patterns of differentiation between the two diversity 
ideologies.  
Limitations and Future Directions  
 Participant race. One major limitation of these studies was that the results focused on 
White participant responses only. Previous research has shown that White participants and 
participants of different racial identities conceptualize multiculturalism differently (Flowers & 
Howard-Hamilton, 2002), making it possible that the lack of a critical conceptualization of 
multiculturalism that I observed in this research was because White participants may endorse 
more normative understandings of multiculturalism than critical ones. To this respect it may be 
likely that critical multiculturalism will influence non-White participants differently. The results 
from the aggregated analysis across all three studies supported some of these previous rationales. 
Specifically, all participants, non-White and White, endorsed multiculturalism the highest, 
suggesting that perhaps that the cultural pervasiveness of multiculturalism in U.S. culture makes 
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it an ideology that is most commonly endorsed. The results also showed initial support for the 
idea that people from marginalized groups did indeed endorse critical multiculturalism the most, 
while White participants endorsed it the least. White participants’ low endorsement of critical 
multiculturalism was also apparent in each of the three studies. This suggests that perhaps critical 
multiculturalism is more threatening to White participants than participants from marginalized 
racial groups. Including threat as a construct in future empirical studies will provide more insight 
into this rationale.  
Previous research has shown that Black and Latinx participants are more likely to 
endorse multiculturalism than colorblindness (Ryan, Hunt, Weible, Peterson, &, Casas, 2007; 
Ryan, Casas, Thompson, 2010) and that multiculturalism affects White participants and non-
White participants differently (Morisson et al., 2010; Ryan et al., 2007, 2010; Wolsko et al., 
2006). The results also modestly suggested that of the three marginalized groups included in the 
aggregated analysis, Black and Latinx participants may endorse critical multiculturalism more 
than Asian participants. Further studies can further explore the differential endorsement of 
critical multiculturalism among various marginalized racial groups. Since the sample sizes of 
marginalized racial groups were much smaller in these studies, even after aggregating across all 
the studies, more empirical work is needed to understand how racial group identifications are 
related to critical multiculturalism. This future extension of the research may provide further 
evidence for deviations between multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism.  
 National identification measures. Another limitation was that national identification 
exploration did not show strong or consistent evidence with being associated with the diversity 
ideologies as expected. On the one hand, national identification exploration is theoretically 
relevant to critical multiculturalism because it suggests a process of more active engagement 
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informed by openness and curiosity of national identity. This active engagement with national 
identity may motivate people to be more open to critical understandings of multiculturalism and 
policy support. However, results from the studies did not show support for this particular aspect 
of the framework.  
National identification as it relates to diversity ideologies may be different within the 
U.S. context compared to other countries. For example, Hahn and colleagues (2010) suggest that 
national identity can be construed in terms of values and political beliefs or in terms of ethnicity 
and culture. In countries such as France, nationhood is strongly tied to a superordinate identity of 
being culturally and ethnically French, even politically finding ways to minimize or ignore 
differences among its citizens within in legal policies (Libereman, 2006; Banks, 2001). However, 
traditionally, the U.S. is an immigrant country without any official policies dictating how to 
consider the diversity of its citizens. Rather it imparts an ideal of a “melting pot.” People born on 
American soil are given citizenship and ethnicity can be attached to any American identity (e.g. 
Russian American, African American, Persian American, etc.) without loss of legal American 
citizenship. Even with the complications of race relations with the U.S., Black people born in 
American are not denied legal American citizenship (Hahn, Judd, & Park, 2010). Thus, it is 
possible that in non-U.S. contexts where national identity is construed in ethnic and cultural 
ways, an emphasis on differences or diversity may seem more disruptive to the social fabric of 
the nationhood of the country (Hahn et al., 2010; Verkuyten, 2005; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2006). 
The relationship between national identification and diversity ideologies outside the U.S. 
remains a direction for future research.  
Study design. A third limitation was that two of the three studies were correlational 
studies. In particular the greatest limitation is that the directionality of how the diversity 
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ideologies are related to national identification, political conservatism, and policy outcomes is 
unclear.  This research primarily focused on the diversity ideologies being the predictors of 
policy outcomes. It is possible that identification may predict what diversity ideologies people 
are more likely to endorse. This is of particular importance as a limitation because the 
experimental study showed no effects of the diversity ideologies primes on policy endorsement. 
Thus, taking into considerations of directionality between the diversity ideologies and other 
related variables in future studies will help to better understand whether identification variables 
impact diversity ideologies which in turn have an effect on policy endorsement, or if people 
choose their identifications based on the diversity ideologies they support.  
Finally, the measurement of critical multiculturalism that I used in this research needs to 
be revisited. The limitation of the critical multiculturalism measure that I used in this research is 
that I created it based on multiculturalism measure previously used in empirical research. The 
overlaps observed between the two ideologies across the studies may be simply a result of the 
measurement construction. Thus, it is important to explore other ways to construct the 
measurement that highlights the differences between the two ideologies. Particularly, due to the 
overlap of the two ideologies as seen from the factor analyses across the separate studies and 
aggregated analysis, it may be beneficial to include critical multiculturalism items that highlight 
the unique difference of the ideology from multiculturalism rather than also including its areas of 
overlap. This would help to further examine whether the construct of critical multiculturalism is 





The current research provides some support for the idea that another more critical version 
of multiculturalism is needed to move people towards higher endorsement of social justice 
policies. Previous research in social psychology examined how diversity ideologies improve 
intergroup relations and reduce prejudice with mixed results. Some research suggests that 
different construals of multiculturalism (abstract vs. concrete) (Berry & Kalin, 1995; Ryan et al., 
2007; 2010; Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014) may differentially contribute to improving 
intergroup attitudes or supporting diversity ideologies, but it is unclear whether these results 
extend to public policy support and actual behavior. The current work provides some insight that 
suggests that at the very least a different manifestation of multiculturalism, one that is more 
critical in its expression, is needed to move people towards supporting more social justice issues 
that are centered around marginalized peoples’ sensibilities and experiences. It will be important 
for future research to continue to examine the distinctions between a multicultural and critical 
multiculturalism ideology to better understand how diversity ideologies can reconstruct 
















Adams, G. (2012). Context in person, person in context: A cultural psychology approach to 
social-personality psychology. The Oxford handbook of personality and social psychology, 
182-208. 
Adams, G., Biernat, M., Branscombe, N. R., Crandall, C. S., & Wrightsman, L. S. (2008). 
Beyond prejudice: Toward a sociocultural psychology of racism and oppression. In G. 
Adams, M. Biernat, N. R. Branscombe, C. S. Crandall, & L. S. Wrightsman (Eds.), 
Commemorating Brown: The social psychology of racism and discrimination (pp. 215-246). 
Washington, DC, USA: American Psychological Association. 
Adams, G., Dobles, I., Gómez, L. H., Kurtiş, T., & Molina, L. E. (2015). Decolonizing 
psychological science: Introduction to the special thematic section. Journal of Social and 
Political Psychology, 3, 213-238. 
Adams, G., Estrada-Villalta, S., & Kurtiş, T. (2017). The Relational Essence of Cultural 
Psychology. In M. van Zomeren & J.F. Dovidio (Eds.), The oxford handbook of the human 
essence (pp. 233-246). New York: Oxford University Press.  
Adams, G., & Markus, H. R. (2004). Toward a conception of culture suitable for a social 
psychology of culture. In M. Schaller & C. S. Crandall (Eds.), Psychological foundations of 
culture (pp. 335–360). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.  
97 
 
Adams, G., Salter, P. S., Pickett, K. M., Kurtis, T., & Phillips, N. L. (2010). Behavior as mind in 
context A cultural psychology analysis of "paranoid" suspicion. In L. F. Barrett, B. Mesquita, 
& E. Smith (Eds.), The mind in context (pp. 277-306). New York: Guilford. 
Allport, G. W. (1954). The nature of prejudice. 
Ansell, A. (2013). Race and ethnicity: the key concepts. Routledge. 
Apfelbaum, E.P., Grunberg, R., Halevy, N., & Kang, S. (2017). From ignorance to intolerance: 
Perceived intentionality of racial discrimination shapes preference for colorblindness 
versus multiculturalism. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 69, 86-101.  
Apfelbaum, E. P., Pauker, K., Sommers, S. R., & Ambady, N. (2010). In blind pursuit of racial 
equality? Psychological Science, 21(11), 1587-1592. 
Baldwin, J. A. (1986). African (Black) psychology: Issues and synthesis. Journal of Black 
Studies, 16(3), 235-249. 
Banks, J. A. (1993). Multicultural education: Historical development, dimensions, and practice. 
Review of research in education, 19(1), 3-49. 
Banks, J. A. (2004). Multicultural education: Historical developments, dimensions, and practice. 
In J. A. Banks, & C. A. M. Banks (Eds.), Handbook of research in multicultural 
education. (pp 3–30). San Francisco, CA: Jossey Bass. 
Banks, J. A., & Banks, C. A. M. (2004). Multicultural Education: Issues and Perspectives. 
Update. San Francisco, CA: Jossey Bass. 
Bell, J. M., & Hartmann, D. (2007). Diversity in everyday discourse: The cultural ambiguities 
and consequences of “happy talk”. American Sociological Review, 72(6), 895-914. 
Benet-Martinez, V. (2012). Multiculturalism: Cultural, social, and personality process. In K. 
Deaux, & M. Snyder. (Eds.), The oxford handbook of personality and social psychology 
98 
 
(pp. 623-648). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Berry, J. W., & Kalin, R. (1995). Multicultural and ethnic attitudes in Canada: An overview of 
the 1991 national survey. Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science/Revue canadienne 
des sciences du comportement, 27(3), 301-320. 
Bettencourt, B. A., Brewer, M. B., Croak, M. R., Miller, N. (1992). Cooperation and the 
reduction of intergroup bias: The roles of reward structure and social orientation. Journal 
of Experimental Social Psychology, 28, 301-319. 
Berry, J. W. (1984). Multicultural policy in Canada: A social psychological analysis. Canadian 
Journal of Behavioural Science/Revue canadienne des sciences du comportement, 16(4), 
353. 
Blake, F., Ioanide, P., & Reed, A. (2019). Antiracism Inc.: Why the Way We Talk about Racial 
Justice Matters. 
Blanca, M., Alarcón, R., Arnau, J., Bono, R., & Bendayan, R. (2017). Non-normal data: Is 
ANOVA still a valid option?. Psicothema, 29(4), 552-557. 
Bonilla-Silva, E. (2017). Racism without racists: Color-blind racism and the persistence of 
racial inequality in America. Rowman & Littlefield. 
Bonilla-Silva, E., & Zuberi, T. (2008). Toward a definition of white logic and white Methods. In 
T. Zuberi, & E. Bonilla-Silva (Eds). White logic, white methods: Racism and 
methodology, (pp. 1-23). Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 
Branscombe, N. R., Schmitt, M. T., & Harvey, R. D. (1999). Perceiving pervasive discrimination 
among African Americans: Implications for group identification and well-being. Journal 
of personality and social psychology, 77(1), 135-149. 
99 
 
Brewer, M. B. (1988). A dual process model of impression formation. In T. K. Srull, & R. S. 
Wyer Jr. (Eds.), A dual process model of impression formation; A dual process model of 
impression formation (pp. 1-36). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.  
Brewer, M. B. (1997). The social psychology of intergroup relations: can research inform 
practice? Journal of social issues, 53(1), 197-211. 
Brewer, M. B., & Miller, N. (1984). Beyond the contact hypothesis: Theoretical perspectives on 
desegregation. In N. Miller & M. Brewer (Eds.), Groups in contact: The psychology 
of desegregation (pp. 281-302). Orlando, Florida: Academic Press. 
Buhrmester, M., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. D. (2011). Amazon's Mechanical Turk: A new source 
of inexpensive, yet high-quality, data?. Perspectives on psychological science, 6(1), 3-5. 
Chrisler, Joan, Golden, Carla, & Rozee, Patricia D. (2008). Introduction. In Joan Chrisler, Carla 
Golden, & Patricia Rozee’s (Eds.) Lectures on the psychology of women (pp. ix-xvii). 
Boston: McGraw-Hill. 
Citrin, J., & Sears, D. O. (2014). American identity and the politics of multiculturalism. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Citrin, J., Sears, D. O., Muste, C., & Wong, C. (2001). Multiculturalism in American public 
opinion. British Journal of Political Science, 31(2), 247-275. 
Cleary, T. A., L. G. Humphreys, S. A. Kendrick, and A. Wesman. (1975). Educational uses of 
tests with disadvantaged students. American Psychologist, 30, 15–41. 
Correll, J., Park, B., & Allegra Smith, J. (2008). Colorblind and multicultural prejudice reduction 




Crenshaw, K., Gotanda, N., & Peller, G. Kendall Thomas, eds. 1995. Critical race theory: The 
key writings that formed the movement.  
Croizet, J. C. (2011). Le racisme de l’intelligence. L’évaluation, une menace, 135-144. 
Davies, P. G., Steele, C. M., & Markus, H. R. (2008). A nation challenged: The impact of 
foreign threat on America's tolerance for diversity. Journal of personality and social 
psychology, 95(2), 308. 
Devos, T., & Banaji, M. R. (2005). American= white?. Journal of personality and social 
psychology, 88(3), 447. 
Dixon, J., Tropp, L. R., Durrheim, K., & Tredoux, C. (2010). “Let them eat harmony” prejudice-
reduction strategies and attitudes of historically disadvantaged groups. Current 
Directions in Psychological Science, 19(2), 76-80. 
Dovidio, J. F. & Gaertner, S. L. (1998). On the nature of contemporary prejudice: The causes, 
consequences, and challenges of aversive racism. In Eberhardt J., Fiske S. T. (Eds.), 
Confronting racism: The problem and the response (pp. 3–32). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
Eidelman, S., & Crandall, C. S. (2012). Bias in favor of the status quo. Social and Personality 
Psychology Compass, 6(3), 270-281. 
Engleman, S., & Jones, J. M. (2007, January). Beyond multiculturalism: Evaluating critical 
multiculturalism as an intergroup ideology. Poster presented at the Annual Meeting of 
the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Orlando, FL. 
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Buchner, A., & Lang, A. G. (2009). Statistical power analyses using G* 
Power 3.1: Tests for correlation and regression analyses. Behavior research 
methods, 41(4), 1149-1160. 
101 
 
Federico, C. M., & Sidanius, J. (2002). Racism, ideology, and affirmative action revisited: the 
antecedents and consequences of" principled objections" to affirmative action. Journal of 
personality and social psychology, 82(4), 488-502. 
Fiske, S. T., Xu, J., Cuddy, A. C., & Glick, P. (1999). (Dis) respecting versus (dis) liking: Status 
and interdependence predict ambivalent stereotypes of competence and warmth. Journal 
of Social Issues, 55(3), 473-489. 
Flowers, L. A., & Howard-Hamilton, M. F. (2002). A qualitative study of graduate students' 
perceptions of diversity issues in student affairs preparation programs. Journal of College 
Student Development. 
Fowers, B. J., & Richardson, F. C. (1996). Why is multiculturalism good? American 
psychologist, 51(6), 609-621. 
Gaertner, S. L., & Dovidio, J. F. (2000). Reducing intergroup bias: The common ingroup identity 
model. Philadelphia: Psychology Press. 
Ginges, J., & Cairns, D. (2000). Social representations of multiculturalism: A faceted analysis. 
Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 30(7), 1345-1370. 
Hahn, A., Judd, C. M., & Park, B. (2010). Thinking about group differences: Ideologies and 
national identities. Psychological Inquiry, 21(2), 120-126. 
Hall, J. D. (2005). The long civil rights movement and the political uses of the past. The Journal 
of American History, 91(4), 1233-1263. 
Hatcher, R. (1987). Race and education: Two perspectives for change. In B. Troyna (Ed.), Racial 
Inequality in Education, (pp. 184-200). Tavistock: London. 
Hayes, A. F. (2018). Partial, conditional, and moderated moderated mediation: Quantification, 
inference, and interpretation. Communication Monographs, 85(1), 4-40. 
102 
 
Hayes, A. F. (2012). PROCESS: A versatile computational tool for observed variable mediation, 
moderation, and conditional process modeling [White paper]. 
Hewstone, M. (1996). Contact and categorization: Social psychological. Stereotypes and 
stereotyping, 323. 
Hornsey, M. J., & Hogg, M. A. (2000). Subgroup relations: A comparison of mutual intergroup 
differentiation and common ingroup identity models of prejudice reduction. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26(2), 242-256. 
Hornsey, M. J., & Hogg, M. A. (2000). Assimilation and diversity: An integrative model of 
subgroup relations. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 4(2), 143-156. 
Huo, Y. J., & Molina, L. E. (2006). Is pluralism a viable model of diversity? The benefits and 
limits of subgroup respect. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 9(3), 359-376. 
Jackson, G. D. (1975). Another psychological view from the association of Black 
psychologists. American Psychologist, 30, 88 –93 . 
Jansen, W. S., Vos, M. W., Otten, S., Podsiadlowski, A., & van der Zee, K. I. (2016). Colorblind 
or colorful? How diversity approaches affect cultural majority and minority employees. 
Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 46(2), 81-93. 
Jetten, J., Branscombe, N. R., Schmitt, M. T., & Spears, R. (2001). Rebels with a cause: Group 
identification as a response to perceived discrimination from the mainstream. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27(9), 1204-1213. 
Jones, J. M. (1997). Prejudice and racism. McGraw-Hill Humanities, Social Sciences & World 
Languages. 
Jones, J. M. (2010). Toward a diversity science: The longest journey begins with the first step. 
Psychological Inquiry, 21(2), 127-133. 
103 
 
Jones, J. M., & Dovidio, J. F. (2018). Change, Challenge, and Prospects for a Diversity Paradigm 
in Social Psychology. Social Issues and Policy Review, 12(1), 7-56. 
Joseph, R. (2017). Multiculturalism: A liberal perspective. Postfilosofie, (2), 29-49. 
Jost, J. T. (2017). Ideological asymmetries and the essence of political psychology. Political  
Psychology, 38(2), 167-208. 
Jost, J.T., Blount, S., Pfeffer, J., & Hunyady, G. (2003). Fair market ideology: Its cognitive- 
motivational underpinnings. Research in Organizational Behavior, 25, 53–91. 
King, M. (1963). Martin Luther King Jr.: I have a dream speech. 
Knowles, E. D., Lowery, B. S., Hogan, C. M., & Chow, R. M. (2009). On the malleability of 
ideology: motivated construals of color blindness. Journal of personality and social 
psychology, 96(4), 857-869. 
Landis, J. R., Koch, G. G. (1977). The measurement of observer agreement for categorical data. 
Biometrics 33:159-174. 
Leistyna, P. (2002). Defining and designing multiculturalism: One school system's efforts.  
SUNY Press. 
Leong, C. H., & Ward, C. (2006). Cultural values and attitudes toward immigrants and 
multiculturalism: The case of the Eurobarometer survey on racism and 
xenophobia. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 30(6), 799-810. 
Levin, S., Matthews, M., Guimond, S., Sidanius, J., Pratto, F., Kteily, N., ... & Dover, T. (2012). 
Assimilation, multiculturalism, and colorblindness: Mediated and moderated 
relationships between social dominance orientation and prejudice. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 48(1), 207-212. 
104 
 
Lieberman, R. (2001). A tale of two countries: the politics of color blindness in France and the 
United States. French Politics, Culture & Society, 19(3), 32-59. 
Lieberman, D. A., & Goucher, C. L. (1999). Multicultural education and university studies. The 
Journal of General Education, 48(2), 118-125. 
Litman, L., Robinson, J., & Abberbock, T. (2017). TurkPrime.com: A versatile crowdsourcing 
data acquisition platform for the behavioral sciences. Behavior research methods, 49(2), 
433-442. 
Loobuyck, P. (2005). Liberal multiculturalism: A defence of liberal multicultural measures 
without minority rights. Ethnicities, 5(1), 108-123. 
Maddux, W. W., Galinsky, A. D., Cuddy, A. J., & Polifroni, M. (2008). When being a model 
minority is good... and bad: Realistic threat explains negativity toward Asian Americans. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34(1), 74-89. 
Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, 
and motivation. Psychological review, 98(2), 224-253. 
May, S. (Ed.). (1999). Critical multiculturalism: Rethinking multicultural and antiracist 
education. Psychology Press, May, S. (2003). Critical multiculturalism. Counterpoints, 
168, 199-212. 
May, S. (2009). Critical multiculturalism and education. In J.A. Banks (Ed.), The Routledge 
international companion to multicultural education (pp.33-48). New York: Routledge.  
May, S., & Sleeter, C. E. (2010). Introduction. In S. May & C. Sleeter (Eds.), Critical 
multiculturalism: Theory and praxis (pp. 1-16). New York: Routledge. 
105 
 
McCarthy, C., & Crichlow, W. (1993). Introduction: Theories of identity, theories of 
representation, theories of race. In C. McCarthy and W. Crichlow (Eds.), Race, identity, 
and representation in education (pp. xiii-xxix). New York: Routledge. 
McLaren, P. (1995). White terror and oppositional agency: Towards a critical multiculturalism. 
Counterpoints, 4, 87-124. 
McLaren, P.L. (1997). Revolutionary multiculturalism; Pedagogies of dissent for the new 
millennium. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
McLaren, P. and Farahmandpur, R. (1999). Critical Multiculturalism and the Globalization of 
Capital: Some Implications for a Politics of Resistance. Journal of Curriculum 
Theorizing, 15(4), 27-46. 
Meyers, L. S., Gamst, G., & Guarino, A. J. (2013). Applied multivariate research: Design and 
interpretation (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA, US: Sage Publications, Inc. 
Mills, C. (2007). White ignorance. Race and epistemologies of ignorance, 247, 26-31. 
Morris, E. W. (2006). An unexpected minority: White kids in an urban school. New Brunswick:  
Rutgers University Press. 
Morrison, K. R., Plaut, V. C., & Ybarra, O. (2010). Predicting whether multiculturalism  
positively or negatively influences white Americans’ intergroup attitudes: The role of 
ethnic identification. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36(12), 1648-1661. 
Myers, D. (1993). Social psychology (4th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Navarro, R. L., Worthington, R. L., Hart, J., & Khairallah, T. (2009). Liberal and conservative 
political ideology, experiences of harassment, and perceptions of campus 
climate. Journal of Diversity in Higher Education, 2(2), 78. 
106 
 
Neville, H. A., Lilly, R. L., Duran, G., Lee, R. M., & Browne, L. (2000). Construction and initial 
validation of the color-blind racial attitudes scale (CoBRAS). Journal of Counseling 
Psychology, 47(1), 59-70. 
Norton, M. I., & Sommers, S. R. (2011). Whites see racism as a zero-sum game that they are 
now losing. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6(3), 215-218. 
Padilla, A. M., & Olmedo, E. (2009). Synopsis of key persons, events, and associations in the 
history of Latino psychology. Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology, 15(4), 
363-373. 
Park, B., & Judd, C. M. (2005). Rethinking the link between categorization and prejudice within 
the social cognition perspective. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 9(2), 108-
130. 
Phinney, J. S. (1992). The multigroup ethnic identity measure: A new scale for use with diverse 
groups. Journal of adolescent research, 7(2), 156-176. 
Plaut, V. C. (2010). Diversity science: Why and how difference makes a difference. 
Psychological Inquiry, 21(2), 77-99. 
Plaut, V.C., Cheryan, S., & Stevens, F.G. (2015). New frontiers in diversity research: 
Conceptions of diversity and their theoretical and practical implication. In P. Shaver & 
M. Mikulincer (Eds.), E. Borgida & J. Bargh (Vol. Eds.), APA handbook of personality 
and social psychology, Vol. 1: Attitudes and social cognition (pp. 593-619). Washington, 
DC: American Psychological Association. 
Plaut, V. C., Garnett, F. G., Buffardi, L. E., & Sanchez-Burks, J. (2011). “What about me?” 
Perceptions of exclusion and Whites' reactions to multiculturalism. Journal of personality 
and social psychology, 101(2), 337-353. 
107 
 
Plaut, V. C., Thomas, K. M., & Goren, M. J. (2009). Is multiculturalism or color blindness better 
for minorities?. Psychological Science, 20(4), 444-446. 
Plaut, V. C., Thomas, K. M., Hurd, K., & Romano, C. A. (2018). Do color blindness and 
multiculturalism remedy or foster discrimination and racism?. Current Directions in 
Psychological Science, 27(3), 200-206. 
Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., Stallworth, L. M., & Malle, B. F. (1994). Social dominance orientation: A 
personality variable predicting social and political attitudes. Journal of personality and 
social psychology, 67(4), 741. 
Purdie-Vaughns, V., Steele, C. M., Davies, P. G., Ditlmann, R., & Crosby, J. R. (2008). Social 
identity contingencies: how diversity cues signal threat or safety for African Americans 
in mainstream institutions. Journal of personality and social psychology, 94(4), 615 – 
630.  
Rattan, A., & Ambady, N. (2013). Diversity ideologies and intergroup relations: An examination 
of colorblindness and multiculturalism. European Journal of Social Psychology, 43(1), 
12-21. 
Richeson, J. A., & Nussbaum, R. J. (2004). The impact of multiculturalism versus color-
blindness on racial bias. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 40(3), 417-423. 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke. (1978). Oyez. Retrieved September 13, 2017, 
from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1979/76-811  
Rosenthal, L., & Levy, S. R. (2010). The colorblind, multicultural, and polycultural ideological 
approaches to improving intergroup attitudes and relations. Social Issues and Policy 
Review, 4(1), 215-246. 
108 
 
Russo, N.F. & Vaz, K. (2001). Addressing diversity in the decade of behavior: Focus on women 
of color. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 25, 280-294. 
Ryan, C. S., Casas, J. F., & Thompson, B. K. (2010). Interethnic ideology, intergroup 
perceptions, and cultural orientation. Journal of Social Issues, 66(1), 29-44. 
Ryan, C. S., Hunt, J. S., Weible, J. A., Peterson, C. R., & Casas, J. F. (2007). Multicultural and 
colorblind ideology, stereotypes, and ethnocentrism among Black and White Americans. 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 10(4), 617-637. 
Saguy, T., Dovidio, J. F., & Pratto, F. (2008). Beyond contact: Intergroup contact in the context 
of power relations. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34(3), 432-445. 
Schlesinger, A. M., Jr. (1992). The disuniting of America: Reflections on a 
multicultural society. New York: W. W. Norton. 
Schmitt, M. T., Branscombe, N. R., Postmes, T., & Garcia, A. (2014). The consequences of 
perceived discrimination for psychological well-being: a meta-analytic review. 
Psychological bulletin, 140(4), 921. 
Schofield, J. W. (2010). The colorblind perspective in school: Causes and consequences. In J. A. 
Banks & C. A. McGee Banks (Eds.), Multicultural education. Issues & perspectives (7th 
ed., pp. 259–283). New York: Wiley. 
Sellers, R. M., Rowley, S. A., Chavous, T. M., Shelton, J. N., & Smith, M. A. (1997). 
Multidimensional Inventory of Black Identity: A preliminary investigation of reliability 
and construct validity. Journal of personality and social psychology, 73(4), 805. 
Sherif, M. (1966). In common predicament: Social psychology of intergroup conflict and 
cooperation. Houghton Mifflin comp. 
109 
 
Shweder, R. A. (1990). Cultural psychology: What is it? In J. E. Stigler, R. A. Shweder, R. A., & 
G. Herdt (Eds.), Cultural psychology: Essays on comparative human development. (pp. 
1-43). New York: Cambridge University Press.  
Sleeter, C. E., & Bernal, D. D. (2004). Critical pedagogy, critical race theory, and antiracist 
education: Implications for multicultural education. Handbook of research on 
multicultural education, 2, 240-258. 
Sleeter, C. E. & Grant, C. A. (2009). Making choices for multicultural education: Five 
approaches to race, class, and gender. New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.  
Sue, D. W., & Sue, D. (2012). Counseling the culturally diverse: Theory and practice. John 
Wiley & Sons.  
Ullman, J. B., Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (2001). Using multivariate statistics. Structural 
equation modeling, 653-771. 
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. The Social 
Psychology of Intergroup Relations, 33(47), 33-47. 
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In S. 
Worchel, & W. G. Austin (Eds.), Psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 7–24). Chicago: 
Nelson-Hall. 
Tomes, H. (2018). Introduction to African American psychology. In F.Z. Belgrave, & K.W. 
Allison (Eds) Allison, K. W. African American psychology: From Africa to America. (pp. 
3- 25). Sage Publications.  
Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). 




Turner, J. C., & Reynolds, K. J. (2001). The social identity perspective in intergroup relations: 
Theories, themes, and controversies. Blackwell handbook of social psychology: 
Intergroup processes, 4, 133-152. 
Van Oudenhoven, J. P., Prins, K. S., & Buunk, B. P. (1998). Attitudes of minority and majority 
members towards adaptation of immigrants. European journal of social 
psychology, 28(6), 995-1013. 
Verkuyten, M. (2005). Ethnic group identification and group evaluation among minority and 
majority groups: testing the multiculturalism hypothesis. Journal of personality and 
social psychology, 88(1), 121-138. 
Verkuyten, M. (2007). Ethnic in‐group favoritism among minority and majority groups: Testing 
the self‐esteem hypothesis among preadolescents. Journal of applied social 
psychology, 37(3), 486-500. 
Verkuyten, M. (2009). Support for multiculturalism and minority rights: The role of national 
identification and out-group threat. Social Justice Research, 22(1), 31-52. 
Verkuyten, M., & Yildiz, A. A. (2006). The endorsement of minority rights: The role of group 
position, national context, and ideological beliefs. Political psychology, 27(4), 527-548. 
Vorauer, J. D., & Sasaki, S. J. (2010). In need of liberation or constraint? How intergroup 
attitudes moderate the behavioral implications of intergroup ideologies. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 46(1), 133-138. 
Ward, J. (2008). White normativity: The cultural dimensions of whiteness in a racially diverse 
LGBT organization. Sociological Perspectives, 51(3), 563-586. 
111 
 
Ward, C., & Masgoret, A. M. (2008). Attitudes toward immigrants, immigration, and 
multiculturalism in New Zealand: A social psychological analysis 1. International 
Migration Review, 42(1), 227-248. 
Whitley Jr, B. E., & Webster, G. D. (2018). The Relationships of Intergroup Ideologies to Ethnic 
Prejudice: A Meta-Analysis. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 1 – 31. 
Wilder, D. A. (1981). Perceiving persons as a group: Categorization and intergroup relations. 
Cognitive processes in stereotyping and intergroup behavior, 213(1), 258. 
Wolsko, C., Park, B., Judd, C. M., & Wittenbrink, B. (2000). Framing interethnic ideology: 
effects of multicultural and color-blind perspectives on judgments of groups and 
individuals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78(4), 635. 
Wolsko, C., Park, B., & Judd, C. M. (2006). Considering the tower of Babel: Correlates of 
assimilation and multiculturalism among ethnic minority and majority groups in the 
United States. Social Justice Research, 19(3), 277-306. 
Yogeeswaran, K., & Dasgupta, N. (2014). The devil is in the details: Abstract versus concrete  
construals of multiculturalism differentially impact intergroup relations. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 106(5), 772-789. 
Zirkel, S. (2008). The influence of multicultural educational practices on student outcomes and  










































Qualitative Codes  
A. Themes of normative multiculturalism.   
1. Differences: to what extent does the participant emphasize differences related to identity of 
people? 
2. Similarities: to what extent does the participant focus on similarities of people? 
B. Themes of critical multiculturalism.  
1. Structural disadvantage: participant discussed understanding different cultural perspectives 
that are a result of structural disadvantage (i.e. country wasn’t built for them, barriers, 
experiences of other people, racism, exclusion from institutions).  
2. Whiteness: participant discussed whiteness, white racialization, white privilege/privilege, etc.  
3. Racism/Oppression: participant discussed racism, oppression or overcoming barriers when 











































Study 1 Interrater Reliability and Descriptive Statistics for Differences and Celebration 
Themes  
 Average Measures ICC 95% CI interval M SD Median 
  Lower Upper    
Differences .546 .046 .754 1.80 1.13 2.0 



















  Lower Upper     
Structural 
Disadvantage 
.313 -.036 .662 170 95.5% 7 3.9% 
Whiteness .394 -.147 .935 176 98.9% 1 0.6% 
Racism/Oppression .702 .426 .978 170 95.5% 6 3.4% 













































Study 1 Standard Multiple Regression Analysis for Variables predicting Policy Endorsement  
Model  b SE B β t sr2 
Constant 0.47 0.38  1.24  
CB -0.05 0.04 -0.04 -1.07 .001 
MC** 0.25 0.10 0.22 2.67 .009 
CMC*** 0.65 0.08 0.64 7.79 .076 
Explore  -0.00 0.06 -0.00 -0.06 .000 
NatID 0.12 0.08 0.08 1.57 .003 
Conservatism** -0.13 0.04 -0.15 -3.20 .013 
Note. The dependent value was social justice policy. R2 = .788, Adjusted R2 = .780. CB = colorblind 
ideology measure; MC = multiculturalism measure; CMC = critical multiculturalism measure; 
Conservatism = political conservatism; Explore = national identity exploration; NatID = national 
identification attachment; *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. sr2 = semipartial correlation coefficient 







































Study 2 Standard Multiple Regression Analysis predicting Common Identity Policy Endorsement  
Model  b SE B β t sr2 
Constant 1.33 0.56  2.38  
CB*** 0.25 0.06 0.25 4.38 .053 
MC 0.07 0.12 0.06 0.59 .001 
CMC* -0.27 0.12 -0.26 -2.36 .015 
Explore*  0.17 0.08 0.14 2.18 .013 
NatID 0.11 0.09 0.08 1.16 .004 
Conservatism*** 0.30 0.06 0.37 5.49 .083 
Note. The dependent value was common identity policy. R2 = .515, Adjusted R2 = .498. CB = colorblind 
ideology; MC = multiculturalism; CMC = critical multiculturalism; Conservatism= political 
conservatism, higher values indicate more politically conservative; Explore = national identification 
exploration; NatID = national identification attachment. sr2 is the squared semi-partial correlation. *p 






































Study 2 Standard Multiple Regression Analysis predicting Diversity Appreciation Policy Endorsement  
Model  b SE B β t sr2 
Constant 1.59 0.35  4.55  
CB 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.23 .000 
MC*** 0.32 0.08 0.34 4.21 .030 
CMC*** 0.33 0.07 0.38 4.51 .034 
Explore**  0.15 0.05 0.15 3.02 .015 
NatID*** -0.28 0.06 -0.26 -4.68 .037 
Conservatism -0.07 0.03 -0.10 -1.88 .006 
Note. The dependent value was diversity appreciation policy. R2 = .705, Adjusted R2 = .695. CB = 
colorblind ideology; MC = multiculturalism; CMC = critical multiculturalism; Conservatism= political 
conservatism, higher values indicate more politically conservative; Explore = national identification 
exploration; NatID = national identification attachment. sr2 is the squared semi-partial correlation. *p 





































Study 2 Standard Multiple Regression Analysis predicting Social Justice Policy Endorsement  
Model  b SE B β t sr2 
Constant 2.56 0.38  6.78  
CB -0.01 0.04 -0.02 -0.35 .000 
MC 0.12 0.08 0.13 1.51 .004 
CMC*** 0.45 0.08 0.51 5.73 .061 
Explore  0.10 0.06 0.10 1.86 .006 
NatID*** -0.28 0.06 -0.26 -4.47 .037 
Conservatism* -0.11 0.04 -0.16 -2.82 .015 
Note. The dependent value was social justice policy. R2 = .676, Adjusted R2 = .665. CB = colorblind 
ideology; MC = multiculturalism; CMC = critical multiculturalism; Conservatism= political 
conservatism, higher values indicate more politically conservative; Explore = national identification 
exploration; NatID = national identification attachment. sr2 is the squared semi-partial correlation. *p 




































Study 2 Standard Multiple Regression Analysis predicting Affirmative Action Policy Endorsement  
Model  b SE B β t sr2 
Constant  1.73 0.50   3.44  
CB* -0.11 0.05 -0.11 -2.09 .011 
MC  0.20 0.11  0.19  1.89 .009 
CMC***  0.45 0.10  0.45  4.38 .048 
Explore   0.05 0.07  0.04  0.66 .001 
NatID -0.12 0.08 -0.10 -1.42 .000 
Conservatism* -0.10 0.05 -0.13 -2.06 .010 
Note. The dependent value was affirmative action policy. R2 = .565, Adjusted R2 = .550. CB = 
colorblind ideology; MC = multiculturalism; CMC = critical multiculturalism; Conservatism= political 
conservatism, higher values indicate more politically conservative; Explore = national identification 
exploration; NatID = national identification attachment. sr2 is the squared semi-partial correlation. *p 





































Study 2 Standard Multiple Regression Analysis predicting Awareness of Race and Privilege 
Model  b SE B β t sr2 
Constant 3.08 0.64  4.80  
CB*** -0.24 0.07 0.20 3.67 .034 
MC -0.16 0.14 0.12 1.15 .003 
CMC*** 0.58 0.13 -0.46 -4.42 .050 
Explore  0.14 0.09 -0.09 -1.47 .005 
NatID* -0.27 0.11 0.17 2.50 .016 
Conservatism*** -0.29 0.06 0.30 4.62 .054 
Note. The dependent value was unawareness of race and privilege. R2 = .551, Adjusted R2 = .536. CB = 
colorblind ideology; MC = multiculturalism; CMC = critical multiculturalism; Conservatism= political 
conservatism, higher values indicate more politically conservative; Explore = national identification 
exploration; NatID = national identification attachment. sr2 is the squared semi-partial correlation. *p 





































Study 2 Indirect Effects and Lower and Upper Confidence Intervals for each Mediation Model 
 Indirect effect coefficient 
 CB through CoBRAS MC through CoBRAS CMC through CoBRAS 
Common identity 
policy 
.40 [.0066 to .0912]* -.03 [-.0082 to .1105] -.10 [-.2136 to -.0148]* 
Diversity appreciation 
policy  
-.02 [-.0554 to .0033] 
 
-.02 [-.0694 to .0043] .05 [-.0105 to .1253] 
Social justice policy  -.05 [-.0860 to -.0172]* 
 
-.03 [-.1000 to .0128] .11 [.0471 to .1997]* 
Note. Numbers in brackets are lower and upper confidence intervals. CB = colorblind ideology; MC = 
multiculturalism; CMC = critical multiculturalism. COBRAS = awareness of racism and privilege. CB 
through CoBRAS = indirect effect of colorblind ideology through CoBRAS; MC through CoBRAS = 
indirect effect of colorblind ideology of multiculturalism through CoBRAS; CMC through CoBRAS = 





































Study 3 Analysis of Variance of Diversity Ideologies, Policy Measures, by Manipulations  
 CB cond.  MC cond.  CMC cond.  F  p h2 
Dependent Variables M  SD M  SD M  SD    
CB 5.49f 1.31 5.27g 1.42 4.86f,g 1.57 4.72 .010 .033 
MC 5.24 1.40 5.33 1.19 5.27 1.28 0.12 .884 .001 
CMC 4.92 1.64 5.16 1.30 5.15 1.62 0.75 .475 .005 
Common Identity 
policy 
3.77 1.40 3.45 1.45 3.60 1.57 1.12 .326 .008 
Diversity appreciation 
policy 
4.40 1.32 4.63 0.93 4.54 1.15 1.00 .369 .007 
Social justice policy 4.27 1.34 4.47 1.03 4.48 1.32 0.91 .405 .006 
Note. degrees of freedom for all analyses = (2, 278); CB = colorblind ideology; MC = multiculturalism; 
CMC = critical multiculturalism; CB cond = colorblind manipulation condition, MC cond. = 
multicultural manipulation condition, CMC condition = critical multiculturalism manipulation 
condition; simple contrast results: f= significant difference between CB and CMC conditions, p = .003, 







































Study 3 Standard Multiple Regression Analysis of Variables predicting Common-identity Policy 
Endorsement  
Model  b SE B β t sr2 
Constant 1.29 0.47   2.77  
Explore* 0.13 0.07 0.11  1.97 .008 
NatID 0.02 0.08 0.02  0.32 .000 
Conservatism*** 0.33 0.09 0.38  6.76 .096 
CB*** 0.28 0.05 0.27  5.38 .061 
MC -0.08 0.11 -0.07 -0.74 .001 
CMC -0.10 0.09 -0.10  -1.02 .002 
Note. R2 = .425, Adjusted R2 = .413. CB = colorblind ideology; MC = multiculturalism; CMC = critical 
multiculturalism; Conservatism = political conservatism, higher values indicate more conservatism; 
Explore = national identification exploration; NatID = national identification attachment . sr2 is the 






































Study 3 Standard Multiple Regression  Analysis predicting Diversity Appreciation Policy Endorsement  
Model  b SE B β t sr2 
Constant  1.46 0.32    4.57  
Explore  0.03 0.05  0.03   0.58 .001 
NatID -0.04 0.05 -0.04  -0.74 .001 
Conservatism -0.04 0.03 -0.07  -1.34 .003 
CB 0.00 0.04 0.00  -0.01 .000 
MC***  0.51 0.08  0.57   6.81 .076 
CMC  0.11 0.07  0.15   1.75 .005 
Note. R2 = .550, Adjusted R2 = .540. CB = colorblind ideology; MC = multiculturalism; CMC = critical 
multiculturalism; Conservatism = political conservatism, higher values indicate more conservatism; 
Explore = national identification exploration; NatID = national identification attachment. sr2 is the 





































Study 3 Standard Multiple Regression Analysis predicting Social Justice Policy Endorsement  
Model  b SE B β t sr2 
Constant  2.13 0.27    7.78  
Explore  0.02 0.04  0.02   0.47 .000 
NatID -0.06 0.04 -0.05  -1.31 .002 
Conservatism*** -0.18 0.03 -0.25 -6.47 .043 
CB -0.01 0.03 -0.01  -0.21 .000 
MC*  0.17 0.06  0.17   2.62 .007 
CMC***  0.44 0.06  0.54   7.91 .065 
Note. R2 = .718, Adjusted R2 = .712. CB = colorblind ideology; MC = multiculturalism; CMC = critical 
multiculturalism; Conservatism = political conservatism, higher values indicate more conservatism; 
Explore = national identification exploration; NatID = national identification attachment. sr2 is the 





Means and Standard Deviations of Aggregated Analysis Across all Studies 
 Asian (n = 53) Black (n = 72) Latinx (n = 46) White (n = 642) Total (N = 813) 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
CB 5.15 1.42 5.08 1.45 5.41 1.04 5.13 1.33 5.14 1.33 
MC 5.78a 1.01 5.79b 1.00 5.74c 1.08 5.25a,b,c 1.28 5.36 1.25 
CMC 5.50 1.12 5.67d 1.08 5.63e 1.23 4.99d,e 1.48 5.12 1.44 
Note. CB = colorblind ideology; MC = multiculturalism; CMC = critical multiculturalism. Post-hoc 
Tukey results indicated significant difference for multiculturalism between: a  = White and Asian; b = 
White and Black participants; c = White and Latinx participants. Post-hoc Tukey results indicated 





























































Figure 1. Theoretical model of awareness of racism and privilege as mediator between diversity 
ideologies predicting each of the policy outcomes. The diversity ideologies entered the model 
simultaneously but were tested with policy outcomes in three separate models. Path coefficients of each 
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Figure 2. The mediating effect of awareness of race and privilege in the relationship between colorblind 
ideology, multiculturalism, and critical multiculturalism and common-identity policy endorsement. 
Notes. CB = colorblind ideology; MC = multiculturalism; CMC = critical multiculturalism; *p < .05, 
**p < .01, ***p < .001; All presented effects are unstandardized; an  is the effect of the three diversity 
ideologies on awareness of racism and privilege; b is the effect of awareness of racism and privilege on 
common-identity policy endorsement; c’ is the direct effect of each of the diversity ideologies on 
common-identity policy endorsement; c is the total effect of each of the diversity ideologies on CB 
policy endorsement.  
 
 
Indirect effects with lower and upper confidence  
intervals; *indicates significant indirect effect.  
CB through awareness of racism and 
privilege: .04 [.0066 to .0912]* 
MC through awareness of racism and 
privilege: .03 [-.0082 to .1105] 
CMC through awareness of racism and privilege: 











a1 = -.24** 





a2 = -.16  
a3 = .58***  
c1 = .25***, c¢ 
= .21** c2=.07, c¢ = .04 































Figure 3. The mediating effect of awareness of race and privilege in the relationship between colorblind 
ideology, multiculturalism, and critical multiculturalism and diversity awareness policy endorsement (N = 
183). Notes. CB = colorblind ideology; MC = multiculturalism; CMC = critical multiculturalism; *p 
< .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001; All presented effects are unstandardized; an  is the effect of the three 
diversity ideologies on awareness of racism and privilege; b is the effect of awareness of racism and 
privilege on diversity awareness policy endorsement policy endorsement; c’ is the direct effect of each of 
the diversity ideologies on diversity awareness policy endorsement; c is the total effect of each of the 













a1 = -.24** 
  





a2 = -.16 
  
a3 = .58*** 
c1 = .01, c¢ = .03 
 c2=.32***, c¢ = .33*** 
 
c3= .33***, c¢ = .28** 
 
Indirect effects with lower and upper confidence 
intervals; *indicates significant indirect effect.  
CB through awareness of racism and privilege: 
-.02 [-.0554 to .0033] 
MC through awareness of racism and privilege: 
-.01 [-.0694 to .0043] 
CMC through awareness of racism and 






























Figure 4. The mediating effect of awareness of race and privilege in the relationship between 
colorblind ideology, multiculturalism, and critical multiculturalism and social justice policy 
endorsement. Notes. CB = colorblind ideology; MC = multiculturalism; CMC = critical 
multiculturalism; *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001; All presented effects are unstandardized; an  is the 
effect of the three diversity ideologies on awareness of racism and privilege; b is the effect of 
awareness of racism and privilege on social justice policy endorsement policy endorsement; c’ is the 
direct effect of each of the diversity ideologies on social justice policy endorsement; c is the total 










 a1 = -.24**  





a2 = -.16 
  
a3 = .58*** 
  
c1 = -.01, c¢ = .03 
 
c2=.12, c¢ = .15, p=.052 
 
c3= .45***, c¢ = .34*** 
 
Indirect effects with lower and upper confidence 
intervals; *indicates significant indirect effect.  
CB through awareness of racism and privilege: 
-.04 [-.0860 to -.0172]* 
MC through awareness of racism and privilege: 
-.03 [-.1000 to .0128] 






Appendix A  
Full set of materials for Study 1  
 
What is Multiculturalism? 
 
Instructions: There is lots of discussion about multiculturalism in the U.S. People tend to 
understand multiculturalism in many ways. We are interested in how you understand what 
multiculturalism means to you. 
 







































Diversity Ideology Endorsement 
 
Instructions: Many people have different beliefs about living in a just and peaceful society. 
Please read each statement and indicate to the extent to which you agree about the importance of 
each statement for a just and peaceful society. There are no correct answers to these items; we 
are just interested in your opinions. 
 
In order to have a peaceful and just society … 
 
1. We must stop obsessing so much about race and ethnicity. [CB] 
2. We must appreciate the unique characteristics of different racial and ethnic groups. [MC] 
3. We must appreciate the unique experiences of oppression that different racial and ethnic 
groups have suffered. [CMC] 
4. Everyone must remember that we’re all just human and not become preoccupied with 
race and ethnicity.[CB] 
5. Everyone must learn the unique histories and cultural experiences of different racial and 
ethnic groups.[MC] 
6. Everyone must learn the history of racism (e.g., colonization and enslavement) that has 
characterized American society.[CMC] 
7. It is important during social interaction to remember that putting racial and ethnic labels 
on people obscures the fact that everyone is a unique individual.[CB] 
8. It is important during social interaction to consider the history and cultural traditions of 
different groups.[MC] 
9. It is important during social interaction to consider group differences in power and 
privilege.[CMC] 
10. We must recognize that race and ethnicity are artificial labels that keep people from 
thinking freely as individuals.[CB] 
11.  We must recognize that each racial and ethnic group has the right to maintain its own 
unique traditions.[MC] 
12. We must redefine the norms of American society to match the diversity of cultural groups 
in it.[CMC] 
13. We must learn about the similarities between racial and ethnic groups.[CB] 
14. We must learn about the ways that different racial and ethnic groups resolve 
conflict.[MC] 
15.  We must learn about the ways that different racial and ethnic groups struggle against 













Social Justice Policy Measure 
 
Instructions: Please indicate how likely you are to endorse the following public policies. There is 
no correct answers to these items. We are just interested in your opinions. 
 
1. I believe that public schools should provide students of underrepresented cultural groups 
to gain access to historical materials from their own cultural groups.  
 
2. I believe that public school systems should provide the choice for children of all cultural 
groups to be educated in the culture of their own groups if their parents so desire.  
 
3. I support the allocation of public funds to break the link between poverty, education, and 
ethnicity in our country to cultivate fairer access to resources for those undermined.  
 
4. I support the allocations of public funds for public space, including air space on 
television and radio to accommodate all cultural groups.  
 
5. I support that customs and practices of different cultural groups (e.g. religious holidays, 
wearing a head scare to cover one’s hair, etc.) should be recognized by law. 
 
6. I support the allocation of public funds for autonomous cultural institutions such as 
communal charities, libraries and museums.  
 
7. I believe that public schools should educate children to be familiar with and cultivate 
























National Identity Exploration  
 
Instructions: Please use the scale below to indicate how much you agree with each statement. 
There are no correct answers to these items; we are just interested in your opinions. 
 
1. I have spent time trying to find out more about American history and traditions  
 
2. I have often talked to other people to learn their views about what it means to be 
American.  
 
3. I enthusiastically participate in holidays, festivals, and other practices associated with 
American history and culture.  
 
4. I enjoy the chance to visit monuments, museums, and other sites to better understand 
what it means to be American.  
 
































National Identity  
 
Instructions: Please use the scale below to indicate how much you agree with each statement. 
There are no correct answers to these items; we are just interested in your opinions. 
 
Centrality 
1. I often think about the fact that I am an American.  
2. Overall, being an American has little to do with how I feel about myself* 
3. In general, the fact that I am an American is an important part of my self image  
4. The fact that I am an American rarely enters my mind.* 
 
Affect 
5. In general, I am glad to be an American.  
6. I often regret that I am an American* 
7. I don’t feel good about being an American.* 
8. Generally, I feel good when I think about myself as an American.  
 
Ingroup Ties 
9. I have a lot in common with other Americans.  
10. I feel strong ties to other Americans  
11. I find it difficult to form a bond with other Americans*  
12. I don’t feel a sense of being “connected” with other Americans* 
 



























Instructions: Please reach each question and indicate the appropriate response. 
 
1. What is your age? ________ 
 





__ Something not listed: _______________ 
 
3. Please indicate your race/ethnicity: 
__ American Indian/Alaskan Native 
__ Asian or Pacific Islander 
__ Black, not of Hispanic Origin 
__ Latino/Hispanic 
__White, not of Hispanic Origin 
__Multi-ethnic 
__Something not listed: ______________ 
 
4. Resident Status: 
__ U.S. Citizen 
__ Permanent Resident 
__ Foreign Exchange Student 
__ Something not listed: ________________ 
 
5. Specifically, with regard to economic issues, and setting social issues aside, how would 
you describe your political orientation? 
 
o o o o o o o 
Very 
Liberal 
     Very 
Conservative 
 
6. Specifically, with regard to social issues, and setting economic issues aside, how would 
you describe your political orientation? 
 
o o o o o o o 
Very 
Liberal 
     Very 
Conservative 
 
7. Please indicate what religious category you identify with: ________________________ 
 




0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at 
all  
     Very 
Much 
 
8. What is the highest educational degree you have completed? 
___some high school, did not graduate  
___ High school GED or alternative credential 
___High school diploma  
___some college  
___Associates degree (e.g. AA, AS)  
___Bachelor’s degree (e.g. BA, BS) 
___Master’s degree (e.g. MA MS, Meng, Med, MSW, MBA) 
___Professional degree beyond a Bachelor’s degree (e.g. MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD) 
___Doctorate degree (e.g. PhD, EdD) 
 
9. From the choices listed below, please choose the best range that describes the income you 
earned in the past 12 months: 
___less than $20,000 
___$20,001 – 40,000 
___$40,001 – 60,000 
___$60,001 – 80,000 
___$80,0001 – 100,000 
___$100,001 – 250,000 

























More Information about the Study  
 
Thank you very much for completing this study. As you read in the consent portion, we are 
conducting this study to better understand people’s beliefs and attitudes about current social 
issues. Specifically, we were interested what multiculturalism means to people. First, we asked 
you to write about what multiculturalism means to you. Next, we had you respond to a survey to 
better understand what type of diversity ideologies (e.g. colorblindness, multiculturalism, and 
critical multiculturalism) people generally endorse. We were interested in whether people's 
conceptualizations of multiculturalism is similar to the type of diversity ideology they endorsed. 
Lastly, we also asked you to complete several other surveys regarding your identity and some 
demographic questions.  
 
We did not tell you about these details at the beginning of the study because we wanted to avoid 
well documented response biases (i.e., when participant responses are influenced by anything 
other than their own inclinations). Studies have shown that a number of response biases will 
occur in experiments if participants are aware of the true purposes of the study. For example, 
participants may respond in a way they think will confirm the study’s hypothesis in an effort to 
be helpful to the researcher. But in the end, such responses will result in invalid data however 
well motivated. By withholding the true purpose of the study, we hope to prevent this type of 
response bias from occurring. We hope that you understand the reasons why we did not fully 
inform you about all details of the study. We did not withhold information to trick you; instead, 
we did so to protect the integrity of the research. 
 
Now that we have more completely informed you about the design and hypotheses of the 
research, we remind you that have the opportunity to withdraw your responses from the study 
without any loss of credit or other penalty. If you no longer agree to let us include your responses 
in the analyses and results of our research, then you can inform us now by checking the box 
below, and we will delete your responses completely without any penalty to you (i.e., you will 
still receive payment for participation). Otherwise, we will include your anonymous responses 
with other anonymous responses in the analyses and reporting of this research. 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about the study, please do not hesitate to contact Dr. 
Glenn Adams (adamsg@ku.edu) or Pegah Naemi (pnaemi@ku.edu). Again, thank you very 
much for your participation. 
 
Glenn Adams, Ph.D.       Pegah Naemi, M.A. 
adamsg@ku.edu                     pnaemi@ku.edu 
 
At this time, you have the option of withdrawing your responses. Please select the option below 
to indicate your permission to let us include your responses in our analyses or to indicate your 
wish to withdraw your responses. Regardless of your choice, you will receive information on the 
next page regarding the completion code to receive payment. 
 
_____I AGREE to have my responses INCLUDED in the analyses and results of the research 
 
_____I wish to WITHDRAW my responses, and I do NOT want the researchers to include them 




Full set of materials for Study 2  
 
Diversity Ideology Endorsement 
 
Instructions: Many people have different beliefs about living in a just and peaceful society. 
Please read each statement and indicate to the extent to which you agree about the importance of 
each statement for a just and peaceful society. There are no correct answers to these items; we 
are just interested in your opinions. 
 
In order to have a peaceful and just society … 
 
16. We must stop obsessing so much about race and ethnicity. [CB] 
17. We must appreciate the unique characteristics of different racial and ethnic groups. [MC] 
18. We must appreciate the unique experiences of oppression that different racial and ethnic 
groups have suffered. [CMC] 
19. Everyone must remember that we’re all just human and not become preoccupied with 
race and ethnicity.[CB] 
20. Everyone must learn the unique histories and cultural experiences of different racial and 
ethnic groups.[MC] 
21. Everyone must learn the history of racism (e.g., colonization and enslavement) that has 
characterized American society.[CMC] 
22. It is important during social interaction to remember that putting racial and ethnic labels 
on people obscures the fact that everyone is a unique individual.[CB] 
23. It is important during social interaction to consider the history and cultural traditions of 
different groups.[MC] 
24. It is important during social interaction to consider group differences in power and 
privilege.[CMC] 
25. We must recognize that race and ethnicity are artificial labels that keep people from 
thinking freely as individuals.[CB] 
26.  We must recognize that each racial and ethnic group has the right to maintain its own 
unique traditions.[MC] 
27. We must redefine the norms of American society to match the diversity of cultural groups 
in it.[CMC] 
28. We must learn about the similarities between racial and ethnic groups.[CB] 
29. We must learn about the ways that different racial and ethnic groups resolve 
conflict.[MC] 
30.  We must learn about the ways that different racial and ethnic groups struggle against 












Instructions: Please use a scale from 0 (not at all) to 5 (very much) to indicate the extent to which 
you endorse the following policies. There are no right or wrong answers; we are just interested in 
your opinion about each.  
 
To what extent to do you endorse policies that… 
 
8. Restrict immigration based on merit considerations to applicants who contribute critical 
skill and pass rigorous background checks (i.e., extreme vetting). [CB policy] 
 
9. Expand immigration to people from all world regions to increase the vibrant diversity of 
U.S. society. [MC policy]  
 
10. Change immigration priorities to emphasize economic, political, and environmental 
refugees who are fleeing violence and injustice. [CMC policy]  
 
11. Require people to demonstrate legal residence and English proficiency in order to gain 
access to government services or benefits. [CB policy]  
 
12. Require public schools systems to support parents who wish to educate children in 
heritage cultural traditions (e.g. history, language, literature). [MC policy]  
 
13. Prohibit racial profiling in law enforcement: that is, the use of demographic features as 
justification for traffic stops or searchers (e.g. “stop-and-frisk). [CMC policy]  
 
14. Require people to present proof of citizenship or government-issued ID to vote in 
elections.  [CB policy]  
 
15. Protect the right of immigrants to maintain customs and practices associated with heritage 
cultural traditions (e.g. religious holidays, wearing head scarfs, etc.). [MC policy]  
 
16. Protect communities of color from violence by police, school security personnel, 
Immigration Customs Enforcement, and other law enforcement personnel. [CMC policy]  
 
17. Require organizations to make decisions about admissions, employment, or promotion on 
an “identity-blind” basis without taking into account racial or ethnic background. [CB 
policy]  
 
18. Ensure equal representation of a variety of cultural traditions in public education 
institutions (e.g. libraries and museums) of American society. [MC policy] 
 
19. Require judicial review of legislative districts to ensure they do not disenfranchise (i.e. 




20. Give priority to core or mainstream American themes (rather than diversity for its own 
sake) in public education and arts institutions. [CB policy] 
 
21. Support the creative traditions (e.g. art, music, literature, etc.) associated with a broad set 
of cultural communities. [MC policy]  
 
22. Expand government investment in communities of color as a form of reparation for past 
and present injustices. [CMC policy]  
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Affirmative Action Scale 
Instructions: Please use a scale from 0 (not at all) to 5 (very much) to indicate the extent to which 
you endorse the following policies. There are no right or wrong answers; we are just interested in 
your opinion about each.  
 
In my opinion, the primary basis of affirmative action policies should be… 
1. to foster inclusion of people who are economically disadvantaged (e.g., first generation 
college student, poverty) regardless of racial and cultural identity.  
 
2. to ensure that important social institutions reflect and benefit from the cultural diversity of 
U.S. society.  
 
3. to ensure recruitment and retention of people from racial and cultural communities who have 
suffered from a history of exclusion and disempowerment.   
 
4. nothing: I believe that we should end the use of affirmative action policies as a means to 




* reverse-coded items – higher scores indicate higher affirmative action policy endorsement  
147 
 
Colorblind Racial Attitudes Scale – Race and Privilege subscale 
 
Instructions: Please use a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) to indicate the 
extent to which you agree with the following statements. There are no right or wrong 
answers; we are just interested in your opinion about each. 
  
1. White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin.* 
2. Race is very important in determining who is successful and who is not.* 
3. Race plays an important role in who gets sent to prison.* 
4. Race plays a major role in the type of social services (such as type of health care or day 
care) that people receive in the U.S.* 
5. Racial and ethnic minorities do not have the same opportunities as white people in the 
U.S.* 
6. Everyone who works hard, no matter what race they are, has an equal chance to become 
rich. 
7. White people are more to blame for racial discrimination than racial and ethnic 
minorities.* 
 






























National Identity Exploration  
 
Instructions: Please use the scale below to indicate how much you agree with each statement. 
There are no correct answers to these items; we are just interested in your opinions. 
 
5. I have spent time trying to find out more about American history and traditions  
 
6. I have often talked to other people to learn their views about what it means to be 
American.  
 
7. I enthusiastically participate in holidays, festivals, and other practices associated with 
American history and culture.  
 
8. I enjoy the chance to visit monuments, museums, and other sites to better understand 
what it means to be American.  
 
































National Identity  
 
Instructions: Please use the scale below to indicate how much you agree with each statement. 
There are no correct answers to these items; we are just interested in your opinions. 
 
Centrality 
13. I often think about the fact that I am an American.  
14. Overall, being an American has little to do with how I feel about myself* 
15. In general, the fact that I am an American is an important part of my self image  
16. The fact that I am an American rarely enters my mind.* 
 
Affect 
17. In general, I am glad to be an American.  
18. I often regret that I am an American* 
19. I don’t feel good about being an American.* 
20. Generally, I feel good when I think about myself as an American.  
 
Ingroup Ties 
21. I have a lot in common with other Americans.  
22. I feel strong ties to other Americans  
23. I find it difficult to form a bond with other Americans*  
24. I don’t feel a sense of being “connected” with other Americans* 
 




























Instructions: Please reach each question and indicate the appropriate response. 
 
10. What is your age? ________ 
 





__ Something not listed: _______________ 
 
12. Please indicate your race/ethnicity: 
__ American Indian/Alaskan Native 
__ Asian or Pacific Islander 
__ Black, not of Hispanic Origin 
__ Latino/Hispanic 
__White, not of Hispanic Origin 
__Multi-ethnic 
__Something not listed: ______________ 
 
13. Resident Status: 
__ U.S. Citizen 
__ Permanent Resident 
__ Foreign Exchange Student 
__ Something not listed: ________________ 
 
14. Specifically, with regard to economic issues, and setting social issues aside, how would 
you describe your political orientation? 
 
o o o o o o o 
Very 
Liberal 
     Very 
Conservative 
 
15. Specifically, with regard to social issues, and setting economic issues aside, how would 
you describe your political orientation? 
 
o o o o o o o 
Very 
Liberal 
     Very 
Conservative 
 
16. Please indicate what religious category you identify with: ________________________ 
 




0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at 
all  
     Very 
Much 
 
17. What is the highest educational degree you have completed? 
___some high school, did not graduate  
___ High school GED or alternative credential 
___High school diploma  
___some college  
___Associates degree (e.g. AA, AS)  
___Bachelor’s degree (e.g. BA, BS) 
___Master’s degree (e.g. MA MS, Meng, Med, MSW, MBA) 
___Professional degree beyond a Bachelor’s degree (e.g. MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD) 
___Doctorate degree (e.g. PhD, EdD) 
 
18. From the choices listed below, please choose the best range that describes the income you 
earned in the past 12 months: 
___less than $20,000 
___$20,001 – 40,000 
___$40,001 – 60,000 
___$60,001 – 80,000 
___$80,0001 – 100,000 
___$100,001 – 250,000 
























More Information about the Study  
 
 Thank you very much for completing this study. As you read in the consent portion, we are 
conducting this study to better understand people’s beliefs and attitudes about current social 
issues and policies. Specifically, we were interested in how people's endorsement of different 
diversity ideologies are related to their perceptions of various policies. First, we had you respond 
to a survey to better understand what type of diversity ideologies (e.g. colorblindness, 
multiculturalism, and critical multiculturalism) people generally endorse.  Next, we had you 
asked about your perceptions of various public policies. We were interested in how different 
endorsement of diversity ideologies are related to various public policies.  Lastly, we also asked 
you to complete several other surveys regarding your identity and some demographic questions.  
 
We did not tell you about these details at the beginning of the study because we wanted to avoid 
well documented response biases (i.e., when participant responses are influenced by anything 
other than their own inclinations). Studies have shown that a number of response biases will 
occur in experiments if participants are aware of the true purposes of the study. For example, 
participants may respond in a way they think will confirm the study’s hypothesis in an effort to 
be helpful to the researcher. But in the end, such responses will result in invalid data however 
well motivated. By withholding the true purpose of the study, we hope to prevent this type of 
response bias from occurring. We hope that you understand the reasons why we did not fully 
inform you about all details of the study. We did not withhold information to trick you; instead, 
we did so to protect the integrity of the research. 
 
Now that we have more completely informed you about the design and hypotheses of the 
research, we remind you that have the opportunity to withdraw your responses from the study 
without any loss of credit or other penalty. If you no longer agree to let us include your responses 
in the analyses and results of our research, then you can inform us now by checking the box 
below, and we will delete your responses completely without any penalty to you (i.e., you will 
still receive payment for participation). Otherwise, we will include your anonymous responses 
with other anonymous responses in the analyses and reporting of this research. 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about the study, please do not hesitate to contact Dr. 
Glenn Adams (adamsg@ku.edu) or Pegah Naemi (pnaemi@ku.edu). Again, thank you very 
much for your participation. 
 
Glenn Adams, Ph.D.       Pegah Naemi, M.A. 
adamsg@ku.edu                     pnaemi@ku.edu 
 
At this time, you have the option of withdrawing your responses. Please select the option below 
to indicate your permission to let us include your responses in our analyses or to indicate your 
wish to withdraw your responses. Regardless of your choice, you will receive information on the 
next page regarding the completion code to receive payment. 
 
_____I AGREE to have my responses INCLUDED in the analyses and results of the research 
 
_____I wish to WITHDRAW my responses, and I do NOT want the researchers to include them in the analyses and 




Full set of materials for Study 3 
 
Diversity Ideology Manipulations  
 
INSTRUCTIONS: This study is part of a larger program of research in which we are interested 
in people's impression of various issues pertaining to diversity in the United States. You will 
read a passage and then some questions will appear on the page for you to respond to. Please 
read the passage on the next page by clicking "continue." 
 
Colorblind Ideology Manipulation  
Sociologists, psychologists, economists, and political scientists all agree that issues surrounding 
relations between people of different cultures are a major concern for a diverse society such as 
the United States. Social scientists suggest that, in order to make the U.S. as strong and 
successful as possible, we must recognize our shared humanity and emphasize our common 
identity as “Americans”. Different people contribute to the nation through their unique, 
individual abilities, so we must look beyond cultural identity and understand each person as 
a unique individual. We need to de-emphasize our cultural differences and recognize the 
similarities that we share as equal citizens of the U.S. If we celebrate our similarities and our 
shared American identity, we can overcome political divisions and begin work on the difficult 
and important problems (e.g., education, health care, aging population) facing our society. 
 
The bottom line is this: social scientists advise that an emphasis on our common identity is 
essential for long-term peace and prosperity of the United States. Educators and other 
community leaders should develop strategies to celebrate and cultivate respect for our shared 
American identity.  
 
In the space below, please list five reasons why you think the approach to diversity you read 
about will yield benefits for U.S. society. When you finish with this task, a "continue" button 
will shortly appear for you to press to move on to the next page.
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Multiculturalism Manipulation  
Sociologists, psychologists, economists, and political scientists all agree that issues surrounding 
relations between people of different cultures are a major concern for a diverse society such as 
the United States. Social scientists suggest that, in order to make the U.S. as strong and 
successful as possible, we must respect cultural differences and learn to appreciate the strengths 
that different cultural groups bring to the United States. Different cultural groups contribute to 
the nation through the richness of their cultural heritage. By recognizing, respecting, and 
celebrating this diversity, we not only validate the identity of each cultural group but also 
recognize its importance to the social fabric of the nation. If we respect and celebrate our 
differences, we can overcome political divisions and begin work on the difficult and important 
problems (e.g., education, healthcare, aging population) facing our society. 
 
The bottom line is this: social scientists advise that appreciation for cultural differences is 
essential for long-term peace and prosperity of the United States. Educators and other 
community leaders should develop strategies to celebrate and cultivate respect for cultural 
differences. 
 
In the space below, please list five reasons why you think the approach to diversity you read 
about will yield benefits for U.S. society. When you finish with this task, a "continue" button 
will shortly appear for you to press to move on to the next page.
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Critical Multiculturalism Manipulation  
Sociologists, psychologists, economists, and political scientists all agree that issues surrounding 
relations between people of different cultures are a major concern for a diverse society such as 
the United States. Social scientists suggest that, in order to make the U.S. as strong and 
successful as possible, we must recognize the contributions of marginalized cultural groups and 
confront the racism that informs our past and present. U.S. society has a foundation in the violent 
exploitation of people whom the European colonists regarded as “cultural others.” This racist 
legacy persists in cultural domination that privileges White American beliefs and desires over 
other cultural traditions. If we confront our racist legacy and design institutions that reflect the 
strength of our vibrant cultural diversity, we can overcome political divisions and begin work on 
the difficult and important problems (e.g., education, healthcare, aging population) facing our 
society. 
 
The bottom line is this: social scientists advise that we must push beyond mere celebration of 
cultural difference and recognize the ongoing legacy of racism to ensure long-term peace and 
prosperity of the United States. Educators and other community leaders should work hard to 
promote understanding of diversity and privilege in American society. 
 
In the space below, please list five reasons why you think the approach to diversity you read 
about will yield benefits for U.S. society. When you finish with this task, a "continue" button 





Instructions: Please use a scale from 0 (not at all) to 5 (very much) to indicate the extent to which 
you endorse the following policies. There are no right or wrong answers; we are just interested in 
your opinion about each.  
 
To what extent to do you endorse policies that… 
 
23. Require people to demonstrate legal residence and English proficiency in order to gain access 
to government services or benefits. [CB policy] 
 
24. Require public schools systems to support parents who wish to educate children in heritage 
cultural traditions (e.g. history, language, literature). [MC policy]  
 
25.  Protect communities of color from violence by police, school security personnel, 
Immigration Customs Enforcement, and other law enforcement personnel. [CMC policy] 
  
26. Require organizations to make decisions about admissions, employment, or promotion on an 
“identity-blind” basis without taking into account racial or ethnic background. [CB policy] 
  
27. Protect the people’s rights to maintain customs and practices associated with heritage cultural 
traditions (e.g. religious holidays, wearing head scarfs, etc.). [MC policy] 
  
28. Require judicial review of legislative districts to ensure they do not disenfranchise (i.e. dilute 
political expression of) communities of color. [CMC policy] 
  
29. Give priority to core or mainstream American themes (rather than diversity for its own sake) 
in public education and arts institutions. [CB policy] 
 
30. Ensure equal representation of a variety of cultural traditions in public education institutions 
(e.g. libraries and museums) of American society. [MC policy] 
 
31. Change immigration priorities to emphasize economic, political, and environmental refugees 
who are fleeing violence and injustice. [CMC policy] 
  
32. Expand government investment in communities of color as a form of reparation for past and 
present injustices. [CMC policy] 
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Diversity Ideology Endorsement 
 
Instructions: Many people have different beliefs about living in a just and peaceful society. 
Please read each statement and indicate to the extent to which you agree about the importance of 
each statement for a just and peaceful society. There are no correct answers to these items; we 
are just interested in your opinions. 
 
In order to have a peaceful and just society … 
 
31. We must stop obsessing so much about race and ethnicity. [CB] 
32. We must appreciate the unique characteristics of different racial and ethnic groups. [MC] 
33. We must appreciate the unique experiences of oppression that different racial and ethnic 
groups have suffered. [CMC] 
34. Everyone must remember that we’re all just human and not become preoccupied with 
race and ethnicity.[CB] 
35. Everyone must learn the unique histories and cultural experiences of different racial and 
ethnic groups.[MC] 
36. Everyone must learn the history of racism (e.g., colonization and enslavement) that has 
characterized American society.[CMC] 
37. It is important during social interaction to remember that putting racial and ethnic labels 
on people obscures the fact that everyone is a unique individual.[CB] 
38. It is important during social interaction to consider the history and cultural traditions of 
different groups.[MC] 
39. It is important during social interaction to consider group differences in power and 
privilege.[CMC] 
40. We must recognize that race and ethnicity are artificial labels that keep people from 
thinking freely as individuals.[CB] 
41.  We must recognize that each racial and ethnic group has the right to maintain its own 
unique traditions.[MC] 
42. We must redefine the norms of American society to match the diversity of cultural groups 
in it.[CMC] 
43. We must learn about the similarities between racial and ethnic groups.[CB] 
44. We must learn about the ways that different racial and ethnic groups resolve 
conflict.[MC] 
45.  We must learn about the ways that different racial and ethnic groups struggle against 





In the beginning we presented you with a passage discussing an approach to diversity that social 
scientists advocate as essential for long-term peace and prosperity of the United States. Which of 
the following statements best describes the approach you read about? 
 
• Social scientists advise that we emphasize a common identity.  
• Social scientists advise that we appreciate cultural difference.  
• Social scientists advise that we recognize the ongoing legacy of racism.  
• I do not recall. 
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National Identity Exploration  
 
Instructions: Please use the scale below to indicate how much you agree with each statement. 
There are no correct answers to these items; we are just interested in your opinions. 
 
9. I have spent time trying to find out more about American history and traditions  
10. I have often talked to other people to learn their views about what it means to be American.  
11. I enthusiastically participate in holidays, festivals, and other practices associated with 
American history and culture.  
12. I enjoy the chance to visit monuments, museums, and other sites to better understand what it 
means to be American.  
5.   I have often done things to better understand what it means to be American.  
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National Identity  
 
Instructions: Please use the scale below to indicate how much you agree with each statement. 
There are no correct answers to these items; we are just interested in your opinions. 
 
Centrality 
25. I often think about the fact that I am an American.  
26. Overall, being an American has little to do with how I feel about myself* 
27. In general, the fact that I am an American is an important part of my self image  
28. The fact that I am an American rarely enters my mind.* 
 
Affect 
29. In general, I am glad to be an American.  
30. I often regret that I am an American* 
31. I don’t feel good about being an American.* 
32. Generally, I feel good when I think about myself as an American.  
 









Instructions: Please reach each question and indicate the appropriate response. 
 
19. What is your age? ________ 
 





__ Something not listed: _______________ 
 
21. Please indicate your race/ethnicity: 
__ American Indian/Alaskan Native 
__ Asian or Pacific Islander 
__ Black, not of Hispanic Origin 
__ Latino/Hispanic 
__White, not of Hispanic Origin 
__Multi-ethnic 
__Something not listed: ______________ 
 
22. Resident Status: 
__ U.S. Citizen 
__ Permanent Resident 
__ Foreign Exchange Student 
__ Something not listed: ________________ 
 
23. Specifically, with regard to economic issues, and setting social issues aside, how would 
you describe your political orientation? 
 
o o o o o o o 
Very 
Liberal 
     Very 
Conservative 
 
24. Specifically, with regard to social issues, and setting economic issues aside, how would 
you describe your political orientation? 
 
o o o o o o o 
Very 
Liberal 
     Very 
Conservative 
 
25. Please indicate what religious category you identify with: ________________________ 
 




0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at 
all  
     Very 
Much 
 
26. What is the highest educational degree you have completed? 
___some high school, did not graduate  
___ High school GED or alternative credential 
___High school diploma  
___some college  
___Associates degree (e.g. AA, AS)  
___Bachelor’s degree (e.g. BA, BS) 
___Master’s degree (e.g. MA MS, Meng, Med, MSW, MBA) 
___Professional degree beyond a Bachelor’s degree (e.g. MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD) 
___Doctorate degree (e.g. PhD, EdD) 
 
27. From the choices listed below, please choose the best range that describes the income you 
earned in the past 12 months: 
___less than $20,000 
___$20,001 – 40,000 
___$40,001 – 60,000 
___$60,001 – 80,000 
___$80,0001 – 100,000 




More Information about the Study 
 
 Thank you very much for completing this study. As you read in the consent portion, we are 
conducting this study to better understand people’s beliefs and attitudes about current social 
issues. First, we randomly assigned some participants to read one of three passages describing an 
approach to diversity: either colorblind, multicultural, or critical multicultural approaches. Next, 
we had participants write reasons why the diversity approach they read would benefit U.S. 
society. We asked all participants to complete surveys regarding endorsement of different types 
of policies. We were interested in how priming people with different diversity ideologies (e.g. 
colorblindness, multiculturalism, and critical multiculturalism) is related to policy endorsement. 
Theory lead us to hypothesize that people in the critical multicultural ideology condition will be 
more likely to endorse policies that are social justice oriented. Lastly, we also asked you to 
complete several other surveys regarding your identity and some demographic questions. 
 
We did not tell you about these details at the beginning of the study because we wanted to avoid 
well documented response biases (i.e., when participant responses are influenced by anything 
other than their own inclinations). Studies have shown that a number of response biases will 
occur in experiments if participants are aware of the true purposes of the study. For example, 
participants may respond in a way they think will confirm the study’s hypothesis in an effort to 
be helpful to the researcher. But in the end, such responses will result in invalid data however 
well motivated. By withholding the true purpose of the study, we hope to prevent this type of 
response bias from occurring. We hope that you understand the reasons why we did not fully 
inform you about all details of the study. We did not withhold information to trick you; instead, 
we did so to protect the integrity of the research. 
 
Now that we have more completely informed you about the design and hypotheses of the 
research, we remind you that have the opportunity to withdraw your responses from the study 
without any loss of credit or other penalty. If you no longer agree to let us include your responses 
in the analyses and results of our research, then you can inform us now by checking the box 
below, and we will delete your responses completely without any penalty to you (i.e., you will 
still receive payment for participation). Otherwise, we will include your anonymous responses 
with other anonymous responses in the analyses and reporting of this research. 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about the study, please do not hesitate to contact Dr. 
Glenn Adams (adamsg@ku.edu) or Pegah Naemi (pnaemi@ku.edu). Again, thank you very 
much for your participation. 
 
Glenn Adams, Ph.D.       Pegah Naemi, M.A. 
adamsg@ku.edu                     pnaemi@ku.edu 
 
At this time, you have the option of withdrawing your responses. Please select the option below to 
indicate your permission to let us include your responses in our analyses or to indicate your wish to 
withdraw your responses. Regardless of your choice, you will receive information on the next page 
regarding the completion code to receive payment. 
_____I AGREE to have my responses INCLUDED in the analyses and results of the research 
 
_____I wish to WITHDRAW my responses, and I do NOT want the researchers to include them in the analyses and 
results of the research. 
